There are three general categories of information about which Cheney hangs Libby out to dry.

These are:

Oppo research conducted during week of June 9, 2003

While not asked directly, Cheney pretended to know nothing about Libby being tasked to collect information on the Wilsons starting the week June 9, 2003. Cheney claimed not to remember the document dump he received on June 9, 2003, compiled by John Hannah. (7) He went on to claim that he might not have seen Wilson’s trip report until after Wilson’s op-ed. (9) But not only did he receive a briefing on this material, but he was trying to get that information released even before the op-ed came out.

Cheney further claimed “he is unaware of anyone in the administration conducting any research or completing a research project on either Joe Wilson or his wife. He advised that he never directed anyone on his staff to conduct such a project and no one advised him they were working on one.” (13) Of course, Libby kept a Wilson folder during the leak period and into the investigative period. Cheney, I guess, claims he knew nothing about that.

This allows Cheney to disconnect his own research at CIA (and elsewhere, probably) into Wilson’s trip from Libby’s activities. While Cheney admitted to having learned of Plame from Tenet (note, I have reasons to doubt this was his only source), he denied discussing Plame with Libby. (13) Yet, Libby reminded Cheney–in October 2003–that there was a note reflecting Cheney informing Libby of Plame’s identity, so not only should Cheney have remembered the event itself, but he should have remembered the reminder.

And Cheney downplayed his involvement in responding to Walter Pincus’ questions about Wilson the week of June 9. “[A]ny press inquiries about the trip that may have been made by Walter Pincus in preparation for his June 2003 article … would have gone to either Libby or Cathie Martin.” (4) However, Cheney and Libby and Martin met on June 11, 2003 at 1:05PM about Pincus’ requests, and from that meeting called Robert Grenier, ostensibly for a first explanation about how the trip had been generated (though at that point both Libby and Cheney almost surely knew of Plame’s identity). Cheney went on to claim he could not remember discussing Plame with Cathie Martin, nor remember Martin telling him that she had learned of Plame’s identity. (11)

Now, frankly, Libby himself never admitted how goal-oriented his actions were during this week. He downplayed the importance of a note, from first thing that Monday morning and just hours after Condi got beat up on ABC News, reflecting learning of Bush’s concern about Wilson’s allegations. Libby himself claimed to have forgotten being told three times that week of Plame’s identity. And Libby also didn’t explain that he and Cheney–at a time when they almost certainly knew of Plame’s identity–called CIA to re-learn it for Cathie Martin’s benefit. So to some extent, Cheney’s denials may help Libby here. And Cheney may be feigning ignorance to protect his sources of Plame’s identity–who are likely not limited (as Cheney claims) to George Tenet. And, if Bush did order Libby to take the lead on this, then Cheney’s forgetfulness may protect Bush here.

Libby’s interactions with journalists, especially during Leak Week

Then there are Cheney’s denials of any knowledge of events from Leak Week–including events that he ordered himself.

Cheney denied making inquiries about Wilson’s contractual relationship with the CIA (a subject that may pertain to a 1999 AQ Khan trip Wilson took), though he did say “someone else might have made such an inquiry.” (13-14). Of course, Libby did make such an inquiry–at a minimum, of David Addington. But he did so on the instructions of Dick Cheney.

Cheney claimed he wasn’t closely involved in Libby’s response to journalists during leak week and before. “He stated that Libby was not required to clear every public statement and press contact because the Vice President had confidence in Libby’s abilities and experience in handling such inquiries. …. He had no specific recollection of any reporters being talked to by Scooter Libby prior to July 14.” (14) Of course, Libby’s notes show Cheney was directing much of this coverage directly, most notably with the Judy Miller meeting and on July 12.

Cheney then claimed he “was not aware of any attempts by Libby to complain to Tim Russert about Chris Matthews’ coverage” (14; the redactions hide references to Matthews and Russert). But Libby had told Cheney of this conversation in October 2003, if not contemporaneously, and Matalin had advised Libby to go to Russert.

Cheney claims to have no memory of directing Libby’s contacts with journalists on July 12, though in this context and in contradiction with earlier statements, he suddenly admitted to sometimes consulting with Libby on such subjects. “Though he cannot recall any specific conversation, he would not be surprised to learn that he had such a discussion with his Chief of Staff. The Vice President advised that he sees Libby several times each day and the two have previously discussed communication strategies for responding to questions from particular journalists.” (18) Just after Cheney claimed not to have directed Libby’s actions, Fitzgerald asked him to read from Libby’s very detailed notes of Cheney’s dictated talking points. Oops.

Even after receiving that document, Cheney blamed Libby for the on the record and deep background instructions in the notes he dictated Libby to use with journalists. “Mr. Libby alone would be the judge of whether or not information was to be presented to any reporters with that caveat [deep background]. … Any decisions about whether Libby, when talking to the media, provides information ‘on the record’ or ‘on background’ are made by Libby himself.” (19-20) Yet, at least according to Libby, Cheney was the one directing what should be on the record and what should be deep background.

Most egregious of these “lapses” in memory, though, is Cheney’s claim to know nothing about Judy Miller. “The Vice President does not recall any member of his staff, including Scooter Libby, meeting with New York Times reporter Judith Miller during the week of 7/7/03, just after publication of Joe Wilson’s editorial in the New York Times.” Libby has the note reflecting Cheney’s order that Libby leak information to Judy at this meeting. And Libby explained that note away (only somewhat plausibly) by saying Cheney instructed him to leak the NIE. Cheney says, though, he “cannot specifically recall having a conversation with Scooter Libby during which Libby advised the Vice President that he wanted to share the key judgments of the NIE with Judith Miller. Although the Vice President cannot recall having such a conversation, if one did occur, he would have advised Libby only to use something if it was declassified.” Cheney went on, “When asked if ever had a conversation with Scooter Libby wherein Libby informed the Vice President that certain material within the NIE needed to be declassified before it could be shared externally, Vice President Cheney advised that he does not recall.” That’s when Cheney started refusing to answer based on presidential privilege. In any case, Libby’s notes show that not only did Cheney know of the meeting with Judy Miller, but Cheney gave Libby a detailed order of what to do at that meeting. But Cheney simply can’t recall those details less than a year later.

Now, if I were Libby, this is where I’d begin to be really furious. Cheney’s pinning all the secret back-channel discussions with journalists (including Libby’s meeting with Judy at the St. Regis, which wasn’t put on Libby’s official schedule) on Libby. But Libby has notes showing that Cheney gave him meticulous instructions on many of those exchanges. And Cathie Martin also testified that Cheney directed Libby to work with journalists that week.

Of course, given how central the Judy meeting is (and, potentially, the July 9 Novak conversation that was hidden by the parties even more assiduously), I can understand why Cheney would want to pretend he had nothing to do with the events. What I don’t understand is how Libby would let Cheney sustain that claim.

The cover-up conversation he and Libby had in October 2003

And then there’s Cheney’s denials of any knowledge of or participation in a cover-up in October 2003. As a general matter, Cheney claims to have “no specific memory” of conversations with Libby about the leak in October 2003–even though they were in Jackson Hole together during one of their later discussions on the subject. I guess that’s why he disclaims all knowledge of the things Libby told him at that time.

Cheney claims “no one told him [after the investigation was announced] of talking to any reporters about Joe Wilson or Wilsons wife.” (23) But Libby claims he told Cheney–at the least–about his fictional conversation in which Tim Russert told Libby about Plame. And Cheney claims he “has no specific memory of … a conversation [when] Libby told him he was not Novak’s source.” (24) But the “meat-grinder note” shows Libby making that claim in writing, with Cheney writing instructions to Andy Card and/or Scott McClellan in response!

Cheney denies knowing “if Scooter Libby independently attempted to get the White House press office to make a statement clearing him prior to discussing it with the Vice President.” (24) Admittedly Libby’s “recall” on this matter was as spotty as Cheney’s, but in his grand jury appearance, he made it clear he talked to Cheney about his inability to get an exonerating statement on his own before Cheney called himself.

All this is the more ridiculous given Cheney’s claims that he has no memory of writing the “meat-grinder note” and especially has no memory of why he wrote “Tenet / Wilson memo” next to Libby’s note where he claimed he hadn’t leaked classified information. When Addington reviewed this note as it was collected for discovery in fall 2003, he called Cheney’s lawyer Terry O’Donnell to warn him about it! So not only must Cheney be aware of this note, his lawyer must be too. Though perhaps that explains Cheney’s lack of all recall about it.

Most of all, though, Cheney claims to have no knowledge of what can only be described as their cover-up conversations, in which Libby told Cheney his fictional story about Russert, but then later reminded Cheney that he–Cheney–had really been the source of his knowledge of Plame’s identity.

He cannot recall Scooter Libby telling him how he first learned about Valerie Wilson. It is possible Libby may have learned about Valerie Wilson’s employment from the Vice President after the Vice President’s phone call with George Tenet, but the Vice President has no specific recollection of such a conversation. The Vice President also cannot recall ever waving Libby off, at a certain point in time, when Libby offered to tell him everything he knew about the Wilson matter. The Vice President has no recollection of Libby saying that he’d learned about Valerie Wilson from a reporter, nor does he have any recollection of Libby indicating that anyone else in the administration knew about Valerie Wilson’s employment at the CIA. Moreover, Vice President Cheney does not have recollection of Libby indicating that reporters with whom Libby was speaking about the Wilson matter, ever informed him of Valerie Wilson’s employment with the CIA.

Now, I don’t blame Cheney for denying any memory of these discussions about a cover-up. The conversations were utterly damning, and perhaps both Libby and Cheney are better off that Cheney didn’t confirm Libby’s version of that story. At the same time, though, as someone who sat in Jackson Hole with Cheney devising a story (and also a strategy about hiding behind journalists), I’d feel betrayed if I were Scooter Libby, seeing Cheney disavowing that close cooperation. This cover-up was always about faithfulness to the cause, but even while Libby spent four years holding up his side of the bargain, Cheney was selling him out with Fitzgerald.

Ironically, in his Fitzgerald interview Dick Cheney treated his trusted former aide in much the same way Cheney treated Joe Wilson after he revealed his trip: Cheney denied having made orders and inquiries that set in motion the whole process, and then later claimed that, since he didn’t get a specific report back, he had nothing to do with the whole thing.

How’s it feel to get the Joe Wilson treatment, Scooter? I know when Wilson got treated that way, he got mighty chatty. Are you getting that urge to hit the talk shows?

Tonight, when we turn the clocks back, we get 60 more minutes to do with as we please.

Being Halloween, that might mean an extra hour of reveling for many. For kids, it might mean staying up an extra hour. For others, it might mean an extra hour of sleeping. But for a couple of folks, it definitely means an extra hour of work.

Take, for instance, the people whose job it is to plan Afghanistan policy at the State Department, the DOD, and the White House.

Noises are coming from Afghanistan that President Karzai’s opponent in the recent disputed election, Abdullah Abdullah, is getting close to announcing he will not participate in the scheduled runoff. Abdullah will give a speech tomorrow at 1AM ET, where he is expected to announce his plans; and people at Foggy Bottom, the Pentagon, and the White House will no doubt be using that extra hour tonight to listen and then figure out what it means. One thing is clear, however, if Abdullah refuses to participate in the election:

Diplomats and analysts have said that, according to the constitution, it was possible the run-off might go ahead with Karzai as the only candidate if Abdullah pulls out. They fear that would have a serious impact on the government’s legitimacy.

“If Abdullah boycotts, voter turnout will be very low and Karzai will be declared winner but with a very low legitimacy,” said Haroun Mir, a Kabul-based analyst and director of Afghanistan’s Center for Research and Policy Studies.

As Reuters notes, “the decision to send more [troops] hinges on whether the Afghan government is seen by U.S. lawmakers and the public as a legitimate and viable partner.” It also hinges on whether the Afghan people see the Afghan government as legitimate. McChrystal’s vaunted counterinsurgent strategy depends on winning the support of legitimate local political leaders — and if Karzai is not seen as legitimate by many in Afghanistan, one big part of McChrystal’s strategy is out the window, whether he gets more troops or not.

But someone else who will probably work through that extra hour tonight is Marcy Wheeler. Yesterday’s release of notes on Cheney’s interview with Patrick Fitzgerald and the DOJ has spurred Marcy into full-scale digging through the weeds, and as I said last Spring, “when people know Marcy is digging, her regular readers start to salivate and those with something to hide start to perspire.”

You can start at that link and work your way forward, through one post after another after another, and watch the dots being connected, the timelines checked and filled in, the conflicting stories spotted, and the legal questions raised.

Here’s the line that jumped out at me, from the end of the last of Marcy’s posts yesterday: “I will have far more to say about this in the coming days.”

If you’re Dick Cheney or one of his minions, that sentence is scarier than any Halloween lightning and Vincent Price organ music.

Bwahahahahaha . . .

photo h/t _tomanthony

1. Law enforcement privilege: If DOJ turns over Cheney’s interview, it will make future Vice Presidents unwilling to cooperate in investigations. This argument fails given the evidence that it has long been routine to release interview materials from high ranking White House figures, going back to the era of Cheney’s first White House job under Nixon, continuing through the investigation conducted parallel to the one Cheney participated in on Iran-Contra, and up through Bush’s predecessor, Clinton. Thus, Cheney’s cooperation itself proves the lie of DOJ’s argument.
2. Deliberative and presidential privilege: Much of the contents of Cheney’s interview comprise his description of deliberations within the White House regarding how to respond to Joe Wilson. This argument fails, in significant part, because much of this was already released during the trial. Furthermore, with the knowledge of at least two other White House officials, Dick Cheney’s lawyer leaked key portions of this to Michael Isikoff in April 2006.
3. National security classification: Finally, DOJ argues that it can’t turn over material already made public, such as the names of Cheney’s and Libby’s briefers, David Terry and Craig Schmall. DOJ and CIA may actually even be protecting the name of that secret CIA officer, Valerie Plame Wilson!

For the most part, this argument doesn’t make sense at all. Most importantly, the core argument–that releasing this interview will inhibit future cooperation–is belied by the last half century of history. Nevertheless, for some reason DOJ has decided to fight release of this document. That’s partly because, I think, this fight started last year, while Cheney still had sway to make it happen. It’s partly because of Obama’s fear of doing anything that would look political. Still, something must explain why Obama’s DOJ is making this crappy argument with such intensity. Something–aside from the defense of secrecy in general–must explain DOJ’s almost comical efforts to keep this interview hidden in spite of the long history of releasing similar interviews.

As I suggested in this post, their concern appears to be much more narrow. I suspect they’re not trying to protect the content of Cheney’s interview, in the abstract. Rather, they’re trying to protect the content because of what Cheney said.

In the hearing before Judge Sullivan on June 18, DOJ argued that if Sullivan reviewed Cheney’s FBI interview report, he’d see the degree to which Cheney was frank with Fitzgerald and that might persuade him why, if this particular interview were released, it would inhibit future cooperation.

But for the record, this particular 302 I think would demonstrate the kind of frankness that the Vice-President gave in this interview as he was trying to assist I assume, trying to assist law enforcement. And the kind of frankness that it can be virtually certain to disappear if documents like this routinely become public.

Then, in yesterday’s brief, DOJ noted that some of what Cheney said was dissimilar from any released before, and–more importantly–some of what Cheney said was not exactly like the information introduced into the record already on the same topics. 

Moreover, as a factual matter, the portions of the FBI 302 protected by the deliberative process privilege are not identical to the public domain information submitted by plaintiff, and in several instances, the FBI 302 contains information that is not at all similar to any information found in plaintiff’s submission. DOJ is unable to expand further on these differences in a public filing without disclosing the privileged information. DOJ can submit further analysis in camera if the Court so directs.

 In both cases, DOJ offered to share the information with Sullivan to convince him that this information merited withholding.

One more thing. As I noted, DOJ is making a completely laughable argument that CREW is demanding "immediate" release of Cheney’s interview materials, even though this investigation concluded over two years ago. While there should be no legal distinction between immediate release or later release, that is a distinction they’re making. Significantly, they argue that releasing this interview in six years may be okay, but releasing it now would be problematic.

The Bush 302 was released six and a half years after his Presidency. It is quite possible, even likely, that, in 2015 or 2019 (six to ten years after Mr. Cheney left office), the release of the documents at issue here can be accomplished without impairment to law enforcement interests. DOJ has concluded, however, that this cannot be accomplished now. 

Six years. Six and a half years. Six years. That’s when it’d be okay to release this, says DOJ. I’m going to suggest that the timing may have more to do with the magical six years than any connection to the end of Cheney’s tenure at VP.

What follows is speculative. It is an attempt to brainstorm out what kind of "frank" revelation Cheney would have made that would still have resulted in the subsequent actions we know Fitzgerald to have taken (notably, the subpoena to Judy Miller and the rest of the journalists), yet that DOJ still thinks should remain hidden.

The Not Identical and Not at All Similar Information

Curiously, DOJ is insisting–for an interview relating to an investigation that ended in a successful perjury and obstruction of justice charge–that Cheney gave Fitzgerald a "full account of relevant events." And they’re dismissing all the related evidence in the public record by claiming that the portions of the interview are either "not identical" or "not at all similar" to the material in the public record. Partly, this is just an attempt to claim that just because records of the actual deliberation have been released, that does not equate to a waiver for what is effectively Cheney’s summary of that deliberation. This is an attempt to say that original source documents–Libby’s direct quotes of Cheney’s statements regarding declassification of the NIE and other material, Cheney’s observation that Tenet’s statement was "unsatisfactory,"  CIA’s characterization of the qusetions that Cheney asked, and Cheney’s meat-grinder note written expressing his argument why Libby should be public exonerated in the same way Rove had been–are somehow less revelatory than Cheney’s description of them.  Provided you buy my argument that DOJ has improperly applied a precedent to try to protect a summary after source documents have been released, then the only way this can be a valid argument (aside from protecting the Condi conversation and Tenet conversation, which have not been described in detail), is if Cheney’s summary does not match Libby’s (and Cathie Martin’s) summary presented at trial.

I suspect that the only way DOJ can honestly simultaneously claim that Cheney gave a "frank," "full account" of events but that his summary description of these deliberations must still be protected is if DOJ believes that Libby’s summary is inaccurate and Cheney’s is accurate. 

I’m suggesting that the reason DOJ is fighting so hard to protect this material is that it differs in some key way from Libby’s testimony, and for some reason DOJ believes Cheney told the truth but Libby lied. And that Cheney was truthful about something more embarrassing than Clinton’s blowjob.

Some possibilities are (remember–this is speculative; also see Mary, ROTL, Garrett on this):

• Cheney admitted that he ordered Libby to out Valerie Wilson–to either Judy Miller or to just Matt Cooper
• Cheney insta-declassified the NIE (and the January 24 document and the trip report) on his own, as opposed to–as Libby claimed–with the involvement of Bush
• Cheney insta-declassified Valerie’s identity on his own
• Cheney learned of Valerie’s identity from some source besides Tenet–such as being shown the documents Valerie wrote in support of Joe’s trip
• Cheney told Hadley and Condi and Tenet and Card that he or Bush had insta-declassified some of these materials

Subsequent Events

But whatever Cheney said must be compatible with Fitzgerald’s and others’ subsequent actions. Some key points are:

May 2004: Just weeks after Cheney’s May 8, 2004 interview, Fitz subpoenas Matt Cooper and Tim Russert to test his then-operative theory that Russert had not told Libby of Plame’s ID, but that Libby had been Cooper’s source for her ID.

August 2004: Fitz submits an affidavit in support of subpoenas for Judy Miller and Walter Pincus stating:

…reporter Miller has been subpoenaed because her testimony is essential to determining whether or not Lewis Libby … has committed crimes including the improper disclosure of national defense information and perjury. Libby has admitted speaking to Miller in July 2003 and discussing the purported employment of former Ambassador Joe Wilson’s wife by the [CIA].

[snip]

Libby testified that he met with reporter Miller on [July 8, 2003] at the general direction of the Vice President to share with Miller portions of the [NIE]. … Libby specifically described he was advised by Vice President Cheney that President Bush had declassified the NIE…

There are redactions on page 8 (pertaining to whether or not Cheney told others in the Administration that he had insta-declassified the NIE), page 11 (footnoting a description of Libby’s admission that Cheney told him of Plame’s identity), page 13-14 (describing whether or not Cheney told Libby to leak Plame’s ID to Cooper), page 18-19 (pertaining to how Novak learned Plame worked in CPD, with a long footnote and further information on Rove’s conversation with Novak), page 19 (describing Libby’s contact with Novak that week), and page 30 (pertaining to whether the President and others have invoked privilege). 

October 2005: Fitz indicts Libby for false statements, perjury, and obstruction of justice, but not IIPA or leaking defense information. Fitz makes no mention of the NIE story. The indictment includes many oblique references to Cheney (plus some explicit ones). 

April 2006: Following up on a point that I first reported that February, Fitz releases a filing specifically implicating Bush and Cheney in the NIE leak and repeating Libby’s testimony that only he, Cheney, and Bush were aware of the NIE insta-declassification.

Defendant’s participation in a critical conversation with Judith Miller on July 8 (discussed further below) occurred only after the Vice President advised defendant that the President specifically had authorized defendant to disclose certain information in the NIE. Defendant testified that the circumstances of his conversation with reporter Miller – getting approval from the President through the Vice President to discuss material that would be classified but for that approval – were unique in his recollection.

[snip]

As to the meeting on July 8, defendant testified that he was specifically authorized in advance of the meeting to disclose the key judgments of the classified NIE to Miller on that occasion because it was thought that the NIE was “pretty definitive” against what Ambassador Wilson had said and that the Vice President thought that it was “very important” for the key judgments of the NIE to come out. Defendant further testified that he at first advised the Vice President that he could not have this conversation with reporter Miller because of the classified nature of the NIE. Defendant testified that the Vice President later advised him that the President had authorized defendant to disclose the relevant portions of the NIE.

[snip]

According to defendant, at the time of his conversations with Miller and Cooper, he understood that only three people – the President, the Vice President and defendant – knew that the key judgments of the NIE had been declassified. Defendant testified in the grand jury that he understood that even in the days following his conversation with Ms. Miller, other key officials – including Cabinet level officials – were not made aware of the earlier declassification even as those officials were pressed to carry out a declassification of the NIE, the report about Wilson’s trip and another classified document dated January 24, 2003.

In response–and with the knowledge of at least Dan Bartlett–Cheney’s lawyer explains the NIE leak this way:

A lawyer familiar with the investigation, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the matter, told NEWSWEEK that the "president declassified the information and authorized and directed the vice president to get it out." But Bush "didn’t get into how it would be done. He was not involved in selecting Scooter Libby or Judy Miller." Bush made the decision to put out the NIE material in late June, when the press was beginning to raise questions about the WMD but before Wilson published his op-ed piece.

May 2006: Fitzgerald and Ted Wells discuss details of Bush and Cheney’s testimony. Wells claims to know that either Bush or Cheney "testified" that the NIE had been declassified and asks to have those interviews turned over. Fitz ends up agreeing only to stipulate that the NIE had been declassified by July 8, but not as to when it was declassified and (as I understand it) never turned over those interview reports. 

WELLS: To the extent that Mr. Fitzgerald is in possession of documents or grand jury material or interviews that establish that, in fact, the vice president and the president were aware that those documents had been declassified, he should turn them over because I do not want to be in a position during this trial that there is some question that Mr. Libby, in disclosing that material to Ms. Miller, did anything wrong.

[snip]

MR. FITZGERALD: I will come back to that. Let me jump ahead. There’s no other discovery we have on it so it’s not like we’re sitting on documents or exhibits that

THE COURT: It is a moot issue. You don’t have anything on it.

[snip]

MR. WELLS: I started out making what I characterized as a Brady request to the extent that either the vice president or the president have testified that they did authorize disclosure.

THE COURT: Testified?

MR. WELLS: I’m making a Brady request. I believe there is testimony. I believe there is testimony or interviews.

THE COURT: I didn’t know they had testified.

MR. WELLS: I don’t know the procedure whether they talked to somebody in somebody’s office. But to the extent he has statements from either the vice president or the president, to the extent that disclosure of the NIE was authorized and I believe that maybe that the testimony does not tie it down to a particular day, only that it did take place, I believe I’m entitled to that.

[snip]

MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, I think they already do. Let me see if I can — in other words, if I summarize the information and disclose it as to what we know about this information, I mean there was an authority to declassify it. We don’t know when. So I don’t know what more there is to that in the sense that I’ll scrub it. But it’s not as if we’re sitting on — we have turned over relevant documents and items but that’s the way it is.

[snip]

MR. WELLS: It is, but if he’s going to say as he just suggested that if I were to say that when he talked to Mr. Woodward he did it with the understanding that he had been authorized and he is in possession of material from either the president or the vice president to the effect that it was declassified and that they know they did it but they’re not sure of the particular date but it was in that general area, I think I should have that material.

THE COURT: I do disagree with that because it seems to me that if he, as I said before, decides to go down that road and then once he does that the government brings out something during cross-examination or otherwise that would suggest that he wasn’t, in fact, being honest when he made that representation, then I think he is entitled to know that before he goes down that road.

MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, I will stipulate that the declassification happened. I don’t know when. The notion that we’re laying low in the tall grass and weeds I think is unfair.

December 2006: Fitz announces that he will not call Cheney as a witness. Libby’s team responds that they intend to call Cheney (they never do, though they do use his potential appearance during jury selection to weed out those opposed to the Iraq War and/or Cheney personally).

February 2007: Fitz closes the trial by describing the "cloud" that remains over Cheney.

And you know what? [The Defense] said something here that we’re trying to put a cloud on the Vice President. We’ll talk straight. There is a cloud over what the Vice President did that week. He wrote those columns. He had those meetings. He sent Libby off to Judith Miller at the St. Regis Hotel. At that meeting, … the defendant talked about the wife. We didn’t put that cloud there. That cloud remains because the defendant has obstructed justice and lied about what happened.

[snip]

He’s put the doubt into whatever happened that week, whatever is going on between the Vice President and the defendant, that cloud was there. That’s not something we put there. That cloud is something that we just can’t pretend isn’t there.

2007 to 2008: Reports–that may or may not be accurate–describe Cheney pressuring Bush to commute the sentence of and then pardon Libby. Bush does the first but not the second.

My Thoughts

From the subsequent events, we can conclude the following:

• Nothing in Cheney’s interview made Fitz rethink his theory that Libby had leaked Plame’s identity to Cooper, all the while knowing he had learned of her identity from Cheney (indeed, the redactions on pages 13-14 of Fitz’s affadavit suggest he may have asked Cheney about this–and remember, Libby once said he did leak to Judy on July 12).
• Fitz believed it likely he had leaked Plame’s identity to Judy, but he considered either that–or some of Libby’s other leaks (such as the NIE and/or the trip report) still potentially criminal. In fact, after reading Fitz’ affidavits later that year, Judge Tatel stated that after getting Judy’s testimony, "charges under the Intelligence Identities
  Protection Act, 50 U.S.C. § 421, currently off the table for lack of evidence (see 8/27/04 Aff. at 28 & n.15), might become viable." Therefore nothing Cheney and Bush told Fitz convinced him in 2004 that the leak of Plame’s identity was legal.
• Fitz at least claimed that Libby’s lies about when he learned of Plame prevented him from understanding Cheney’s role in the leak.
• Fitz didn’t want to give Libby’s team Bush and Cheney’s interviews, and he never planned to call Cheney.

I’m stumped, for now. Perhaps they’re trying to prevent new details on the fight with CIA–particularly the effort to trick CIA into revealing Plame’s ID (though that is, frankly, somewhat evident from the publicaly available evidence from the week of June 9). Perhaps they’re trying to hide information that Bush ordered Cheney and Libby to respond to Joe Wilson–and gave them carte blanche to do so. But this, again, is at least partly revealed in Libby’s June 9, 2003 notes and in the meat-grinder note.

Which leaves me with one more observation. DOJ is willing to see this released in several years, but not now. I’m wondering if that has as much to do with a 5 year statute of limitations as it has to do with anything else? Perhaps there’s enough evidence of Bush’s involvement in the leak that they want to avoid any questions of whether Bush obstructed justice when he commuted Libby’s sentence?

A document filed in federal court this week by the Justice Department offers new evidence that former vice president Richard B. Cheney helped steer the Bush administration’s public response to the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson’s employment by the CIA and that he was at the center of many related administration deliberations.

Which, if you take "new evidence" to mean "a new list summarizing many of the events described in evidence introduced two years ago at the Libby trial," would be factually correct.

But this isn’t.

Barron also listed as exempt from disclosure Cheney’s account of his requests for information from the CIA about the purported purchase; Cheney’s discussions with top officials about the controversy over Bush’s mention of the uranium allegations in his 2003 State of the Union speech; and Cheney’s discussions with deputy I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, press spokesman Ari Fleischer, and Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. "regarding the appropriate response to media inquiries about the source of the disclosure" of Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity. [my emphasis]

Smith gets that last bit from this language in the filing.

Vice President’s recollection of discussions with Lewis Libby, the White House Communications Director, and the White House Chief of Staff regarding the appropriate response to media inquiries about the source of the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity as a CIA employee.

Now, the language used there–"the source of the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity"–ought to be a pretty big clue to Smith that this conversation happened after Plame’s identity was actually made public. That is, after July 14, 2003, which happened to be Ari Fleischer’s last day, meaning it’s pretty clear that Ari Fleischer (who was White House Spokesperson, not Communications Director) isn’t the guy referenced here. But you don’t really need clues like that to figure out that Smith is wrong here. Had Smith only clicked that link above his article and actually looked at the evidence released at trial, he would have seen the famous "meat grinder note," a note Cheney used as a talking point document for conversations with Andy Card (correctly identified by Smith as Chief of Staff) and Dan Bartlett (in his role as "White House Communications Director," the position listed in the filing) in early October 2003 to get them to force Scottie McClellan to exonerate Scooter Libby publicly.

Has to happen today.

Call out to key press saying same thing about Scooter as Karl.

Not going to protect one staffer and sacrifice the guy the Pres that was asked to stick his neck in the meat grinder because of the incompetence of others.

Perhaps I’m being pedantic, but the news that Scooter Libby and Dick Cheney orchestrated the statement exonerating Libby was a pretty central issue of the trial–and the meat grinder note was a shocking piece of evidence, not least because that crossed out "the Pres" implicated Bush directly. And it was reported in depth again in Scottie McClellan’s book. So it should be fairly clear what this language refers to.

But that’s not the piece of reporting that bugs me most in this article. It’s this bit:

The declaration also said Cheney had helped resolve disputes about "whether to declassify certain information," including portions of a National Intelligence Estimate related to Iraqi weapons programs that Libby leaked to then-New York Times reporter Judith Miller.

Smith gets this from these two–separate–items listed in the filing.

Page 25, line 39-page 26, line 1: Vice President’s description of his role in resolving disputes about whether to declassify certain information.

Page 26, lines 8-10, 14-17, 24-26: Vice President’s description of government deliberations involving senior officials regarding whether to declassify portions of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate.

That is, Cheney’s comments about "resolving disputes about whether to declassify certain information" is treated as totally distinct in David Barron’s declaration from the declassification of the NIE, though it obviously was closely linked in time.

Smith’s conflation of the two is a problem for two reasons. First, it erroneously suggests that Judy Miller was the only one to whom Scooter leaked contents of the NIE; by the time Fitzgerald asked these questions, though, he knew Libby had leaked it to David Sanger and may have leaked it to Andrea Mitchell. As it turned out (though I’m not sure Fitz figured this out until after the indictment), Libby had also leaked the NIE to Bob Woodward, several weeks earlier. And that detail is important because it shows that Libby’s claim–given as an explanation for what Cheney ordered him to leak to Judy–was at least partly bogus.

Smith’s conflation of the two also suggests, falsely, that the NIE was the only thing Libby and Cheney were fighting over declassifying at the time–and squabbling with Tenet about leaking. We know, at a minimum, that they were also declassifying the report from Joe Wilson’s trip; that was formally declassified mid-week the week of the leak, though someone probably named Scooter Libby leaked contents of it to Bob Novak before it was declassified. We also know they were leaking the January 24 excerpt from the NIE to people at the WSJ. Most importantly, we know they were leaking Valerie Wilson’s identity–though I’m not sure whether Fitz had enough evidence by May 8, 2004 to ask Cheney whether he had insta-declassified her identity.

The entire story of the leak of Plame’s identity is about–obviously–declassifying leaking classified information. Yet Smith conflates details presented in the filing in such a way that recreates precisely the myth that Scooter Libby and Dick Cheney mobilized to cover up their leak.

I don’t think he’s doing it purposefully. But in his reporting of what is in the Cheney interview, Smith just happens to neutralize the most important questions we know Cheney got asked in this interview.

As I mentioned, DOJ did one crappy-ass job of trying to give Emmet Sullivan a better reason they can’t turn over Dick Cheney’s interview materials than that Jon Stewart would embarrass poor Dick. They trot out the same canard about needing cooperation from high level officials in the future. But there two big problems with their argument.

The Release of a Late-Investigation Interview of the Target of that Investigation Will Hurt Early Investigative Cooperation

First, they’re basically forced to argue that they won’t be able to get information early in an investigation if VPs and the like worry that their interviews with Special Counsels will eventually be made public.

For example, obtaining information through interviews early in an investigation “often assists law enforcement agents in obtaining important background information,” “help[s] law enforcement investigators determine where to concentrate or focus the investigation,” and may “obviate the need to convene a grand jury at all or circumscribe the focus of the grand jury’s inquiry.” Breuer Decl. ¶ 6. “A law enforcement investigation based upon interviews subject to an expectation of confidentiality also benefits from senior officials more inclined to provide identifiable leads, name percipient witnesses, offer credibility assessments of the accuser or other witnesses, and even articulate inferences, insight or hunches that can be invaluable to a law enforcement investigator.”

But of course this interview wasn’t about "obtaining important background information" about "where to concentrate or focus the investigation" that might "obviate the need to convene a grand jury." Neither Bush nor Cheney gave an interview at that early stage of the process. Rather, this was an interview conducted while there was an active grand jury, at a time when all major witnesses save journalists had already been interviewed.

This was an interview of the ultimate target of the investigation, not a mere bystander.

Meanwhile, the DOJ wants to pretend that a grand jury investigation of top White House officials might thwart an investigation.

Additionally, if a senior White House official were to require the investigators to go through the grand jury process, “[s]uch a decision could impose considerable practical difficulties and burdens upon investigators and prosecutors that at best could prolong investigations and at worst thwart investigations.”

Tell that to Karl Rove and his five grand jury appearances. Turdblossom couldn’t get enough of the grand jury (and he’s been before a grand jury since). Which, in turn, makes this claim all the more laughable.

Mr. Breuer also expresses a concern about politicization of law enforcement investigations: “In addition, forcing White House officials to be brought before grand juries could have the effect of injecting the law enforcement investigation itself into the political process, which could intrude upon government operations at the highest level of government, and which could risk the perception that the investigation itself was political, thus undermining public faith in the impartiality of the judicial system. Baseless, partisan allegations that easily could be investigated and dismissed through voluntary interviews now may have to be investigated through the specter of the grand jury process.

Aside from the obvious fact–which played out in this case–that White Houses are going to go to some lengths to avoid an investigation getting to the grand jury stage because it implies a seriousness that an FBI interview does not, again, Cheney’s interview happened after everyone had been before the grand jury already. Which makes the argument pretty nonsensical.

Here’s Evidence from a Library of Public Reports Proving We Can’t Release This Information Publicly

And then there’s the other big problem with their investigation. Judge Sullivan asked for a list of the other White House officials who have been interviewed in the past. And to make that list, DOJ referred to a whole slew of public reports basically revealing the contents of the interviews that–DOJ reports–were never released in FBI 302 form. The list of those reports includes:

• Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters
• Final Report of the Independent Counsel In Re: Janet G. Mullins
• Report of the Independent Counsel In Re: Vincent W. Foster, Jr.
• Report of the Independent Counsel In Re: David Watkins
• Final Report of the Independent Counsel In Re: Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Ass’n
• Tenth Report by the Committee on Government Reform

DOJ also erroneously claims that Fitzgerald interviewed a slew of people in this investigation (they’re mistaking the earlier fall 2003 FBI interviews with Fitzgerald’s later interviews before the grand jury) and admits that Reagan’s interview transcript from Iran-Contra is public.

In other words, to support their argument that if interviews with top White House officials were to be made public, no one would cooperate, they name a bunch of interviews that–because there was a final public report for the investigation–were made public (though not the 302s)!

Not only that, but they list the five grossly political investigations of Clinton, and claim–with a straight filing-face!–that anything they could do would politicize investigations.

We Can’t Reveal Info Publicly That’s Already Been Released

And then, finally, there’s the fact that DOJ is basically claiming a bunch of things already released in the Libby trial to be exempt from FOIA. For example, here’s the list of things that DOJ says is exempt–with either the name, or a document showing very closely related evidence:

• Vice President’s discussion of his requests for information from the CIA relating to reported efforts by Iraqi officials to purchase uranium from Niger. Faxes, memo, and CIA’s version of VP request all released at trial or subsequent to trial.
• Vice President’s description of government deliberations, including discussions between the Vice President and the Deputy National Security Advisor, in preparation of a statement by the Director of CIA regarding the accuracy of a statement in the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address. Libby’s notes–with Cheney’s statements–introduced at trial.
• Vice President’s recollection of discussions with Lewis Libby, the White House Communications Director, and the White House Chief of Staff regarding the appropriate response to media inquiries about the source of the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity as a CIA employee. Cheney’s own note introduced at trial–with additional testimony from David Addington and in Libby’s Grand Jury testimony.
• Vice President’s description of government deliberations involving senior officials regarding whether to declassify portions of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. Described in Scooter Libby’s Grand Jury Testimony.
• Description of a confidential conversation between the Vice President and the President, and description of an apparent communication between the Vice President and the President. Described in Scooter Libby’s Grand Jury testimony.
• Names of non-governmental third-parties and details of their extraneous interactions with the Vice President. Andrea Mitchell, possibly Bob Novak.
• Name of a CIA briefer. Probably Craig Schmall.
• Names of FBI agents. Jack Eckenrode and Deb Bond.
• Names of foreign government and liaison services. Italy, the UK, and Niger.
• The name of a covert CIA employee. Valerie Plame Wilson.
• The methods CIA uses to assess and evaluate intelligence and inform policy makers. Sending Joe Wilson to Niger.

As noted in that post, this information is all that is new:

• Vice President’s discussion of the substance of a conversation he had with the Director of the CIA concerning the decision to send Ambassador Wilson on a fact-finding mission to Niger in 2002.
• Vice President’s recollection of the substance of his discussions with the National Security Advisor while she was on a trip to Africa.
• Vice President’s description of his role in resolving disputes about whether to declassify certain information.

So DOJ is basically saying that a bunch of information released in one of the most publicized trials of the last several years cannot not be re-released because it is tied to the Vice President who was willing to testify at that trial about precisely these things and–partly because he didn’t testify, has had a cloud over his head ever since.

And, if I’m right that the covert CIA op that Cheney talked to Tenet about is Plame–as Libby claimed in his Grand Jury appearances–then it means DOJ says it can’t reveal Plame’s real name even though Cheney was instrumental in revealing Plame’s real name. Which is all the more problematic since in Cheney’s devious little mind, he was preparing to claim that he had insta-declassified Plame’s ID so Libby could leak it to Judy Miller.

You know? DOJ was making a less ridiculous argument back when they were arguing Cheney’s interview materials couldn’t be released because Jon Stewart would make fun of him.

First, the date. Rather than early June, as previously assumed, the CIA declaration included with this document reveals the documents were dated May 8, 2004–a month earlier in the investigation that we had known (and therefore a month and a half earlier than Bush’s interview).

Otherwise, the declarations reveal the following contents of the interview:

• Vice President’s discussion of the substance of a conversation he had with the Director of the CIA concerning the decision to send Ambassador Wilson on a fact-finding mission to Niger in 2002.
• Vice President’s discussion of his requests for information from the CIA relating to reported efforts by Iraqi officials to purchase uranium from Niger.
• Vice President’s recollection of the substance of his discussions with the National Security Advisor while she was on a trip to Africa.
• Vice President’s description of government deliberations, including discussions between the Vice President and the Deputy National Security Advisor, in preparation of a statement by the Director of CIA regarding the accuracy of a statement in the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address.
• Vice President’s recollection of discussions with Lewis Libby, the White House Communications Director, and the White House Chief of Staff regarding the appropriate response to media inquiries about the source of the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity as a CIA employee.
• Vice President’s description of his role in resolving disputes about whether to declassify certain information.
• Vice President’s description of government deliberations involving senior officials regarding whether to declassify portions of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate.
• Description of a confidential conversation between the Vice President and the President, and description of an apparent communication between the Vice President and the President.
• Names of non-governmental third-parties and details of their extraneous interactions with the Vice President.
• Name of a CIA briefer.
• Names of FBI agents.
• Names of foreign government and liaison services.
• The name of a covert CIA employee.
• The methods CIA uses to assess and evaluate intelligence and inform policy makers.

Now, as I’ll get into when I discuss what a load of crap this is, almost every single bit of this was already revealed at trial. The single event we don’t know significant details of already is this:

Vice President’s recollection of the substance of his discussions with the National Security Advisor while she was on a trip to Africa.

Given the location of the discussion–it appears on the same page as the description of the Cheney-Libby-Hadley discussions on the Tenet statement–it probably pertains to the perceived understanding of Condi’s role in sticking the shiv in Tenet’s back–and/or her willingness or not to admit fault in sticking the uranium claim in the State of the Union. Also remember–Condi passed word through Hadley that Bush was "comfortable" with their plan (which may have included outing Plame).

Another interesting detail not introduced at trial: schedules released during the trial and a CIA document released after the trial show Cheney had a meeting with John McLaughlin during the week of June 9, 2003–when Cheney learned of Plame’s identity. But this seems to confirm that Cheney also had a conversation with Tenet that week (Libby claimed Cheney learned of Plame’s identity from Tenet, though I think Cheney learned of it from reading two memos Plame wrote wrt the trip).

The one other piece of information that would be very interesting would be the "names of non-governmental third-parties and details of their extraneous interactions with the Vice President." Otherwise known as "media," including (at a minimum) Andrea Mitchell, but also Bob Novak.

For some reason, Obama’s DOJ doesn’t want us to see these things. But considering what a ridiculous argument they’re making here–and the degree to which these things are already declassified–I’m guessing we get to see some of this.

Stephen Bradbury

Though we may need new rules about linking to the Washington Post after they canned Dan Froomkin, not only is this story not an AP story (what with their expansive claims of fair use), but it has a bunch of more interesting details. So here’s the story about Judge Emmet Sullivan, demanding the government allow him to review the Dick Cheney FBI interview materials they’re trying to withhold from FOIA before he’ll allow them to withhold the materials.

U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan expressed surprise during a hearing here that the Justice Department, in asserting that Cheney’s voluntary statements to U.S. Attorney Patrick J. Fitzgerald were exempt from disclosure, relied on legal claims put forward last October by a Bush administration political appointee, Stephen Bradbury. The department asserted then that the disclosure would make presidents and vice presidents reluctant to cooperate voluntarily with future criminal investigations.

But career civil division lawyer Jeffrey M. Smith, responding to Sullivan’s questions, said Bradbury’s arguments against the disclosure were supported by the department’s current leadership. He told the judge that if Cheney’s remarks were published, then a future vice president asked to provide candid information during a criminal probe might refuse to do so out of concern "that it’s going to get on ‘The Daily Show’ " or somehow be used as a political weapon.

Sullivan said Bradbury, who was the acting head of the Office of Legal Counsel, was not obviously qualified to make such claims and that they were in any event unsubstantiated. Sullivan said the department needed new evidence, if it hoped to prevail, and said the administration should supply him with a copy of Cheney’s statements so he could directly assess whether the claims are credible.

No word on whether Sullivan believes Bradbury is unqualified because this is not the purview of OLC, or whether he has just read Bradbury’s crappy ass OLC opinions and made the same conclusion the rest of us have: his legal judgment ain’t worth much.

Sullivan appears to be predisposed to accept CREW’s–and frankly, Fitz’s–argument that, since Cheney didn’t have to appear before a grand jury, he (and the government) can’t now claim his interview materials can’t be released because of grand jury secrecy laws.

Also note, there are three items responsive to the CREW subpoena, all in some way pertaining to the FBI interview. That means in addition to the interview report, we’ll get notes. Which I’m guessing will be far more interesting to read.

And it’s finally looking like we might get to read them.

LOLTron by Michael Heilemann

If there’s one thing the past week has taught us, it’s that Republican politicians can’t be trusted to use Twitter without posing a danger to themselves or to others.  First Pete Hoekstra used it to violate all known security protocols by repeatedly broadcasting his whereabouts in Iraq, and then Virginia’s GOP Chair used it to sabotage his own party’s attempt to seize control of the state senate.

And before Twitter, there was YouTube.  Remember when Patrick McHenry volunteered as a spotter for Iraqi militants by posting that helpful where-the-rockets-hit video on his website?  And how two days later there was a much more successful rocket attack (19 casualties) on that very spot?  I mean, at least the Twitter twits didn’t get anyone killed.

It’s all part of a pattern: Republican jackass wants to show off what a big swinging insider dick he is, ends up blurting out obviously confidential information without a care in the world for what the consequences might be.  Sometimes those consequences are comic, like in Virginia, but more often they’re tragic or have the potential to be.  And with the immediacy of the internet, there’s no media filter to stop the dickitude from seeing the light of day.

But this blithe disregard for consequences isn’t limited to the GOP’s early-adopter showoffs.  Karl Rove and Dick Cheney didn’t need the internets to blow up an entire CIA operation dedicated to preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons, just to settle a score with one agent’s husband.  And remember when the Bush administration outed an al Qaeda double agent, apparently just to brag about what a great job they were doing in the War On Terror?

Terrorism and Iranian nukes were supposed to be unthinkably deadly threats, and yet the Bushies sabotaged their own efforts against them for the shallowest of reasons.  Right now, Congressional Republicans are attempting to block or sabotage the economic stimulus package to score political points, and they could care less if another Great Depression is the result.

The pettiness and irresponsibility of this mindset is simply breathtaking, and it permeates everything the GOP does.  They have to have that cookie, and it doesn’t matter if they have to smash through a load-bearing wall to get it.

I wonder, do Republicans care so little for the consequences of their actions because they so rarely have to face any?  Would they be more circumspect if they saw other Republicans getting fired or prosecuted whenever they fucked up?  Nah, probably not.  But I know I’d sure be a lot happier.

UPDATE: I knew Jeff Frederick’s name sounded familiar. He’s the same wanker who made the Osama and Obama "both have friends who bombed the Pentagon" joke while training volunteers for the McCain campaign. That makes his epic fail even sweeter. Call it "Tweetenfreude."

Toensing

As TPM has reported (and a number of you have emailed) Scooter Libby’s press flack, Barbara Comstock, is running for office. Honestly, given the Democratic tilt of Virginia of late, I had been inclined to keep just half an eye on Comstock. After all, so long as she looks likely to lose, why give her any attention?

But news like this makes me rethink that. After all, what better way to undercut Comstock’s network of purportedly independent resources than to establish that they were on the host committee for Comstock’s earliest fund-raisers?

A who’s who of conservative women showed up at the home of Mildred Webber to register their support. Among them: the Ashcroft Group’s Juleanna Glover, National Review’s Kate O’Bierne and former Homeland Security official Fran Townsend.

Also on the host committee: Victoria Toensing, Jeri Thompson, Cathy Gillespie, Maria Cino and Kellyanne Conway.

Now, I know that there has been no doubt since the Clinton wars that Toensing is a Republican hack. But Toensing was able to attempt jury nullification with articles like this during the Libby trial, all under the claim that she was an independent entity.

And here we come to "find out" she’s one of Comstock’s closest buddies.

By Burt

When Libby was first asked about any discussions he had with Cheney in response to Joe Wilson’s op-ed, he first claimed he had not discussed the op-ed until after the Novak column (though with his aborted discussion of a "conver–"sation, he may have been thinking of the July 9 conversation he had with Novak and subsequently hid).

I don’t recall that conversation until after the, until after the Novak piece. I don’t recall it during this week of July 6. I recall it after the Novak conver — after the Novak article appeared I recall it , and I recall being asked by the Vice President early on, you know, about this envoy, you know, who is it and — but I don’t recall that, early on he asked about it in connection with the wife, although he may well have given the note that I took.

Q. And so your recollection is that he wrote on July — that you discussed with the Vice President, did his wife send him on a junket? As a response to the July 14th Novak column that said, he was sent because his wife sent him and she works at the CIA?

A. I don’t recall discussing it –yes, I don’t recall discussing it in connection with when this article first appeared. I recall it later.

Then, when Fitz points out the utter absurdity of discussing with Cheney, speculatively, that Plame was purportedly involved in sending her husband, after Novak had already reported that fact directly, Libby shifts, and tries to claim they talked about it after July 10 when–he claimed–Tim Russert had told him of Plame’s identity.

Q. And are you telling us under oath that from July 6th to July 14th you never discussed with Vice President Cheney whether Mr. Wilson’s wife worked at the CIA?

A. No, no, I’m not saying that. On July 10 or 11 I learned, I thought anew, that the wife — that, that reporters I lwere telling us that the wife worked at the CIA. And I may have had a conversation then with the Vice President either late on the 11th or on the 12th in which I relayed that reporters were saying that.

Basically, Libby was trying to date the notations Cheney had made on Wilson’s op-ed ("Or did his wife send him on a junket?") to a time after journalists might have known of Plame’s identity. If he couldn’t do that, after all, it would serve as proof that Cheney knew of Plame’s purported role in Wilson’s trip–and was obsessing about it–shortly before Plame’s identity got leaked to at least four different reporters. It would highlight the fact that Cheney’s notations prettly closely matched the talking points given to Matt Cooper and Walter Pincus and Bob Novak.

The problem is–as I pointed out during the trial–Cheney’s own talking points made it clear that he had already read Wilson’s op-ed on July 8. Cheney actually changed his talking points in direct response to Wilson’s op-ed on July 8, proving Libby’s lies to be false, but also proving that Cheney was well aware of Plame’s purported role (and therefore, her CIA identity) when he was responding to journalists on the day Plame’s name was first leaked to Bob Novak.

That’s the context for Murray Waas’ report today–that Cheney admitted to Fitz and the FBI that he had changed his talking points on July 8 in an attempt to get journalists looking into Plame’s purported role in Joe’s trip.

Vice President Dick Cheney, according to a still-highly confidential FBI report, admitted to federal investigators that he rewrote talking points for the press in July 2003 that made it much more likely that the role of then-covert CIA-officer Valerie Plame in sending her husband on a CIA-sponsored mission to Africa would come to light.

Cheney conceded during his interview with federal investigators that in drawing attention to Plame’s role in arranging her husband’s Africa trip reporters might also unmask her role as CIA officer.

Cheney denied to the investigators, however, that he had done anything on purpose that would lead to the outing of Plame as a covert CIA operative. But the investigators came away from their interview with Cheney believing that he had not given them a plausible explanation as to how he could focus attention on Plame’s role in arranging her husband’s trip without her CIA status also possibly publicly exposed. At the time, Plame was a covert CIA officer involved in preventing Iran from obtaining weapons of mass destruction, and Cheney’s office played a central role in exposing her and nullifying much of her work.

As Fitz pointed out in his closing argument, Cheney changed his first talking point from,

The Vice President’s office did not request the mission to Niger.

To,

It is not clear who authorized Joe Wilson’s trip to Niger.

(The "VP did not request" became his second talking point.)

That is, Cheney’s new talking points raised a question the answer to which was–Cheney believed–"Valerie Plame, Joe Wilson’s CIA spook wife." Which, as Cheney apparently admitted to the FBI, might raise the chances that Plame would be outed–as happened like a charm with Matt Cooper and John Dickerson. Dickerson, recall, was instructed to look into who sent Wilson, and Cooper answered that question for Dickerson with help from Rove: Wilson’s wife.

Now, Murray points out that Cheney’s admission–certainly from the perspective of June 2004, when Cheney was interviewed–would make it more likely that Cheney had a role in outing Plame. Frankly, when you put Judy’s testimony together with Libby’s notes and Addington’s testimony, that case has already been proved, and for much earlier in the week than Murray’s discussing (since it proves that, on Cheney’s order, Libby was asking Addington about both Plame and Wilson in the preparation to talk to Judy). But, people are thick, so hopefully Murray’s reporting–apparently direct from Cheney’s FBI interview–will convince some people to actually look at the available evidence.

There’s a lot more that Murray’s post suggests, though, both about Fitzgerald’s investigation and about Cheney’s direct role in Plame’s outing. Only, you’re going to have to wait until tomorrow to get that!!