[Welcome Sebastian Junger, and Host David Axe]
[As a courtesy to our guests, please keep comments to the book. Please take other conversations to a previous thread. - bev]
I have just one complaint about War, the new book from Sebastian Junger, author of The Perfect Storm and a documentary filmmaker. In the book, Junger draws a clear distinction between “war” and “combat.” War is politics and strategy. Combat, by contrast, is a personal experience entirely divorced from the politics driving it. The book should have been called Combat.
In 2007 and 2008 Junger and his photographer Tim Hetherington spent several months living with a platoon of U.S. Army paratroopers in eastern Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley. At one point during a spike in the fighting, the 30 young men of Junger’s Second Platoon — part of the 173rd Airborne Brigade based in Italy — accounted for around a third of all the combat experienced by the 160,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan. Half of the platoon fell dead or wounded. Others suffered psychological injuries.
“In the Korengal the soldiers never talked about the wider war — or cared,” Junger writes. They might not have realized it, but their Korengal campaign represented a turning point in the now nine-year-old war. This year, a bloodied NATO pulled out of the Korengal and some surrounding areas. The alliance characterized the move as a “realignment.” Others might consider it a retreat.
But that’s not what War is about. Instead, it’s a portrait of a small group of young men in extraordinary circumstances. It’s about the terror of imminent death. It’s about violence. Most of all, it’s about brotherhood, as the soldiers find in each other the only motivation they need to fight and risk dying. It’s not for no reason that Junger divides the book into three parts: Fear, Killing and Love.
It’s a sad, sad book. Junger lovingly paints the portrait of the scout squad leader, Larry Rougle, “a short, strong-looking man with dark eyes and jet-black hair … a legendary bad-ass and some kind of ultimate soldier.” Rougle stands with Junger on a bunker roof and surveys the rugged landscape all around. “Everything you can see, I’ve walked on,” Rougle says. Later, he dies in a bloody, complex ambush as Taliban fighters swarm isolated American outposts. Second Platoon is disbelieving, heartbroken. “You’re lyin’ right, man?” one boy cries when he hears the news.
Junger wisely follows up with some of his soldiers in the aftermath of the Korengal. One kid tries to get out of the Army but finds he can’t cope with civilian life. At “peace,” soldiers drink, grow paranoid and depressed. They pick fights. They feel angry. After combat, and the brotherhood of combat, everyday life just seems flat, silly, unfair and, ironically, at times terrifying.
“Combat was a game the United States had asked Second Platoon to become very good at, and once they had, the United States had put them on a hilltop without women, hot food, running water communication with the outside world, or any kind of entertainment for over a year,” Junger writes. “Not that the men were complaining, but that sort of thing has consequences. … [S]ociety should be careful what it asks for.”



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Welcome all. This is David Axe, freelance war correspondent and your host for today’s discussion with Mr. Junger. I’ll get things started with the obvious question:
Mr. Junger, what compelled you to tackle such a dangerous and, at times, tedious project as this?
Sebastian, Welcome to the Lake.
David, Thank you for Hosting today’s Book Salon.
Welcome to Firedoglake – glad you could join us today!
My pleasure. Mr. Junger?
Thanks for being here today Sebastian, and thanks to David for hosting.
I’ll second David’s question, and add — how do you think the experience changed you?
Sebastian is here, answering the first question.
Okay, great. Let’s await Mr. Junger’s response before piling on more questions.
Hi there, its a pleasure to be on. I’ve been covering Afghanistan – and human rights issues in general – since the mid-nineties. I was in Afghanistran in 2001 when Kabul was liberated from the Taliban, and i was very moved by the gratitude of the Afghans that I met in those first heady days. Unfortunately the war was undermanned, under-resourced and the Bush administration basically forgot about it and moved on to Iraq. I decided that if my country was going to be engaged in Afghanistan for many years, I should understand what it’s like to be a soldier in combat. I followed one platoon – about 35 men – off and on for a deployment. That was the concept for the book – and the documentary I shot, directed and produced with my partner, Tim Hetherington.
Good afternoon Sebastian and David and welcome to FDL.
David, I have not had a chance to read your book but based on this intro, it sounds like you’re starting on the current series of books that folks like Michael Herr, David Halberstam, and all the others wrote about Vietnam and the troops serving then.
It’s a damn shame that still another generation of US military have to deal with all the fall-out of War.
@Dakine, yes, I look forward to reading those books.
@Sebastian: so to repeat the other commenter’s question, how did your reporting change you?
Anyone so inclined should feel free to retweet:
NOW: Perfect Storm author @SebastianJunger discusses new book War w David Axe @Daxe of @warisboring on FDL Book Salon: http://yhoo.it/d1y34s
Yes it is a shame…and i’m not sure i have a hopeful answer for you. There is this, however: According to anthropological surveys of tribal societies around the world, the typical mortality rate among non-combattants from inter-tribal violence is something like ten or fifteen percent. In the recent bloody century, the civilian casualty rate in western wars is around one percent. So as violent as this century may seem, it’s at least a tenfold improvement over our evolutionary origins.
@Sebastian: so how have you change personally as a result of this work?
My reporting has changed me profoundly – particularly in Africa, where the level of civilian suffering was pretty hard to process, psychologically. The suffering of others is in some ways more disturbing than ones own hardships, and the trips i made to liberia and sierra leone, as well as Afghanistan in 2000, really left a mark on me.
With the soldiers, i found that the time i spent with them – five one-month trips at a remote outpost – made me much more emotional about things. In a good way, though – easily moved, more open, more accessible. That happened to a lot ofd guys in the platoon. Shrinks even have a term for it: post-traumatic growth.
Realistically what could the U.S. have done in Afghanistan anyhow, other than leave? The Soviets put no shortage of resources into the country, running the gamut from total war in parts of the country, to development of infrastructure like roads & schools in parts of the country. It was during the Soviets that Afghan women became ‘liberated,’ going to USSR for higher ed & becoming doctors & teachers. How’d that work for the Soviets?
@Sebastian: “Post-traumatic growth.” I like that. My own reporting in East, Central and West Africa has resulted in the same changes in my own life.
Next question?
How did you get access to shoot and interview?
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I see eCAHNomics has the next question. Thanks.
Inserting troops into the Korengal as in Afghanistan more generally was and is a pointless exercise. It is important to understand what the larger strategy and policy are to measure whether the sacrifice asked of real people is worth the price. Our policy aim of chasing al Qaeda from Afghanistan was accomplished within a few months. Since then there has been simply no policy reason to keep an army in country. We have only to look at countries like Somalia and Yemen to see examples where we have retained strike capacities without an occupying force. Afghanistan should have been no different.
I have forgotten the exact figures but back in WWII the rule of thumb was something like about 40 straight days of combat and maybe 100 cumulative total were the limits because after that it was assumed the soldiers were too damaged and crazy to be either useful soldiers or citizens. Nowadays it seems soldiers face many multiples of these combat exposures but that reality seen in WWII has not changed. This brings me around to the hypocrisy of our political elites, both Democratic and Republican who claim to “support the troops” and the very time they are so casually spending their lives, their bodies, and their souls.
Why in 9 years in Afghanistan and Iraq have the media spent so little time exposing such hypocrisy and waste? Do you think your book does or was it more an adventure story?
I see. Thanks.
Hugh, those are all good questions, and I’m eager to read Mr. Junger’s response. My own reporting in eastern Afghanistan taught me that much of the fighting has little to do with Islamic extremism. We’re fighting a dozen unrelated wars in Afghanistan. A clearer strategy would help winnow down the fighting to that which actually matters. For one, we should be less enthusiastic about supporting a government as corrupt and dangerous as Hamid Karzai’s.
“Post-traumatic growth.” I like it.
I’m very much looking forward to seeing Restrepo when it opens on July 2. For those who haven’t seen the trailer:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-DjqR6OucBc&feature=player_embedded
The style of the movie seems to match that of the book: more intimate and personal, less bravado than a lot of war reporting.
If there was one thing you would say gets poorly communicated in most reporting on Afganistan, and you could correct it, what would it be?
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan and failed to impose their will on the Afghan people. The US was welcomed by the vast majority of Afghans – somewhere around 90% in those early days – because they hated the Taliban. The Taliban were seen as a foreign invasion by Pakistan. With the hearts and minds pretty much in support of us,it was a hard war to botch, but nevertheless Bush and Rumsfeld still managed to. I know gwnerals in the military who are still bitter about this. We left 15,000 American troops there and moved on to Iraq. There are 35,000 cops in NY city, by comparison. There was absolutely no plan for success in Afghanistan becaise the administration was so focussed on Iraq. But that does not mean that as a military problem, it was insurmountable.
Can you talk about the mechanics of your reporting: how you got access, how you published while “deployed” and what kinds of logistical challenges you faced?
I know you’ve also done reporting from Afghanistan, David. How did the experience of the platoon in War match up with your own experience?
The troops were put into the Korengal to prevent attacks on the Pech River Valley, which was an important economic and mobility corridor between Pakistan and Kabul. It worked. A road was going to be paved through the KOrengal and the CHowkay to Jalalabad, which was going to bring goods, services and government to a very poor area. THe first outposts were built with the understanding that an influx of troops would finish the job. Because of Iraq that influx never happened, so the outposts had no real purpose and were abandomed. Four hundred thousand Afghans were killed during the chaos and violence of the 1990′s. In the nine years since NATO has been on the ground, something like 10,000 Afghan civilians have died. So at least from a humanistic standpoint, please don’t condemn the war as hypocritical. As hopeless as the situation may seem, it’s far better than those terrible days after the Soviet withdrawal.
None of my experiences were as “kinetic” (a.k.a, violent) as Sebastian’s. After all, Sebastian experienced what was probably the most intensive violence of the war so far. But as for the dynamics of the platoon and the broad problems of the war … I can vouch for Sebastian’s accuracy. He knows what he’s talking about. And he’s captured some of the importance essence of the timeless experience of going into battle with your friends.
Sebastian, how did you react to the news, earlier this year, that NATO has withdrawn from the Korengal?
I would also be interested in what other considerations are involved in reporting in Afghanistan because there have been stories for years now about how the Pentagon trades access for good press.
i was an accredited journalist who was placed with a unit by the army public affairts office in bagram. i flew i by helicopter and was free to pretty much stay as long as i want, film whatever i wanted and report as i saw fit. i was writing for vanity fair and shooting video for ABC. I filed my stories after I got home, but I did have a satelite phone with me.
it seemed to make sense given then shift in strategy by the taliban and by the general lack of troops. that said, it was a painful moment for the men who had fought there.
Hugh, actually, I haven’t found that to be true. I’ve written several highly critical stories about the Afghan war and have never seen any restrictions on my access. The logistics of traveling in eastern Afghanistan are often daunting and can thwart reporting enterprises, but we shouldn’t blame that on military censors.
Somwhat OT, but not entirely, for both Sebastian and David: how do you feel about what is happening to Private Bradley Manning, the whistleblower who gave the footage of the Apache helicopter strike in Iraq to Wikileaks?
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/06/18/wikileaks/index.html
Next week it appears Wikileaks is going to release the 2009 Gerani footage in which more than 140 Afghan civilians & 92 children were killed. And the Pentagon won’t let Manning have access to an attorney that Wikileaks has provided.
There also appears to be a concerted attempt to smear him in order to deter future whistleblowers. Would be interested in knowing your thoughts.
A perhaps odd question: how did you cope with the boredom of living long periods at a remote outpost?
that certainly was not my experience but i cant speak for all journalists. i think the military gets upset if they feel the reporting is slanted and biased, and the press corps is certainly capable of that. But we shot – and aired – video of civilian casualties immediately after a US airstike, and we never heard a peep from the military. We went back six more times to that unit without any issue. I would like to credit Battaion Commander Bill Ostlund for ensuring that journalists maintained free access to the Koerngal and other areas in Kunar province. He really “got it.”
I don’t want to get too far off-topic, but I will say this: I am a proponent of TOTAL transparency, even in the WikiLeaks case. Our government should not be in the business of hiding the facts from us. After all, this is our war. We’re paying for it.
I hate to tell you this but that is close to no argument at all. That’s a vanishingly low bar to say that we are killing fewer people than the Russians. My previous comment was primarily about politicians across the board getting campaign mileage off troops at the same time they are sending them to die and be maimed physically and psychologically in meaningless wars. But as you bring up the Afghans, the question is why we should be killing any of these people or sending our soldiers to be killed there. Saying that fewer people are getting killed for nothing doesn’t actually help those who were, in fact, killed.
“Imposing one’s will on another nation” sounds like a surefire way to lose hearts & minds before passing GO & collecting $200 even once.
i’ve got no experience in that field. i think its more the FBI than the military that is dealing with the leaker.
i brought a lot of good books.
There is this story from Stars and Stripes from August 24, 2009 covering events primarily in 2008-2009 about how the Pentagon was doling out embeds to supportive journalists.
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=64348
Aloha, Sebastian and David! Mahalo for being here at the Lake!
A side question… Wasn’t the Korengal outpost the one where the Bn. Cmdr and others officers were given letters of reprimand for the site selection, in that it was virtually indefensible…?
the Allies killed thousands of Frenchmen during the D Day bombing campaign that drove the Germans out of France. The ten thousand figure in Afghanistan is total deaths – most of which have been caused by the Taliban. If you’re going to urge a pull-out of Afghanistan because of accidental deaths, I think you’re going to have to advocate a position that we should not have fought and defeated the German Army in Europe. BUt that seems like a tricky position to argue.
No that was the Waygal, and the letters of reprimand have not been issued to date.
Hugh, I’m familiar with that story and the reporters who investigated it. I believe, if you read closely, you’ll see that the military circulated internal memos on various reporters’ publishing histories, but did not make embed decisions based on those memos. In fact, I’m fairly sure that the colonels who approved most of my embeds (I’ve had around 20) never did much digging into my background. Just some simple Googling. I don’t mean to sound like a military apologist, but there honestly is not much censorship going on — and what little does happen, is scattered and certainly not categorical.
that would make it hard to exlain all the negative press that came out of both wars. Elizabeth Rubin wrote an extremely negative piece about thwe Korengal for the NY Times magazine and was invited back months later.
Sebastian, I want to ask a perhaps difficult and seemingly insensitive question. I ask with all due respect and all sincerity: considering that you’re a “combat veteran” (though not a soldier), do you ever find yourself looking down on people who aren’t combat vets?
Sebastian and David –
Thanks so much for participating here. Very appreciated.
To keep my question short and simple: What effects (if any) on the Afghans’ attitude towards the US presence has the use of drone strikes had?
The legitimate reason for pulling out of Afghanistan is the use of violence as in war, as well as other situations, is not only immoral but ineffective in resolving conflict.
The elevation of warriors to positions of admiration, if not worship, is in fact elevating the training of young men and women to be killers. It is reprehensible. I for one hate to see this because it seduces our young people into violence and too often their own deaths and injury, not to mention the children, spouses and siblings of other human beings.
I am not an expert but I am suspicious of embedding media for those reasons. I look forward to reading this book and hope I do not find the promotion of admiration of these soldiers, not to mention those who exploit them.
David, you’re my kinda guy
;)
None of the Afghans I’ve spoken to in the Kunar valley and Logar province had anything to say about drones. Their complaints were directed at U.S. mortars and artillery that often peppered their homes and killed their livestock. And they hated the big armored military trucks that routinely destroy bridges, culverts and walls. Infantry leaders spend a lot of time apologizing for ruined infrastructure and dead animals.
Yes, it is tricky to argue that because it is a strawman. There was a reason to fight WWII. There is no reason for us to be still in Afghanistan. A commitment of troops requires not just a strategy but a policy. There has been no policy reason for troops to be in Afghanistan for nearly 9 years. Every death, every physical and psychological wound, Afghan, US, or NATO during those 9 years has been for nothing. We do not have an army in Afghanistan fulfilling a policy. We have an army in Afghanistan in search of such a policy. We can debate whether this is a big waste or a little waste, but it is still a waste, pure and simple.
I respectfully disagree. Violence can be a very effective way of resolving conflicts. The key is to use it VERY judiciously.
no i dont…that would result in me “looking down on” almost every one of my friends and my entire family. Along with a good many people who i admire for the amazingly varied forms of courage and strength that life can require.
With the discussion now about the stated withdrawal date/or to start, what do you see that needs to happen to make withdrawal = success?
Ah, I see. That must be the “post-traumatic growth.” Thanks.
those strikes are mostly in pakistan and i dont think the afghans worry about it too much. many of them see pakistan as supporting the taliban and so there is no love lost between the two countries.
It’s all about semantics. The administration needs to establish achievable benchmarks — say, train up 300,000 Afghan troops and reduce violence in the five biggest cities — while also distancing itself from the Karzai regime. Then we leave, congratulating ourselves on the way out.
Do you see that (setting benchmarks) happening?
The book is pretty much what it feels like to be a soldier in combat. A lot of them like it. I think young men have been “liking” it since the siege of troy, and beyond, and the reasons are profound and need to be understood if war is ever to be stopped. like it or not, violence is sometimes the most effectve way to stop violence. NATO stopped a genocide in Bosnia with a two week bombing campaign. Their only mistake was that they waited until 250,000 civilians had died. It’s hard for me to accept the idea that the world should have sat by and just continued to watch the slaughter.
The “war in Afghanistan” was originally sold to America and the military force that was authorized by Congress was authorized as a military supported grab and snatch. Afghanistan had Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, we wanted them, “Afghanistan” (via its outlaw, unrecognized Taliban govt that was a catspaw of Pakistan) wouldn’t turn them over, so we were going in to get them.
Since then, obviously things became very different from the original sales pitch. What they have never become, however, is coherent or mission oriented. While a lot of Afghans weren’t crazy about the Taliban, where they lots more crazy about our “allies” like Dostum? And weren’t they in large parts happy to see the Americans bc they thought we were going to usher in some kind of prosperity for them (i.e., no one told them were were there on grab and snatch at first)?
What IS the goal? The gameplan? And if it is supposed to be anything positive for Afghans, as opposed to an America-centric goal, and will require a military element, how does that military generate and keep the positive feelings towards Afghans that would be needed when they are suffering the kinds of losses and battles and impacts you describe?
I’m not sure how much I trust the “combatant v. noncombatant” numbers when almost every male over 15 and anyone killed gets categorized as being a terrorist or insurgent, but in the end, I just don’t get what we are doing other than keeping a reason for us to have Bagram and border access with Pakistan.
With the Afghan army, yes. But we’re still waffling on Kandahar and we’re too close to the Karzai regime.
i think we went there becaues of 9-11, but from the Afghan perspetive a pull-out would be disastrous. The reasoning behind staying there – other than humanitarian concerns – would be that Al Qaeda would theoretically have a chance to reinstall themselves there and attack Spain, England, Morrocco, Algeria, Tunesia, Egypt, Jordan and of course the US again. I’m not saying i’m for or against it, but i do believe that is the strategic reasoning behind being there.
Want to thank Junger for writing this book, and Axe for hosting today. I’m still reading “War” and am hopscotching around it because it hurts more to read straight through. As a family member of a vet it makes all too palpable the conditions which result in PTSD.
The distinction in Axe’s introduction here today is very important, making clear the difference between war and combat. I thought of that disconnect when reading this passage:
(p. 170)
The war at meta level is muddy out here away from the outposts; I can’t even begin to understand how our troops manage to keep it together when war is completely divorced from the field and becomes nothing more than a constant battle for survival.
I think we have very different ideas about negative is. A lot of the Iraq war coverage was done by NYT neocons like Michael Gordon and John Burns. Nor do I think Tom Ricks, or any of the other network and cable correspondents, were much better. They all bought about 90% of the Pentagon narratives on Iraq and only disagreed around the edges. It wasn’t the war’s goals but rather how these were being accomplished which they focused on. And even there they were always open to a bait and switch. The surge’s primary goal was to create the conditions for national reconciliation, with that reconciliation being the measure of whether the surge had succeeded or not. In the end, they opted for a definition of success as a reduction in violence, much of which came not from the surge but buying off (fairly cheaply too) the Sunni militias and ethnic cleansing of Baghdad largely accomplished by the time the surge occurred.
I see much the same in the coverage of Afghanistan where the nuts and bolts of policy and the complexities of Afghanistan are papered over in favor of whatever McChrystal’s next big plan is.
the casualty numbers were compiled by human rights watch and the UN, not the US military.
Isn’t comparing Afghanistan with WWII (including population density issues) a bit apples and oranges? What is it that we are going to be able, with a bombing or military campaign, to successfully drive out of Afghanistan and why is it a nation interest to have that military drive go on for years and years and years?
thank you for reading my book, and for what you said. i decided to keep politics out of my book because i was trying to capture those weird moments of reflection that all soldiers have. i’m really glad you picked up on that.
I would like to think some of the brass knows what we/they are doing. From what we hear, I am not sure the kind of strategy you describe is in place. Of course since it is so hard to trust the gov’t any more, there is so little we can believe.
The famously stated ‘Avenue of Last Recourse’… Unlike Shrub’s tendency as the first avenue…!
for me its more a moral issue: if we are willing to accept the moral ambiguity of killing frenchmen to liberate france, why are we stumbling over the same issue in Afghanistan. If the Afghans didnt want us there, we would be fighting a broadbased insuergency like the Soviets were. And thats not happening (believe me, you;d know about it if it were.) The fact is that a pullout would result in a horrific level of suffering and death for the Afghan people. Its really, really hard for me to get myself to advocate that.
I agree that hoping for an Iraq-style “surge” is not a wise approach to Afghanistan. If we wanted to enforce true, street-level security across all of Afghanistan, it would require a million troops — more than we and our NATO allies even have at the ready. We need a clearer strategy tied to real national interests and honed by an awareness of our limited resources.
I don’t know how anyone compiles credible casualty numbers – what is Taliban killing civilians v. warlord fighting druglord? With no real policing or police force, what is vendetta and theft and opportunism v. “war” casualties? When men, women and children die in remote areas – there aren’t statiticians there. And who is wrapping in refugee deaths and how are killings in refugee camps accounted for etc.?
But while I don’t trust numbers that get tossed around, that was the lesser point – the bigger point is I have yet to hear anyone really explain why we are there. The soldiers have a reason- to survive and to help each other survive. But that reason isn’t a mission, it’s not a strategy, it’s not a national goal.
Sebastian, can you update us on any of the soldiers in your book, and where they are now?
Why don’t we hear it? What are we missing? Obama is supposed to be the Educator in Chief, and I think he should have the capacity to bring us along.
Are you seriously calling NY Times correspondent a neocon? That’s impressive. Are you are of the three decades of reporting he has devoted to human rights abuses around the world?
The point is we do not need to occupy Afghanistan or keep an army there just to strike at al Qaeda bases that aren’t even there but only may be there someday. Strangely enough, for 9 years al Qaeda has been in Pakistan able to plan these very same attacks you say we need an army in Afghanistan to prevent. If they are in Pakistan and we don’t have an army in Pakistan, why do we need an army in Afghanistan where they only might be but currently aren’t?
The politics must still be resolved, though; how do we put the lives of our troops, our family members, on the line for something so flimsy that it can be so easily separated from what happens in the field? It shapes our nation’s priorities and decision-making when military ask for more and better weaponry to fight these epic battles and wrenching skirmishes, using failures and defeats in the field as justification, when the real reason for war is never very clear.
What these troops and the people they fight never learn, administer, receive is what is needed most: winning each other’s hearts and minds and coming to some shared understanding about the common need for security and stability. The endless string of combat driven by the flimsy rationale for war does not appear in any way to achieve this end.
As i said before, we went there after 9-11 to stabilize the country so that it could not be used as a base of operations by Al Qaeda. That may not be sufficient reason to have gone, but that was the historical reason. We are still there because Afghanistan is not capable of maintaining its own security or governing itself. As for casualties, they are actually highly accurate because the Taliban – sensing a propaganda potential – was very effective at disseminating information about “collatoral damage.”
Isn’t this the same argument that was made about Iraq? A couple million people died in the Congo. On this line of reasoning, why didn’t we have our army there?
(Also in reply to Sebastian @58)
I might have expected some concern on the Afghani’s part that the drone strikes — which seem to be used very aggressively and which certainly have caused significant collateral damage — would result in retaliations and radicalization on the other side, that could hurt the Afghanis themselves, unnecessarily. Interesting that that’s not what you have observed.
Yes lust for blood is addicting. I don’t want to hear how much fun it is to hunt and kill other human beings. But cultures and societies have variously developed many anti-social taboos, including in some to violence.
It is this we should strive for.
There is little different programing our youth to violence and sacrifice of self than the doping and cutting out of the hearts of Aztec youth,.
Actually they’ve got a lot in common, I do blame the Brits in the arbitrary ‘Durand Line’ that bisected the Pashtun tribes…
And Pakistan’s ISI in fueling the Taliban…!
I dont think they’ve managed to attack the US as they did on 9-11. I think the military wisdom here is that their operational freedom is much reduced – but not completely shut down – in Pakistan. If they had their “own” country, with an airport, industry, mineral wealth, communications, etc., they would be far more effective. They might even be able to threaten the Pakistan state from a secure position in Afghanistan. For a number of reasons that would not have a good outcome.
for me its more a moral issue: if we are willing to accept the moral ambiguity of killing frenchmen to liberate france, why are we stumbling over the same issue in Afghanistan.
I think this goes to my 68 – ping ponging isn’t easy ;) When you have an army occupying a densly populated city and you have a military objective and goal of pushing them out, and it’s an army that has declared war on your country and has planes, warships, uboats etc. with which it is engaging in that war, you do have a drastic situation. We weren’t “liberating France” to liberate France, we were at war with Germany.
OTOH, what we keep hearing is that we are in Afghanistan to, you know, win hearts and minds and help protect people. In essence, to be the local police force (that doesn’t speak the language or have any connection with the locals and which has a lot of baggage from the locals blowing up the police from time to time, but still). So the why we balk has to do a lot with, for example, why we would balk if the response to gangs in LA would be to bomb the inner city.
What is the goal? If the goal is truly a WWII aligned goal of figuring out who the Taliban Army is (or the Al-Qaeda army, or …) and driving it somewhere (where’s the Red Sea when you need it?) then IMO that’s just not a goal that can be accomplished but even if it can – what is the national interest in exporting war for years and years to drive a Taliban army out of Kandahar?
If the Afghans didnt want us there, we would be fighting a broadbased insuergency like the Soviets were. And thats not happening (believe me, you;d know about it if it were.) The fact is that a pullout would result in a horrific level of suffering and death for the Afghan people. Its really, really hard for me to get myself to advocate that
Or VietNam…bomb ‘em back to the stone age, then we are surprised all these people have not built democratic institutions. I am still hearing people surprised that Iraq is a country in shambles.
International military forces ARE in Congo and have saved lives. Iraq was not at war and I think the outrages of the Husseim regime could have been dealt with more effectively by threatening military action but not employing it. So in no way am I using Afghanistan to justify Iraq…please dont throw me in that pile.
hmm, having trouble seperating the sarcasm from the sincere points. I was over there for 5 months and never really observed “blood lust.” It was a far more complex situation than that. Maybe your experiences in war zones is different, I can only speak to my own.
Most of the bloody drone strikes take place in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. Drone ops in Afghanistan are mostly aimed at providing “close air support” to the ground troops. Those missions always require the vetting of a forward observer on the ground, so civilian casualties are minimized. I observed those activities myself and can vouch for their strictness.
Apparently you have never listened to Burns do one of his Iraq interviews. It runs like this. Iraq is very depressing. Everything seems to be going wrong. Nothing the US is doing there is working. So obviously the US must stay indefinitely. Yes, Burns is a neocon, an especially annoying one. I think you don’t understand that the people around this blog cover many different aspects of government and policy. We have paying close attention for years. One of the first things we ever learned was that we needed not just to look at the facts in a story but who was reporting and for which publication because this said a great deal about how the story was being spun. It is no accident that Judy Miller and Michael Gordon work or worked at the NYT, or that Burns was in Baghdad, or that Bill Keller was executive editor, or that any neocon able to scribble an op-ed while on a drunked binge could get published on Andy Rosenthal’s editorial page.
I believe the stated goal is to build up the Afghan economy, infrastructure and security forces so that they can return to the level of functionality that existed before the Soviet invasion.
I’m not sure we’re going to have a productive conversation at this point. Good luck with your endeavors.
Similar things could be said about both Somalia and Yemen. We have armies in neither. We need armies in neither to accomplish our goals. We do not need an army in Afghanistan either.
Something is clearly going on in Pakistan anyhow, though. There has to be a credible threat which has resulted in the deployment of hundreds (if not thousands) of military and state personnel and contractors under the guise of advisory capacity. Jeremy Scahill documented a portion of this effort in his piece last fall, The Secret US War in Pakistan. There’s a massive complex being built, guarded by what Pakistanis believe to be Xe personnel (there’s a lot of details out in the wild over the internet about the complex).
Which makes the current level of effort in Afghanistan look futile if the real threat is in Pakistan; why not de-escalate to a special ops only level? Has there been any discussion of this option by military that you are aware of?
Sebastian, have you followed up on any of the 2nd Platoon soldiers? I’d love to know how they’re doing.
the uzbeks and the kyrgyz have plenty in common and they’re killing each other right now. unfortunatelt thats a seperate issue from social or political ties. you are absolutely right about the brits and the Durand line, though…history would be very different without that.
That is interesting information, thank you. Still, it’s the attitudes of the people living in Afgjhanistan, I mean about consequences of the less controlled drone strikes on the Pakistan side of the border, that concerns me most.
Well apparently they did not “save” the first 2 million. You just seem all over the place though in your rationalizations and justifications for our military occupation of Afghanistan. This is unsurprising because so much of that is the recycled arguments of the Bush and Obama Administrations and neither of them has come up with a coherent reason for our being in Afghanistan now, not 9 years ago, but now.
yes i’ve been in touch with them continually…most are still in the service and many are already back over there. brendan o’byrne is doing well. their response to the book was incredibly positive, which was a very gratifying thing for me.
I don’t mean to be argumentative and I appreciate your participation and your book – but I don’t think even the historical reason was to “stabilize” Afghanistan – it was to get Bin Laden. With the failure to accomplish that goal, and with transit of Al-Qaeda operations cross borders to Pakistan and some leeryness aobut invading Pakistan in the same way as Afghanistan and with a political strategy at work which centered around using Afghanistan primarily as a springboard for ramping up support for militarized actions and invasion of Iraq, I think “stabilizing” Afghanistan quickly became a part of the lexicon, but I haven’t really heard what that is suspposed to mean, either.
If it is as simplistic as saying, “a stabilized Afghanistan is one from which Al-Qaeda can’t sit securely to plot against America” then is that our goal worldwide? Shouldn’t we be invading Pakistan if our military goal is not allowing Al-Qaeda to plot? Or Somalia? Do you battle a worldwide ideology, unsupported by armies but advocated by many cells and groups under many names and affiliated with many criminal enterprises as well, by plopping US soldiers into one or two spots – Afghanistan here?
I just can’t believe in the US military as something like an institutionalized St. Patrick, able to drive the ideological snakes out of Afghanistan (but then into where? at least the German army could be driven to Germany and dealt with institutionally there – whereas we are trying to drive something from the planet and give it no place of quarter and negotiation)
I agree with you that society should be careful what it asks for and I think that hammering on the options and outcomes might help it ask for something more realistic.
i dont think you can seperate the two. An effort in Pakistan – without a NATO presence in Afghanistan, or a stable Afghan government – would simply push combattants back over the line again.
Okay, folks, we’ve only got 15 minutes left. Can we rein in the chat and focus on the book? Remember, WAR is not about, ahem, “war.” It’s about the personal experience of combat.
Hi, I’m not taking a position here, I’m just explaining what I believe the stated rationale for the NATO presence in Afghanistan to be. THe stated rational is to deprive Al Qaeda of a base to attack to duplicate the attacks of 9-11. Attacks like that have not come out of Yemen or Somalia, for a variety of reasons, and at least Yemen has a fairly stable government. You may disagree with me, but I cant really see a good reason for using US troops in those countries.
Sebastian, do you ever miss the thrill of combat?
Yes, you’re pointing at a key problem: mission creep. Or at least that’s the simplest label to put on this muddying of major objectives to be accomplished with military action in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
Of course the missions were deliberately muddy from the beginning. The AUMFs do not match the arguments provided by two different administrations for what we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, let alone a myriad other countries over which we are lily-padding the face of the earth.
combat is terrifying and i hated it. i still have bad dreams about it.
and then there are the ongoing questions about Ethan Bronner’s NYT coverage from Jerusalem.
Ok – good. Let’s take that. It’s not a “drive the Germans out of France by bombing” goal. Building infrastructure and building an economy – as combat goals? This is where I have so much disconnect. And I have to wonder – did your platoon see or feel that as its mission? Building infrastructure and the economy of Afghanistan?
This is where I think the combat analogy breaks down. Post WWII, this was our goal – but we weren’t killing tens of thousands of Frenchmen after the war to accomplish it. What will it take to build the Afghan infrastructure and economy if that is the goal and how is it accomplished by our current practices and is Afghanistan’s infrastructure and economy so very much more important than African and other places in SE Asia and the ME and Indonesia?
If you thought this blog visit was going to be a walk in the park, I am sorry to disabuse you. We don’t have a lot of time and so we can be less than gentle in finding out who you are and where you are coming from. But we are trying to tell you something. You can not separate the larger questions from the personal experiences, as you say you have. A lot of people you met died and were wounded in the Korengal. It is important to understand that however intense those experiences were all that energy, boredom, and pain was ultimately for nothing, a pointless deployment in a misguided war that had lost its raison d’être years ago. That is the context we are trying to remind you of today.
Thanks.
I have the sense that you’re suffering from a mild case of PTSD yourself; it’d be very difficult not to have some residual psychological impact after being on a heightened state of alert for such long stretches.
Are you or have you received any treatment? Are there any therapies that your military cohort have received which have been effective?
I’m definitely going to pick up a copy of ‘War’…! Having served 20 years in the US Army, I always enjoy first hand accounts…!
Mahalo, Sebastian for all your efforts in embedding and writing/producing the book and documentary…! *g*
As we come to the end of this Book Salon,
Sebastian, Thank you for stopping by the Lake and spending the afternoon with us discussing your new book and experiences.
David, Thank you very much for Hosting this great Book Salon.
Everyone, if you would like more information, here is Sebastian’s website, and David’s website.
Thanks all.
Hugh, please be more respectful. In spending as much time as he did in what amounts to the most dangerous part of Afghanistan at its most lethal moment, Sebastian has done everyone a service. He has helped us understand what our soldiers go through in service of our foreign policy. Focusing on the personal experience does not make Sebastian an apologist for misguided policy. Neither does it make him an expert on it … nor accountable for it. I feel some of the commenters are missing the point, and value, of Sebastian’s book.
Thanks, everyone!
Sebastian’s documentary – http://trailers.apple.com/trailers/independent/restrepo/
If there’s still time and you’re still around – let me shift gears completely and ask, since we as a society have asked for the Afghan and Iraq wars from our soldiers, what should we be doing that we aren’t to help reduce the issues you point out relating to the difficulty of soldiers re-integrating?
The military has provincial reconstruction teams that have actually done quite a bit over there. in the “new” era, i think stabilization efforts actually ARE what many wars are going to look like. Combat between mechanized armies, like in WW II, is thank God probably a thing of the past. The level of casualties in the “new” wars is a tiny fraction of the horrors of mechanized warfare. So if I had to pick one, frankly I’d pick this. Or we could simply leave and let the Afghans suffer whatever the consequences are, but i think from a humanistic standpoint that would be very painful to watch.
David Dayen is upstairs!
Trumka’s Important Speech on Immigration
Thanks for being here, Sebastian, to discuss your book; thanks, David, for hosting.
This is a tough topic, in no small part because what happens on the battlefield has been so removed from the political process. Until we reincorporate the physical and psychic price of combat back into the political process, we’re going to make a lot of mistakes costing much human collateral.
OT — There was a comment from Raven here a minute ago, and now it’s not here. However raw the comment was, that rankles.
May I put in a good-faith request that the good Mods consider defaulting to “edited in moderation”, not just disappearing comments? Especially from longstanding community members who’ve contributed as much as Raven has?
Without context the meaning is lost. Hard questioning is not respectful nor disrespectful. It is what happens in these salons. Perhaps Junger can tell a good war story, but after 9 years we should be able to expect he has more than a vague understanding made up of Bush and Obama Administration talking points for why we are still in Afghanistan. Leaving out the pointlessness of the conflict removes a crucial dimension of the narrative and reduces its value.
Hugh, the host pointed out in the intro to this salon that this was about combat, in spite of the book’s title. Junger covered combat and the actions/reactions of the troops engaged in it, not the politics which define war.
Maybe you could suggest authors whose work covered the political machinations which make war, who might also be better targets for your questions about policy.
He doesn’t have questions he has an agenda.
David, Sebastian, thank you both so much for being here today. Looking forward to seeing Restropo.
If you take this tack, how does this book advance anything? Young Americans fighting, dying, and wounded, same as it ever was. We knew that.
As for Raven, you are correct. I have an agenda. It is to not send American soldiers into pointless wars to kill and be killed for the mistakes of their military and civilian superiors. I would think that was an agenda we could share.
It’s important to document this war, Hugh; every war and the people we send off to do our dirty work deserve this careful, clear examination at close range as a reminder there is a human toll and there is failure. Why do these men who died in our names — whether we support the war they are fighting or not — deserve less than men who fought in other wars?
Should we simply leave a massive, unexamined black hole where people were physically and mentally wounded or died, fighting a bloodless battle of policy all around it as if the hole never happened? Forgetting the human toll makes your agenda hollow, and discouraging us from examining it means disconnecting humanity from policy even more than before.
[edit: I suggest you actually read the book and ask yourself about the other policy issues involved. There are going to be tens of thousands of O'Byrnes walking around for decades to come; the war itself is not the only matter we must address. Some of us already know and love these O'Byrnes and are dealing with issues that most Americans only deal with as an abstraction. It would have been nice to talk about more concrete issues related to the O'Byrnes.]
I am sorry I had to leave but will make final note in case anyone may look.
My agenda is as yours.
It is unfair to speak without reading the book but what we don’t need is anything that makes war seem natural, just normal things being done by virtuous heroic warriors.
As long as we worship the warriors there will be young people signing up to learn to do violence to others and to their own spirits and bodies.
Someday I want to read a book by a journalist who embeds with the Afghan people and tells us of their experiences and … post traumatic growth.
I’m hoping somebody is already doing that, but I wonder if they are not American but some other nationality and we’re missing their work for the narrowcasting that publishers do in this country by favoring English-language works.
I hate to think there’s only Sarah Chayes’ work so far.
Poor widdle neocons Think that the U.S. mission should be restoring Afghanistan to what it was before the Soviets invaded. What??? No Jeffersonian democracy? Not even a flush toilet in every Afghan hovel? My how the neocons have fallen.
Dream on. Brown peeps don’t count. As well you know.
The closest I know of is the work of Anand Gopal -
http://anandgopal.com/