This must be the day when everything gets sewn up into neat little packages. The Greek government has announced a deal has been reached to secure their second bailout, though one junior partner has not confirmed agreement. The head of the European Central Bank is saying a deal has been done as well.

Greek bailout talks have deadlocked again, but at the moment the culprit is not the hedge funds seeking a higher payout on the distressed debt they bought, but the “troika” of the EU, ECB and the IMF. They gave Greece a Monday deadline to accept bailout terms. And those terms, frankly, are totally insane.

David Ignatius offers two cheers for Mario Draghi, the head of the ECB, for giving away super-cheap money to bankers. These pundits love their banking daddies, don’t they? Ignatius does realize, however, that the real problems in Europe are beside the point of the banking debt crisis. The problem is he thinks the real problem is the lack of an enforceable fiscal union.

When Standard and Poor’s downgraded nine European countries last Friday, they said plainly that European leaders were blinding themselves to the full crisis, ignoring the trade imbalances between core and peripheral Euro nations. But Germany’s Merkel doubled down on austerity, which has created a depression in Greece, with huge risks of default.

The European Central Bank is firing its bazooka and lending massive amounts to European banks, which they can use to purchase Euro government debt that pay higher interest for some easy money. It’s a backdoor way of being the lender of last resort for sovereign debt, while bailing out the banksters.

If European banks need $154 billion in cash to meet new capital requirements and backstop losses on sovereign debt, and investors are unlikely to be a source for raising cash, then banks really have nowhere else to turn except their national governments. And that may get problematic in a hurry.

The 17 countries of the Eurozone formally backed a new deal for fiscal management, one designed to “save the euro” but which can only help if a host of other measures fall into place, including any plan to actually boost growth on the southern periphery.

Earlier in the week, I wrote about how David Cameron wanted to use his leverage as a non-Eurozone member of the EU to wring concessions as a condition of signing treaty changes. At the EU summit, he presented his aims: basically, softening a financial transaction tax that the other countries in Europe want, and other policies that protect British banks. Because you need all 27 members of the EU on board with the preferred fiscal policies that really only affect the 17 countries in the Eurozone, Cameron thought he had the power to hold out. So Cameron vetoed the revisions to the Treaty of Lisbon. And then the Eurozone leadership, essentially France and Germany, went around Britain and negotiated a bunch of Eurozone side deals.

Harold Meyerson confuses them today in an otherwise useful column on how democratic governments are being forced aside due to economic pressures.

The European Central Bank pulled out some of its arsenal today, lowering its benchmark lending rate to 1% and “relaxing” collateral standards for lending to banks. This action highlights the dichotomy between what measures elites will proffer to banks versus what they will give to the people of the affected countries on the European periphery, who had nothing to do with the lending decisions that caused the crisis, certainly not as much as the banks did.