[Welcome Julian Zelizer, and Host Fred Logevall.] [As a courtesy to our guests, please keep comments to the book. Please take other conversations to a previous thread. - bev]
Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security – From World War II to the War on Terrorism
In an interview in the summer of 1965, McGeorge Bundy, who as Lyndon Johnson’s national security adviser was an architect of the major U.S. escalation in Vietnam then just getting under way, was asked how the actual conduct of American diplomatic affairs differed from his perception of it when he was a dean at Harvard. Bundy replied that the first thing that stood out was “the powerful place of domestic politics in the formulation of foreign policies.”
It’s not a statement that should surprise, and yet it does. It surprises because presidents and their senior aides so seldom make this admission on the record. Sometimes they’re reluctant to admit even to themselves that their decisions in foreign affairs could be affected by cynical partisan maneuvering, by legislative agendas, by election-year imperatives, by careerism. Instead they rush to proclaim fidelity to that favorite adage of politicians first articulated by Daniel Webster during the War of 1812: “Even our party divisions, acrimonious as they are, cease at the water’s edge.”
But Bundy knew whereof he spoke. (Webster did not; the war decision in 1812 had been intimately bound up with party politics and presidential ambition.) Anyone who is skeptical on the matter should read Julian Zelizer’s powerful new book, Arsenal of Democracy, which shows in stark relief just how strong has been the interplay between U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy in the era since World War II. Foreign policy, Zelizer argues, is always a political matter. It’s not always a crass partisan matter—genuine ideological differences sometimes divide Democrats and Republicans, and on occasion these divisions exist also within the parties. But it’s always political.
In the United States of the post-1945 era, Zelizer demonstrates, the jockeying for political advantage never stops. Viewed from a president’s perspective, the next election (whether mid-term or presidential) will arrive all too soon, and presidents are well aware that voters are capable of giving incumbent parties the boot, as of course they have done with regularity. Leaders of the opposing party know the same thing.
Skeptics may wonder if this case is not being made rather too strongly. U.S. elections, after all, seldom turn on foreign policy concerns. Does it not follow that American diplomacy and domestic politics must have only minor influence on each other? Not necessarily, Arsenal of Democracy shows. For one thing, what matters most is what candidates believe the importance of foreign policy in a given election will be or could be, rather than what ex post facto analysis shows it to have been.
Moreover, although it is true that American voters tend to give their chief attention to domestic matters, foreign policy questions have in most years been significant enough to merit the attention of practicing politicians. The professionals in politics have always realized that when domestic issues are in the forefront, diplomatic questions can still shift a few votes in swing districts in critical states. This can mean the difference between victory and defeat for a national ticket, or can decide control of Congress. That, essentially, has always been the politician’s interpretation of the politics of American foreign policy—both for those who are in and those who are out of office.
Zelizer is not the first scholar to offer this line of analysis. What makes his book so important, however, is that he grounds his analysis in deep research in archival sources as well as a thorough understanding of the existing secondary literature. To a greater degree than anyone before him, he is able to puncture the myth of bipartisanship in American politics during the Cold War; in unprecedented detail, he shows that politics seldom in fact ceases at the water’s edge, Daniel Webster’s comforting claim notwithstanding.
I thought of Arsenal of Democracy a couple of months ago when Barack Obama announced his decision to expand U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. The path the president chose, a middle-course option that sends 30,000 additional troops and begins pulling them out in eighteen months, is difficult to understand if the geopolitical stakes in Afghanistan are indeed as high he has said they are.
But if the strategic logic is weak, the domestic political reasoning is compelling. Like Lyndon Johnson on Vietnam, Obama painted himself into a corner with his repeated affirmations, starting in the 2008 campaign, of the Afghanistan struggle’s vital importance; hawks stood ready to remind him of his stark words should he appear to be backing down. By expanding the military commitment Obama could cover his right flank while pursuing domestic goals such as health care reform, jobs, and a new environmental agenda. He could parry right-wing accusations that he was insufficiently committed to the war on terror during elections in 2010 and 2012. At the same time, by stressing clear limits to the war and promising a quick withdrawal, Obama could enhance his chances of keeping disaffected liberals on board.
All of which is to say that Julian Zelizer’s book is not merely a myth-shattering work of history; it’s also a study that has compelling contemporary resonance. I’m delighted to be able to host this salon, and to be able to explore these themes further. The range of potential topics for discussion is vast, ranging temporally from World War II to the Cuban Missile Crisis to Vietnam to Afghanistan. One possible place to begin is with the most recent past: to what extent does our author believe that Obama’s recent escalation in Afghanistan squares with the argument so thoroughly developed in the book? Was the decision in large part about perceived domestic political imperatives?



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Julian, Welcome to the Lake.
Fred, Thank you for Hosting today’s Book Salon.
Thanks for that wonderful post Fred and thanks to Bev for having me. It is a real honor to be on the site. Clearly there are some remarkable similarities between the political environment President Obama has faced with the fierce Republican attacks that he and his party are weak on defense and the attacks President Johnson heard in the early 1960s. The emphasis on Afghanistan since 2006 was in part a Democratic strategy to find a way to oppose Iraq without opening themselves up to the charge that they are against all war and in some ways the Democrats are now living by the logic of that argument. With Rahm Emanuel by President Obama’s side, I am sure that the political factors were elements in the room when the decisions were made.It does seem there are two important models from the 1960s that Obama might look at. Kennedy as he resisted political and military pressure with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and Johnson when he didn’t take that path in 1964 and 1965.
Hi everyone! Looking forward to the discussion.
me too. Looking forward to talking about any of the periods that I cover.
Welcome to Firedoglake – glad you are here!
Thanks!
I am personally curious if people think there are presidential administrations in recent history who offer a useful model for national security policymaking.
Good afternoon Julian and Fredrik and thanks for being her this afternoon.
Julian, I have not had a chance to read your book but I assume you cover all the times where one party or the other failed to follow Webster’s adage. Has it been spread fairly evenly between the parties or are there indications of the one or the other parties doing the undercutting more than the other?
(I am old enough to know it has happened with both parties in power and sometimes the undercutting has come from within the party in power)
What about the counter-argument, Julian, i.e. that Obama made his decision in December for the reasons he said, i.e. that the outcome in Afghanistan is crucial to US national security, and that moreover the dispatch of these additional troops has a good chance of succeeding? In other words, is it possible that you I are being too cynical, or at least that I was in my intro post?
I think the whole “national security advantage” has been more dynamic than we remember. There were many periods–World War II and the early Cold War, the late 1950s (when Democrats like Stuart Symington raised the issue of a missile gap and attacked Eisenhower’s fiscal conservatism), to the the 1990s when Democrats in power showed they could be as hawkish as the GOP. Often Republican divisions were much deeper than we remember, like the 1990s when House Republicans were hesistant about using force in places like Bosnia and divided over homeland security. Also sometimes the more dovish wing of the Democrats, such as in the 1980s, proved to be much stronger politically than we remember.
Oh yummy. This is a book I’ll have to read.
I learned about this last summer when I listened to Dallek’s Nixon & Kissinger. The book was nothing more than an excuse to string together quotes from recently released tapes. But as I listened I discover that they were talking about VN in a way that I had never read in any book on the subject. It was crazy. They weren’t talking about VN at all, but all about how their moves would play in domestic politics. Bizarro world.
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And to answer your question, I would say no administration of the last few decades really offer much more than the barest they could get away with in national security policy making.
Fred. I don’t think the two have to be mutually exclusive. Usually strategic and political reasons are both at work. It is true, and important to remember, that we don’t yet know if political factors were explicitly at work with Obama/Afghanistan as we now they were with LBJ and Vietnam. It could be more subtle, that those fears influenced the White House as they heard arguments from people like Biden about avoiding this war. Or they could be more direct where Obama, believing this path was strategically sound, also saw the political value of moving forward. We just don’t know yet. But we are very aware of the heated political environment in which the decision was made.
Yes those tapes are really haunting. With Nixon, we can see quite clearly how some of his more diplomatic initiatives such as detente were made with very clear calculations about 1972. At the same time, the decisions over Vietnam, both the gradual withdrawal and secret bombing campaign, were made with politics on the mind.
The strategy is irrelevant. It is the absence of an Afghan policy that is critical. And while Obama’s campaign hawkishness on Afghanistan explains his surge, it does not explain why he delayed his Iraq withdrawal on which he also campaigned. I would also note that his surge was not a middle course. It was just one of several hawkish surge options. Withdrawal and reduction were never on the table.
In “The Coldest Winter” by Halberstam the author quotes Kennedy as saying, “just wait till the next guy has to deal with this mess (VN)” (paraphrase). Many folks feel that he was going to wind down but I have my doubts. What say you?
It is important to note Fred that politicians are capable of making decisions without politics dictating their decisions, and I did find that. My chapter on Kennedy really stresses how political Cuba was in 1962 given that Republicans had been attacking the administration since the summer with an eye toward the midterm campaigns. When Kennedy sees the famous photographs, he instantly thinks about the politics of the issue. But in the end the archives made pretty clear that he made decisions which went against those political pressures. Reagan did the same to some extend with INF, as conservatives were calling him a “dupe” of the Kremlin and worse.
No recent administration is without its major flaws. I’m not up on Carter. but I’ve seen a comment wherein it was said that he committed some unnecessary heinous warlike act.
Fair enough, Julian. As a fellow professional historian I certainly concur that there is a great deal that we don’t know about the details of the Obama decision-making. I’m just skeptical that *Senator* Obama would accept the arguments for escalation offered by *President* Obama. The strategic logic seems weak to me, the domestic political logic much more compelling.
Very fair point. I think that we have also seen other ways in which politics has influenced the current administration. Clearly with closing Guantanamo and the civilian trial of the 9/11 mastermind, the president has reversed his decision when Democrats complained of the political hits they were taking. He has also been quite slow to make major changes to the counterterrorism program and by all accounts the administration has been very sensitive to the political fallout of these kinds of decisions.
Do you have evidence in other cases, where there are no tapes, but that are as clear as the Nixon-Kissinger case?
And what does this imply about real U.S. security. In that case, it certainly seemed to work to the detriment of actual security and that would be my guess about how it works in general. For the reason that they were not spending their time figuring out what actually might have worked.
Carter did come under attack. There were certain areas such as Indonesia, where historians have shown his human rights policies much of an influence. He came under significant criticism from human rights groups. Moreover after 1978 Carter shifts to the right, following the midterm elections where conservatives post big gains and hammer away at the president on Panama. The military buildup that accelerates under Reagan really started under Carter. The political attacks from the right were very much on the administration’s mind. He also backs off front detente because it is doing so poorly in the Senate.
Thank you both, Julian and Fred for joining us.
Agree with you about Kennedy, Raven, though the myths would have us “believe” otherwise.
DW
I am not convinced that Kennedy would have brought it to an end. I do think the Cuban Missile Crisis bolstered his confidence, as did the LImited Test Ban Treaty, about resisting the Republican Right and coming out ok. He was also more confident in his foreign policy expertise than Johnson. That said his administration was still filled with many hawks on Vietnam. he also faced the same political pressures, not just for reelection but in terms of preserving decent Democratic majorities. The 1964 election might not have been as much of a landslide had he lived and the continued frustration with the conservative coalition blocking his bills could have also caused him to think twice about withdrawal fearing Republicans would make a lot out of it. So I don’t think the evidence is there to prove he would have taken a different course of action.
I personally believe Obama made the right decision in Afghanistan, given the limited choices. It sounds that you are suggesting if the political calculus had been different, he might have made a different decision.
I have pondered this counterfactual question at length, Raven, and written about in a few places including in my first book Choosing War. It’s unanswerable, of course, but my guess is that JFK would have avoided a major escalation of the war. He was a skeptic on Vietnam, especially in his final year, and he used his advisory system better than LBJ did. Also, the key decision for him would likely have come in his second term, when he no longer had to think about reelection. This is not to say, though, that he had firmly decided on withdrawal prior to his death and indeed begun to implement that withdrawal. I find that argument unconvincing. Like a good politician he was leaving his options open.
Thanks.
This raises the issue of the extent to which Kennedy bought into the domino theory.
Arsenal of democracy sounds a lot like the MIC by another name.
What do you make of what I would call national security clowns, like Dick Cheney, John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Joe Lieberman. They have an unvarnished record of being wrong on everything touching on national security but this does not seem to have diminished either their influence or their reputations an iota.
I assume you are not referring to MAVC when you say “advisory system”?
Yes. The archival data from the Truman years is quite compelling. These are the years when the Republican Right emerges in the GOP and starts using a series of issues such as anti-communism at home, fighting communism in Asia, Korea and more to attack the Democrats. When Truman forms is famous bipartisan alliance with Vandenberg in 1947 and 1948 and in the years that followed there is substantial evidence the White House thinks of the political factors involved. There is an amazing memo from Clark Clifford in 1947 talking about how shifting to the right on anticommunism can help the president. The record from the Johnson administration is just overwhelming if one wants a case study about how politics can directly influence national security policy. There is also really interesting material in the Reagan archives about how political pressures gradually pushed Reagan away from the militarism that characterized his first few years. I even founds some excellent memos about how the administration really was worried about the nuclear freeze movement and its political impact as they thought about SDI.
There is often a big disconnect between the soundness of a policy argument and the political strength of the person making it. The Eisenhower administration felt this way in the late 1950s when Senate Democrats attacked Eisenhower by saying his cutting the budget and trimming defense allowed the Soviets to gain an advantage on intercontinental missiles. Eisenhower knew this was not true and had the evidence to prove it. Yet the missile gap argument brought Kennedy right into the White House.
With Johnson, the tapes really raise a lot of questions about how much he believed in the domino theory, at least with Vietnam. While he talks about the domino effect and worries about how it will play out in southeast asia he and people like Richard Russell have pretty explicit discussions as to why this is not the case with Vietnam. Some of the analysis Kennedy is getting in private quarters and from politicians like Mansfield raised similar doubts.
I have similar beliefs. Too often the archives show how important the political considerations were. I have little doubt politics was PART of the mix for sure.
There’s a big lesson in there for Obama vis a vis a one-term President and the futility of shifting (appeasing the mouth breathers) to the right instead of sticking to Democratic Principles. Flippity Floppity is a bitch at election time.
PS. I don’t believe for a second that Obama is a believer in Democratic Principles. Retroactive immunity for Big Telco. Continued Bush Policies abound, Centrist Supreme Appointment, Credit Card Biden As VP, Gates, Brennen, Petreaus, Trickle Down Too Big TO Fail Banker Stimulus and more.
No, I’m referring to his key civilian advisers–McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, as well as the JCS. As for the domino theory, aardvark, I think the private JFK was skeptical about the whole notion of falling dominoes, that the “fall” of one country would inevitably cause neighboring ones to fall as well. I don’t believe Kennedy was the Cold War hawk that many claim, especially in the wake of the CMC. Do you agree, Julian?
Hackworth 1–would be curious to know what you think Democratic Principles are in 2010 on national security?
And you are right. Even in cases when Democrats play to the hawks and this helps give them some political protection for reelection, never does it stop the ferocity of the attacks for being weak on defense. After Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and move toward Americanization, Republicans in 1965 and 1966 continued to criticize the administration for not unleashing all of America’s force in the area. Republicans did the same after 1947 and 1948 when Truman shifted to the right on anticommunism.
Yes I agree with Fred. Kennedy was much more nuanced as a thinker about the Cold War, especially after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, than some of the accounts suggest. The domino theory was being questioned many times in private during both Kennedy and Johnson’s administration. Many congressional Democrats were raising these questions as well.
Julian and Fred;
Do either of you find it interesting that revelations about the Gulf of Tonkin “incident” seemed to sink beneath the surface almost as soon as they came to light?
I remember several naval intelligence higher-ups who were considerably upset when the “incident” occurred.
It seems to me that such revelations rarely seem to sink into the popular awareness or long prick the official “conscience”, such as it is.
DW
We could certainly draw comparisons between Gulf of Tonkin revelations and WMD revelations after the invasion of Iraq. It is surprising how learning about massive errors or the direct manipulation of data does not have the kind of political impact one would think. With Gulf of Tonkin I think that the attacks were not at the heart of the rationale about why we were using force there. Since the justification was about the broader fight against communism, it might be that revelations have not had the impact they otherwise would have. With Iraq I find it more surprising still, and can’t explain, how the discovery of their absence did not have more of an impact.
Julian: why do you think Democrats have felt so vulnerable to the “soft on communism,” charge, and more recently the “soft on terrorism” charge? And to what extent has their concern been justified? To use LBJ as an example, if indeed he believed he would be finished politically if he failed to fight the fight in Vietnam, was he correct in this view? I’m inclined to say no, as you know.
Democratic Principles in 2010 on national security…
Did you see the Saturday Night Live episode with a few members of the cast posing as Blue Oyster Cult? Guest Host Christopher Walkin played the interrupting Producer and relentlessly called for “More Cowbell!”.
Agreed, regarding WMDs, but the “incident” was what was used to “sell” the public, as I recall.
DW
Wouldn’t that go back to the “Who lost China” question of the fifties? Since Vietnam was the 3rd Asian country after South Korea and China/Taiwan, all in a roughly 15 year period.
Well your work has really made a powerful argument, raising questions about why Johnson had so many fears and if they had any basis in fact. I do understand where johnson came from. Meaning, he was a Democrat who was a product of 1950s America when the Republican Party had regained lost ground from World War II by using anti-communism as a key electoral tool. Johnson is always thinking about the 1950s and what happened to Truman/Stevenson when talking about withdrawal. After 1964, when you think he would feel all the comfort in the world, Johnson turns right away to the 1966 midterm campaign. He is worried that appearing too dovish could increase the size of the conservative coalition and harm his domestic agenda. In Johnson’s case I don’t think the fears were irrational–and make sense in the context of the period–but I do think as you have argued they were wrong and Johnson/Democrats had much more political space than he suggested.
I asked 2 questions in one comment. You answered the first one thoroughly. Thank you. But the second one seems to have gotten lost in the shuffle. So here it is again for your consideration:
And what does this imply about real U.S. security. In that [Nixon-Kissinger] case, it certainly seemed to work to the detriment of actual security and that would be my guess about how it works in general. For the reason that they were not spending their time figuring out what actually might have worked.
I wonder if the issue of the soft of communism / terrorism charge is because Democrats are (or were) willing to turn on their fellow Democrats to join Republicans in these attacks? That is, whether much of the politics is really about elite conflict rather than about votes.
With Democrats since the 1970s I do think there is a fallacy that the Republican attacks will always win out. The reality is that there are many components of American political culture uneasy with militarism. We are a country without a draft, we are a country not eager to sacrifice for war or to become engaged in longer operations, etc. Reagan discovered this very clearly by his second term and I would argue that Bush learned this lesson in his second term. Often the public in the contemporary period is much closer to Democrats than Republicans beyond boilerplate poll questions. Democrats though are so timid on the issue and hesitant about outlining their ideas I think they make their worst nightmares come true.
Class war?
I’m not sure I understand why you’re convinced that Obama’s Afghanistan strategy is so unsound and therefore more likely driven by political considerations.
The alternative would have been to begin withdrawing immediately. Would that have been more sound strategically?
He’s giving the Afghan government 18+ months to prepare for a US withdrawal. He’s clearly making every effort to use this time to eliminate those who can cause the most instability in the region (i.e. in Afghanistan and Pakistan) after we’re gone.
I think withdrawing immediately beginning in 2009 would have created far bigger problems strategically, which would have created political problems for Obama (i.e. he’s looking to avoid political problems for himself by succeeding where Bush failed).
Spot on.
One hopes Obama may somehow hear those words, Julian.
DW
Sorry about that! I am writing at a rapid pace here. Well sometimes I think good can come out of political considerations. It is not always bad. I do feel and write about in the book how detente is very connected to Nixon’s political strategy. In that case detente–meaning negotiations with the Soviets over arms and economic trade and the trip to China–could be seen as a pretty positive strategy for the Cold War. There are some who would say Truman’s political concern about the right in 1947 and 1948 helped motivate him toward the construction of a national security state which was instrumental in the long-term. Now others disagree. Fred has just written a fantastic book with Campbell Craig about the Cold War which argues that Truman took on an adversarial position toward the Soviets which moved us in a bad direction, and this was driven in large part by the politics of insecurity. This is a wonderful read and connects to our discussion today. I highly recommend it.
You could also argue that politics might have pushed Johnson in a better direction if he listened to different political voices. He was so focused on conservatism and the right, that he tried to outflank and crush the political pressure from the left. In some ways Nixon was more open to that pressure as he sought to undercut the left with Vietnamization and ending the draft.
You and Julian make good points here. I would merely add that I think Johnson and other Democrats misread the history. What lost the 1952 election for the Dems was not “loss of China” but what Truman opted to do in the aftermath of that development, namely to take the country into a bloody and stalemated war in Korea.
Gee, not like this hasn’t happened a few times over the years. Like with most every decision the Democrats make.
Yes. The Democrats being weak on defense is really a pretty long tradition. It is def. not an invention of post-Vietnam America and you can really see it accelerate after World War II. It comes from a cohort in the GOP who are really worried about the politics of being tagged as isolationists as a result of their stands in the 1930s and seeking a way to reclaim some of the national security advantage that FDR had built for the Democratic Party. I think the fall of China to Communism in 1949 was a real political turning point as this argument sunk into Republican strategy. Then the 1952 elections, which I think are downplayed too much in historical memory, really had a huge impact on national security politics for the next few decades.
Well, you may be right. I hope you are! I guess I’m just skeptical that the Obama strategy can work. It’s hard to see how a troop increase of this size, even if accompanied by a boost in NATO troops, can really do the job in the vast and forbidding Afghan terrain. By announcing a deadline, moreover, the President signals to anti-American forces in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) that they count on an American withdrawal in 2011 and hence can bide their time until then. But again, reasonable people can differ here.
Yes they are mostly timid and hesitant about standing up for workers, the middle class and the poor. But we should not forget that a Blue Dog Democrat or a “New Democrat” is very likely to use belligerent, bombastic campaign rhetoric for vote getting. They also favor of tax cuts (for the rich).
Someone said that the right and its media has successfully equated patriotism with union busting and tax cuts.
What I think is so odd about Obama and Democrats feeling vulnerable on charges of being socialist and weak on terrorism is that Obama is far from weak on terrorism and congressional Democrats have put forward proposals for domestic policies that are anything but socialist (they’re often decidedly corporatist!).
I suppose the stimulus – which was necessary as part of the fix for Bush’s miserable failures – was too easily twisted into something that it was not (a good part of it was cutting taxes) and the creation of a public health insurance option was too easily tagged “government takeover of health care” (though it was not). Reckless Republicans are just better at rhetorical bullshitting, and Obama couldn’t fight back by saying that his policies are essentially Republican policies.
Although I would add that Republican presidents have usually governed in a more complex fashion. Eisenhower runs on a hawkish ticket in 1952 and as a military hero yet spend his second term railing against defense spending, cautioning against pure aggression and ends with his talk about the military industrial complex. Nixon is a hawk’s hawk in the 1940s and 1950s. While he does conduct many covert operations and a ruthless bombing campaign he also introduces and pushes detente which is a significant move away from militarism. Reagan also ends his term, focusing on INF, rather than the ideas and rhetoric which brought him into power
What you say here and what Fred said @53 is profoundly important, generally overlooked or even ignored.
Selective memory loss among the Democrats, perhaps?
DW
The deadline also showed that Obama is very much thinking about politics. I don’t see that as a strategic calculation as much as one aimed at easing Democratic concerns about his policies. The fact he backed off from the deadline within one day also shows that he does not make these decisions in a vacuum. I am not convinced that Afghanistan is a wise use of limited resources or that he has a clear plan about what the objective is.
Having come of age in the ’60s and ’70s, it probably also goes to the “dirty ef’fin’ hippies/anti-war crowd” being so closely associated (in people’s minds anyway) with the Democratic Party, helped along by the response of Carter to the Iran hostages and his “Human Rights” campaigns.
After all, since Carter didn’t turn Tehran into a black glass parking lot, he must have been weak on security.
I don’t know if it was selective with Johnson. I do think he believed that those attacks had the effects he outlined. I think Fred is more on target but Johnson, and many Democrats, did feel that those loss of China issues were instrumental to 1952. Many Democrats likewise feared with Iraq II that the vote in 1990-1991 had been politically costly. Given the outcome of the 1992 elections, one could wonder why that loomed so large.
I think he announced the deadline because he’s more worried about the Afghan and Pakistani governments getting the message than about what he’s telegraphing to the Taliban or Al-Qaeda. He seems determined to strengthen the former and weaken the latter during this time.
Of course, I may be too optimistic about this strategy. It can definitely turn out that I’m wrong. I hope I’m not.
Didn’t Eisenhower initially speak to the “Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex”?
However, objections from certain places caused him to remove an ingredient from that mix?
DW
You stumped me. It was implicit in the speech and given how frustrated he was with Congress by that point it is hard to see why he would leave it out (remember this was his farewell address so he didn’t have much to lose). But you could be right I had not come across that before.
You’re right that the fall of China in 1949 was hugely important. But it’s interesting that the Republicans see the communism issue as a potentially powerful political weapon for them already in the 1946 midterms, and then use that cudgel again in 1948 (as your book shows). The range of acceptable political discourse in this country begins to narrow dramatically even before China fall in late 1949. McCarthyism preceded McCarthy, as the saying goes.
If that was the case, which I am skeptical about, it is surprising he and other officials would back off right away from the deadline.
Yes, this is correct. An early draft of the speech had “Congress” in the mix as well.
Yes that is right. You can see the Republicans taking this turn in the midterm campaigns that really start playing on anticommunism. One writer said of that campaign, “The word ‘Communism’ was whopped about like an Indian war cry.” I think the fall of China fit into a narrative that Republicans had been developing for several years, one that focused on communist spies undermining a strong Asia policy and about Democrats in general being more focused on Western Europe. The impact of China was important not because it changes the debate but because it lends support to a political argument that Republicans had been incubating for a few years. They could say, and did say, “see we were right.”
Could that be put down to a certain “comity” between and amongst politicians.
I wonder.
The political class may have their kabuki, for our benefits, but they do protect their own, usually, regardless of party.
The Sunstein axiom, and all that?
DW
Julien I havn’t read your book yet,
From the above read quickly:
In those decades gone by, the soul searching of the presidents to weigh so many considerations of the domestic vs foreign. And of course internal tensions between this and that block. And as it was wedded to election politics, and economics, who was getting the better rewards out of results of war actions etc.
Do you see that kind of book meeting the questions that come with todays melding of the parties, and real seamless transition, not to speak of presidential inconsequence in the mix. As the president appears to be taking orders, if I can be so crude. And lastly where will you put the rational for the decisions in this time of media hyped reasons and substitutes thereof from time to time leaving the questions what the aims are, what the goals are, strangely mysterious, other than that it would be nice to occupy all the territory around the world.
Why not just come out and say it. Make it short and sweet, the people would be for it.
In response to Julian Zelizer @ 68
True, but that may prove the opposite of your argument. He may want a deadline for strategic purposes (it’s not good for governments in the region to continue acting like we’ll be there indefinitely), but have found that Republicans mastered the art of playing the “time-tables show weakness” argument so well that he’s had to back off it for domestic audiences.
I do realize that I’m being optimistic and that you and Fred may very well be correct. There’s definitely good reason to be skeptical.
Obama’s made serious missteps on other issues, but I’m hoping that he succeeds on this one (and gets the political kudos for it to boot!).
by the way-it is worth noting the selective memory impacts both parties. I have a chapter on the 1990s which stresses how House Republicans were key to killing President Clinton’s proposals for expanding federal power in counterterrorism. Clinton pushed for things like roving wiretaps after Oklahoma City where agents could tap multiple phones used by one person without a court order. Representative Bob Barr headed the opposition and really helped kill the bill. Yet after 2001, that strand of the party faded and those arguments were generally ignored within the party. Clearly selective memory was at play.
Doesn’t this also fall into the move from the tumult of WWII, to “losing China,” to the Russians developing the bomb, Korea, to Dien Bien Phu and so on.
For a lot of folks in the late 40s/early ”50s, they probably felt whip sawed by a lot of these activities, lending themselves to Tail Gunner Joe and his “I have here a list…” (and the HUAC of course)
Ah, me olde gray cells still function, then.
Thanks, Fred.
;~DW
Better at BS because they are more adept at linking their argument, irrespective of how irrational, to an emotional response that resonates.
Yes, it is truly bipartisan.
The convenient forgetting …
DW
If propaganda has not yet been discussed can you please comment on its “need’, and how it relates to your work on the coupling of domestic and non-domestic policy?
I assume it has been discussed but I have to read the comments.
In your opinon will (or even has) an emperial nation/power ever been w/o an “enemy”?
How are “domestic enemies” ised in the context of what you have found.
After terror, socialists, US current wars, Iran, and China – what other enemies are going to be put on the list?
How does the reverse of this work in domestic politics – for example “giving up freedom” and a “unitary executive” to deal with crisis (e.g., war, or even aversion to losing an election so those in power can do what the deem must be done, and that which the opposition “does not understand”).
Apologies for all the quotes.
I’m with you Knoxville, but holding my breath and crossing my fingers.
Very often the debates are within some kind of consensus and that is true. Even during the early Cold War there is broad agreement on some of the fundamentals of strategy. Certain alternatives were sidelined as a result. Yet that did not prevent the parties from entering into some very heated fights which influenced decision making. There were also differences about important decisions, such as whether to “Americanize” Vietnam, that had major consequences. So even as we can see the parties are not always as far apart as they sound that should not mean we downplay the divisions and fights that do take place. Moreover, you are right another lesson of the book is that institutions are difficult to change just as we find with domestic policy. Rarely can presidents remake the political world that they inherit and this is true in national security. One reason is that the politics often makes it extraordinarily difficult. Retrenching national security institutions opens parties up to the attacks we have been discussing.
In terms of propaganda, I am not sure exactly what the question is you are asking. Does the government us propaganda to stir up public opinion behind certain national security objectives. Yes. What is equally interesting, and more the focus of my book, is how many of our arguments and conceptions about national security come out of the political sphere and parties posturing for position. This is a bit different than propaganda. But parties do try to distinguish themselves on national security, especially when there is some kind of broad consensus on goals, and the arguments elites make I believe shape our public discourse. It is hard to look back at the discussions about Asia and anti-communism without recalling the partisan battles where Republicans moved to make Asia so central to U.S. strategy and why their party could offer a better alternative to the Democrats.
I might differ a bit in that I do think there are real threats and real crises. The book I have written tries to provide a narrative filled with stories and important moments looking at how domestic politics and national security intersect. That said, I don’t think this is all that matters. My interest is how this dimension of the history unfolded and how it interacted with other factors. Here I share the approach of Fred and Campbell Craig in their new book that I recently mentioned.
No question. A great deal went on world politics in the period; as historians we need to bear that in mind. The policymakers of that era–and of course to the general public–the future was merely a set of possibilities, and they often had to act with limited knowledge. “Whip-sawed” is a good word for what many people felt, and no doubt it inclined many to take McCarthy at his word. The real task for historians, then, is to uncover what officials (and others) were saying at the time about the importance of these various developments to the nation’s security.
Wasn’t there a lot of animosity between Barr and the Republican Party after 9/11? He seems to have a relationship with the Republican Party that’s similar to that of Ron Paul, though worse than that of Ron Paul.
Julian and Fred;
I don’t know how much longer you may be able to stay with us, but it has been a true and rare pleasure to meet you both.
Thank you, both, for being with us and for seeking out and sharing, through your books and your conversations, the history we all need to know.
DW
Democrats have had their moments though. I keep coming back to my chapters on the history of the “missile gap” debate in the late 1950s and here Democrats really did play to these emotions and were effective politically. I have another chapter on the rise and fall of detente and Senator Henry Scoop Jackson really was effective at using the issue of Soviet Jewry to challenge the economic component of detente. During the 1990s, one could argue, President Clinton was pretty skilled at capitalizing on Republican divisions and making moral arguments about the need to use military force in certain areas that brought him political success.
True. Although Barr was much more influential in the mid-1990s. On the issue of counterterrorism he headed a powerful block of votes and was able to really force the administration to water down its bills. I don’t think Paul had the same influence. And yes Barr was never comfortable with the GOP in the post-9/11 environment (or with Borat in that famous scene from the film….) which reflects the changes in the party.
Yes and thank you DWBartoo@86 for joining us.
Thank YOU!
This has been a very interesting and enlightening discussion; thanks so much.
I think someone asked about the media earlier. I do think the changes in the media will have a significant impact in several ways. First, the 24-hour and instantaneous news cycle is making it more difficult to contain debates and keep them out of the public sphere. It is interesting in the Johnson material or the Nixon material that all the internal debates we now have learned about became clear decades later. All the debates about Afghanistan were instantly reported. Second, I do think the polarization of the news media combined with its fragmentation will make it more difficult to sustain political coalitions behind big changes in national security. Curious what others think?
FYI-According to the news, it looks like Cheney will appear on the morning news show tomorrow to attack Obama for being weak against terrorism and making Americans less safe.
Thanks. Fred and I have both been working hard to bring more historical analysis into discussion of these issues.
I fear you are correct, regarding “national security”, so we shall drift, most likely, from crisis to catastrophe with periodic episodes of calamity.
Especially if the economy truly goes “South”.
By the way, true national security, the well-being of “the people”, would include a genuine change in health care, as opposed to health insurance.
DW
I wonder if the oppositon from the prevailing administration’s opposite political party is the true measure of the discontent with the foreign policy of the time. It appears to me that the reading from history is that it is the opposition from the public at large that determines when a chosen military campaign begins to wind down. And not whether the opposing political party turns against the chosen foreign policy.
The war in VN did not appear sustainable to LBJ when the country turned against it, not because of the opposition from either political party. But even with popular discontent Nixon continued the war for 4 more years, while opposition from Democrats and Republicans was muted.
Similarly even with vast popular opposition to the invasion of Iraq Bush pushed on cheered by both parties and it was only the persitent popular opposition that ultimately has led to the winding down of that war.
The point is that the population at large never is an advocate for war and it is that opposition which determines when the foreign policy changes, while opposition from the various politcal parties if it exists at all is not what prompts an administration to change course away from the war effort.
DW–this has been an argument that others have made. Many proponents of liberal internationalism in the 1940s and 1950s did not accept the idea that domestic issues could be separated from national security question. Certainly toward the end of his life FDR tried to make this argument in the most explicit way possible. Although obviously much more conservative, Eisenhower also constantly stressed how the domestic health of the nation was important to our security. Now for him balancing the budget was central. But his point was if we don’t take care of the homefront we could never win the Cold War. Lyndon Johnson, with all his flaws, fundamentally believed that the U.S. had to work on social equality and rights if we were to be a secure nation. So this argument too has some long roots although it doesn’t have as much political success in recent decades as some would hope.
Well and, I think, truly said, gonalb.
DW
That is an interesting point and popular opposition (in the case of your post, described as opposition to war) has been an important factor in moving to wind down wars. That said, party opposition does matter. In the case of intensifying military conflict, clearly the competition between the parties in the 1940s and 1950s was extremely important. One could same the same in 2002 and 2003 when Democrats were politically terrified of being tagged as weak on defense. I also think in terms of popular opposition parties do matter. In 1966 when Senator Fulbright turns against the war and starts to raise public criticism through the power of investigation it is an important moment in the anti-war movement. Randall Woods has written that it gave some middle class legitimacy to the kinds of arguments being made on campus. While Democrats in Congress fail to end the funding for Vietnam, the constant pressure in Congress that develops after 1968 with annual pushes for funding cuts is very much on the mind of Nixon as he moves to bring the war to an end. It drags out for a long time and Democrats don’t legislate an end to the war but I think Democratic opposition was quite important. The memos from the period and the tapes shows Nixon/Kissinger thinking a lot about the limits of what they could do because of this pressure.
I’m not surprised. The GOP thinks the “soft” charge can work for them, and Cheney clearly relishes leveling it. The question is whether it will work. On the media point, Julian, I think you’re right, broadly speaking. OTOH, the public charges–and the response to them–do have a very familiar ring. And I’m guessing that the high-level internal deliberations in the halls of power in recent years likewise harken back to the pre-CNN era.
Then, I am not in bad company, Julian.
;~DW
Moreover, with Iraq, the Democratic takeover of Congress in 2006 was quite important to change in war and move toward some kind of potential end. Of course popular opposition and party pressure are often closely connected as in the 1960s and today. So not sure we want to treat these as separate.
For a man who’s gotten everything wrong, he sure gets asked for his opinion a lot.
Oh, it is all about gravitas, eCAHN.
That, and his own fears, as you know, which are apparently “catching” …
DW
This is a very powerful point. I would add one thing: LBJ privately himself doubted that the VN War was sustainable from an early point. Indeed, he had those doubts even before he Americanized the war in ’65. McNamara too had those doubts, notwithstanding his advocacy of the escalation, as did VP Humphrey and many others at the high and middle levels of the administration. Of course, the public knew little or nothing of these misgivings.
he has also been extremely effective at using the new media to his advantage. his ability to draw attention with a pretty consistent message via long, unedited interviews and statements has been noteworthy. But again it is not just Cheney. It is clear that the GOP really focusing in on this as a central theme for 2010 and 2012, an issue they seem to have more comfort with than domestic issues (beyond opposition).So Cheney’s remarks amplified all that much more because it taps into this broader narrative.
The level of misgivings about Vietnam is overwhelming. One does not have to know about the New Left to learn about the anti-war arguments. You can just listen to the White House tapes in 1964 or read some of the memos that Fred mentions. The level of division, debate, and concern within closed doors is really shocking. In a different way, it is worth looking back at newspapers and floor debates from 2002 and 2003. I did this for a later chapter in thebook. Now we often remember that everyone favored going into Iraq, everyone agreed on WMD–there was an elite consensus. But once again, just a little research shows all kind of huge doubts about why we were invading Iraq, whether there were weapons of mass destruction, etc–and that is the public record. We often forget this after the fact, both those who justify the decisions made or those who want to argue that policymakers were “blinded” by some kind of consensus.
Sounds like a lot of folks went on a trip to Abileen
(For those not aware, there is a Psychology/Sociology/Business Management film that shows up occasionally titled “The Road to Abileen” – if you’ve ever seen it, you will recognize the reference)
There is some of that factor going on. Often politics is the push for making that choice though. I didn’t go into the archives expecting to find so much of it, but I did come out while writing this book finding how many times that happens.
If that’s what passes for doubt in D.C., then they have a pretty narrow range. On 9/11 (live in Manhattan) I knew nothing about terrorism, Islam, Afghanistan but as I was retired, I read up on it. In the summer of 2002, when WMDs in Iraq came up, I likewise read up. Among other sources, Scott Ritter got me on the right track. He was completely excluded from the D.C. bubble.
As we come to the end of this lively Book Salon,
Julian, Thank you for stopping by the Lake and spending the afternoon with us discussing your new book, and politics and foreign policy.
Fred, Thank you very much for Hosting this great Book Salon.
Everyone, if you haven’t bought Julian’s book yet, here is a link.
Thanks all.
The debate over why Iraq was pretty open. There were stories in the mainstream press about WMD’s and more importantly, from what we have seen from investigations etc there was much more internal debate in D.C. than we knew. My guess is as the archives open up we’ll see that the inevitable choice in this case was not as inevitable as we remember–even within the DC bubble.
Thank you Bev for having me. Thank you Fred for a really thoughtful discussion and introduction. Finally, thanks to everyone who joined us. This was really thought-provoking for me and I hope people enjoy the book. Thank you.
I believe you not4ed that Cheney was going to be on the Sunday talks shows complaining that Obama is weak on terrorism. Obama and the Democrats have bought into most of the Republican War on Terror. So what even does this mean? Cheney is criticizing Obama for following his policies?
This I think is an important difference with the past. Now we get partisan atmospherics but the underlying policy in essentially identical between Dems and Republicans.
I’m a cynic. If there were debate, it was how to handle the P.R. when the WMDs weren’t found.
Again, I wouldn’t want to downplay real decisions and turning points that are made and substantive differences that do exist. But thus far I agree that various factors, including politics, have resulted in very little change to the basic war on terrorism (again, this can be a result of political competition where neither party wants to give the other the advantage, see the blowback from Guantanamo). You are right Cheney is really criticizing the infrastructure his administration built.
My pleasure, Julian. And thank you, Bev, for inviting me. And thanks to everyone for the excellent and thought-provoking comments. Best to you all.
emptywheel is upstairs!
Dealing Away Civilian Law
Thanks for the solid discussion.