[Welcome Andrew Ross Sorkin, and Host Felix Salmon.] [As a courtesy to our guests, please keep comments to the book. Please take other conversations to a previous thread. - bev]
Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System—and Themselves
There has been no shortage of crisis books published of late, but Too Big To Fail is by far the biggest and most detailed of them. Full to bursting with facts both momentous and trivial, it presents to us the story of the crisis in close-up detail.
No one comes out of this book smelling particularly fragrant: it’s a story without heroes. There are the obvious villains, like Lehman’s Dick Fuld, of course, but everybody else, up to and including Tim Geithner and Hank Paulson, ends up doing things which, in hindsight, looked panicked and ill-thought through.
That shouldn’t come as much of a surprise, given how little sleep these people were working on and how many balls were in the air at any given time: the desperate needs of AIG, for instance, were relegated to the back burner during the most fraught weekend in September as everybody scrambled — unsuccessfully — to try to save Lehman.
Still, there are many scenes, from the big (Paulson secretly meeting with the board of Goldman Sachs in Moscow) to the small (John Mack of Morgan Stanley instructing his driver to commandeer Manhattan’s west-side bike path) which show just how much the bubble of privilege can skew the world-view of the rich and powerful: they genuinely think that the normal rules don’t apply to them.
The financial overclass is paying itself record bonuses again this year, thanks to the extraordinary amounts of money that Geithner, Paulson, and Bernanke pumped and are still pumping into the banking system. Next week, a large subset of that overclass will meet in self-congratulatory mode in an exclusive Swiss ski resort, to ogle each others’ jets, pat each other on the back, and talk with great seriousness and gravitas about the problems facing the world.
The financial system is still standing, and that has allowed the relatively small cast of characters in Sorkin’s book to convince themselves that they did whatever was necessary to save the world. But substantially all of those people were part of the problem too — and many of them are still around, collecting their eight-figure bonuses, and convincing themselves that their monster paychecks are an indication of how very valuable they are, both to their firms and to the global economy as a whole.
This book is a portrait of fallible humans struggling with forces largely beyond their control. But looking at the behavior of those humans today, it seems they haven’t been particularly humbled. Maybe they should read Too Big To Fail on their flights to Davos, and ask themselves whether the hubris of a conference committed to “improving the state of the world” is in fact a large part of what caused the crisis in the first place.



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Andrew, Welcome to the Lake.
Felix, Thank you for Hosting today’s Book Salon.
Hi Bev, Hi Andrew!
Hi Felix! And hello to everyone on Firedoglake. Thanks for having me. Bring on the questions…
So, first off, can you say a bit about the reception to the book since it came out?
Hi Andrew – what event or meeting, if any, do you regard as central to the way the crisis unwound Fall 2008?
Felix, thanks for hosting this. Hi Andrew, thanks for being here to discuss TBTF. What an amazing account–the image of Hank Paulson heaving into a trash can will be with me for some time.
I do have a question for you, or several questions regarding AIG. Yves Smith at NaketCapitalism.com had a post this week highlighting a particularly interesting anecdote from your book regarding the Fed’s decision to extend a loan to AIG, and the need for the company to come up with $14 billion in collateral in a matter of minutes. You write: “Then it dawned on them: the unofficial vaults. The bankers ran downstairs and found a room with a lock and a cluster of cabinets containing bonds – tens of billions of dollars’ worth, dating mostly from the Greenberg era. They began rifling through the cabinets, picking through fistfuls of securities that they guessed had gone untouched for years. In an electronic age, the idea of keeping bonds on hand was a disconcerting but welcome throwback.”
I have numerous questions about these amazing paragraphs.
The way this is written, it seems that the “unofficial vaults” were secret, known of only to only a handful at the highest level. Did Robert Willumstad know what was downstairs, and if so, how could he have forgotten in the days before when he really, really, needed good collateral? Were these certificates off balance sheet, to be used by the CEO at his sole discretion for anything or had they ever been declared in an AIG financial statement? Who started collecting certificates in these vaults, whose certificates were they, what was the total amount, and what was the purpose of this fund?
I am reminded of Hank Greenberg’s recent legal travails with AIG regarding the AIG stock he gained control of when he became head of CV Starr, and the claim that the AIG stock in that company was supposed to be used to reward AIG employees (the words “slush fund” come to mind, for some unknown reason, and I can’t help but wonder about that in light of the enormous amount of wealth tied up in the “unofficial vaults”).
While I understand the second edition of TBTF will note that these were stock certificates of the subsidiaries, that still doesn’t quite make sense. If they were for the subsidiaries, why would AIG physically walk them over to the Fed, rather than just sign an agreement pledging them as collateral? Some stories beg for a follow up; this, I would think, is one of them.
Thanks so much.
Thanks, Felix. Well, personally, I have been overwhelmed by the reception to the book. As a first time author, it has been remarkable to see the book on the best-seller list. I’ve heard that everyone from Warren Buffett to Hank Paulson to members of the Senate have all read it. So it’s been pretty cool.
Most fun I’ve had reading a business book since “Barbarians at the Gate.” You met the high bar this earlier book established for getting readers in the room, Mr Sorkin. Nicely done.
The difference being, of course, that readers could understand what the companies in “Barbarians” actually contributed to the American economy. I’m afraid I came away from TBTF still unclear as to what, exactly, all these innovative instruments and black boxes added to the American economy. Sure, more risk could be taken, since it was hedged. But was that a good thing, in the end? Not really.
Thanks for the great intro, Mr Salmon. Looking forward to this chat.
Kelly –
I believe that one of the most central meetings was the one that took pace on April 15 at the Fed when Neel Kashkari of Treasury presented what turned into the original TARP plan.
pocketblonde –
they were stock certificated of aig’s subsidiaries. they were being pledged as collateral. however, your larger point is well taken: at that moment, the company was insolvent. but the fed didn’t realize that!
I think pocketblonde’s question is excellent. And more generally, how many other such questions do you think the book has raised — questions which require serious follow-up reporting? Is there any reporting, at the NYT or elsewhere, which you’d like to flag as really moving forward the story which you told in TBTF?
Good afternoon and welcome to Andrew and Felix.
Andrew, I have not had an opportunity to read your book but do have a question.
It seems fairly obvious to those of us NOT stuck inside the Beltway or Wall St bubbles that most of the players are total idiots with absolutely no conception of how things operate with most of the world (Felix, I would disagree with your statements that the folks did not come out of the situation “smelling particularly fragrant” – I would say instead that they smell exceptionally fragrant but it is the odor of the outhouse).
Are the insiders so blind as to think that they and they alone are the only people capable of anything?
(Note: Andrew, and with all due respect, I have noticed that sometimes in your blog, you do fall into the trap of supporting many of these people, even when you presumably do know better)
thanks, teddy. i agree with you — many of the “instruments” were only useful in making wall street richer.
Andrew,
Thank you for joining us at Firedoglake to talk about your book.
I bought it a few weeks ago and read much of it (I promise to finish it!).
What struck me was the emphasis on the people who thought that they were too big to fail. Honestly, I think there are significant systemic problems that need to be fixed. Assuming that human nature is what it is, don’t we need to focus as much on reforms, oversight of the Fed, and new regulatory agencies?
Btw, did you see the excellent discussion about the finanical services industry on CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS today?
I’d also like to ask if you’ve had the opportunity to read Hank Paulson’s book yet, and how reliable you think he is as a narrator of the financial crisis. When you interviewed him for TBTF, could you pretty much always take what he said at face value?
As a technical note, there is a “Reply” button in the lower right hand of each comment. By clicking the “Reply” the information of who and which comment you are responding to pre-fills (but with some browsers, you do have to wait for the page to finish loading after a refresh for it to work properly)
felix — i think the book has spurred some additional inquiry into what was known inside the government about lehman and aig prior to that fateful week in september. i hear that folks at the financial crisis inquiry commission have been picking over different scenes in the book.
sorry. got it now.
i agree with you completely. reform is necessary. i am afraid, however, that we won’t get it!
and as to your question about gps, i didn’t see the show yet.
Welcome to Andrew and Felix. Just got my copy and anxious to read it. One of the theories of the Treasury during the 2007-08 period was that Paulson knew we were in deep yoghurt early on, and was desperately trying to keep the markets from sinking at least through the elections. I take it you have pretty much confirmed that? And if so, how complicit were Geithner at NY Fed and Bernanke in that effort?
Do you think that the lack of effective regulation by the SEC (in Lehman’s case) and the OTS (in AIG’s) was a serious contributing factor to the severity of the financial crisis? If the regulators had done their job, just with the authorities they had, would we have avoided the worst of the crisis? Or do we really need major regulatory overhaul in order to hope that regulators will be effective in future?
i haven’t read hank’s book yet though i have heard good things about it and know that while i was reporting out my book, he was reporting out his — we had many of the same sources :)
as i said in the author’s note, i can’t disclose who i spoke to — but i will say that the memories of most of the various sources in government wasn’t too good. i ended up having to reply on people’s notes and emails to prod them to remember event correctly.
Yes, my thought exactly – Greenberg referred to this ‘fund’ several times – I’m sure he feels that the ‘assets’ that were used really belonged to HIM and that AIG had no right to use them.
You say you’re afraid that we won’t get reform. How does Chris Dodd’s retirement affect the likelihood of effective reform? He seems to be making noises now about killing the CFPA, which he wasn’t making before he announced his retirement. What do you think the chances are that he will end up with a highly-paid job in the financial-services industry shortly after retiring from the Senate?
thanks for your question. i think paulson/geithner/bernanke knew the problems were worse than they were letting on — but, in fairness, i don’t think it was driven by the elections. paulson isn’t a political guy. i think they hoped against hope that a miracle would happen and solve their problems. the economy and the markets are based on confidence, as we’ve learned this past year so well. they were just hoping that confidence wouldn’t get sucked out of the system.
Well, at least he was doing reporting for his book, which is a good sign — and of course Mike Carroll is a very good journalist. So I guess for the time being we give him the benefit of the doubt. I look forward to your book review, though! I’m sure you’ll tell us in that how much we can trust Paulson’s memoirs.
to both of you: wrt to the FCIC hearings, the media seemed very interested in the first day, with the big bank chiefs, but much less interested in the following on panels, except perhaps for the fed regulators — Bair, Shapiro. Yet a glance at the testimonies of the state regulators and other testimony seems to be laying the groundwork for a strong case that the feds at most levels, and especially the FRB, were not merely negligent but complicit.
How do you see that story playing out, and what’s your assesssment so far of how the Commission is proceeding?
I’ve recommended it to everyone who asks me about the financial crisis. My father was amazed at how petty the ‘masters of the universe’ are, I hadn’t really thought about that – but indeed TBTF provides a unique perspective on the personal dynamics that influenced key decisions that had tremendous impact on the entire economy.
Question – any reactions from people since the book came out that really surprised you? Anyone wind up more pissed off than you anticipated, etc?
the lack of regulation by the sec and occ was egregious. i’d also add the fed in there too. the day after bear was sold to jpm, the fed literally moved its own people into lehman’s headquarters to monitor things. but, alas, at that point it may have been too late.
Let’s talk regulation. One of the things I heard on This American Life was how regulation was so spread out and how businesses picked the weakest regulator they could find. Sort of regulation shopping.
Two questions:
What has the industry done to stop any new regulation?
How can we help get better (or any) regulation?
Are there any “after the fact regulations” that we can still apply to the companies? Penalities assigned?
Is anyone looking into this are?
Okay, that seems to be granted a lot of good faith to these actors. But didn’t you find there was at least a conscious effort to avoid having to tell Congress how bad it was and ask for help — they seemed to have postponed that as long as they could, until Bernanke finally said, “you have to go to Congress.” Not political? Not connected to the election?
ah! wouldn’t it be amazing if dodd ended up in finance after all of this? you would have thought he’d be even harder on wall street at this point since he’s not running again. i can only hope that he if he wants to kill the CFPA he replaces it with something meaningful.
Does that mean you agree with Alan Greenspan that a rising stock market is something of a self-fulfilling prophecy, and that we really can take real solace in what has happened to stocks since March? Is the crisis over for real?
When you say people “in government,” does that include The Fed and FRBNY?
i am more impressed with the commission than i thought i’d be. however, i don’t think you’re going to see indictments when they are done. they seem to be looking at all the right issues. it will be interesting to see how far they take it.
wrt to the Fed Reserve and Office of the Controller of the Currency, Sheila Bair’s testimony last week seemed to go out of her way to point the finger at her regulatory, uh, colleagues, one of whom even sits on the FDIC board and voted against her proposed rules on TBTF fees. That guy was blamed for a lot of inaction and obstruction of state regulatory efforts — see Madigan’s testimony and Crawford’s testmony — so what does this say about the Administration’s commitment to major reforms, if these people are still there?
I think it’s far too early to tell how the FCIC is going. This is a year-long project, and much of the real work is going to take place out of the public spotlight. As for the complicity of the regulators, I think that’s a big part of what happened. It’s called regulatory capture, and it was endemic in the financial system by the time the crisis happened.
i’d like to see a serious conversation about glass-steagall. i don’t know where i’d ultimately come down, but it is worth discussing. and wall street is pushing back on that. i’d also like to see a meaningful discussion about capital requirements and leverage levels. (the new tax introduced last week addresses this a bit.) finally, i think there’s value in resolution authority, but it isn’t free — so there probably needs to be an assessment of some sort of the biggest institutions. (that’s what i expected the tax would do, but it doesn’t.)
These financial tycoons, who walk funny due to their massive erections, clearly have high opinions of themselves, but everyone else thinks they shouldn’t be allowed onto the Street without adult supervision (pun intended). Can we expect a corporate friendly redux of financial regs like we are seeing in health care?
yes!
You mean Dugan, of the OCC? I too can’t believe he’s still there. Andrew, do you know how easy or difficult it is to fire him?
Hi Andrew,
I enjoyed reading Too Big To Fail and thought it was superb. I was wondering if you could describe how you interacted with your sources after your initial interviews with them. Did any of them ask for you to e-mail them quotes or sections from the book afterwards? If so, did you usually comply with their requests?
I was also wondering if any of your sources e-mailed you quotes or their own version of a conversation. Some sections of the book where you quote extensively from what a character was thinking during a particular moment–like Tim Geithner’s morning run in Chapter 17–made me curious about this. Were you ever concerned that a source might tell you what they wanted you to believe they were thinking, when they may have been exaggerating or lying about it altogether?
Thanks
on that, i do agree with greenspan! (that’s hard to say aloud.) and i suspect that the current crisis is over — but i also suspect we’re just setting ourselves up for another one later.
Andrew… did any of your research suggest to you that…
AIG = intel gathering front for CIA?
The Secret (Insurance) Agent Men
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/sep/22/news/mn-25118
Beyond its origins, I’m also thinking of the history of its leadership (Hank Greenberg, Frank Wisner Jr).
Who would have said a year ago, “Yeah, Erik Prince is obviously CIA and Blackwater stocked with CIA agents. Who doesn’t know that?”
So, why wouldn’t the CIA use AIG as an intel gathering arm and money mover?
I agree on the regulatory capture. The Texas Commissioner — Denny Crawford — didn’t mince words on that, pointing a finger at the SEC under Cox. Do we know whether the Commission plans to haul Cox in for testimony?
It’s worth remembering that the likes of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, etc were all perfectly Glass-Steagal compliant. I don’t think that reinstating Glass-Steagal would solve many problems, beyond just making banks smaller, which is of course something we want but which is very hard to do.
i’m afraid to say the type of regs currently being proposed don’t do as much as many people had expected — kind of like healthcare reform.
Macroeconomic evidence, i.e. U.S. economy grew more slowly during all these financial innovations than before them and that financial corporate profits accounted for a larger share of the economy, and common sense, both point to the conclusion that financial innovation is a net negative for the “economy,” especially the labor (2/3) part.
Any impressions of FCIC so far? I’ve watched all the hearings to date (well, until cspan experienced tech probs), and find the commishes VERY underinformed weak tea.
Yes, Dugan. Andrew’s colleague, Gretchen has a good article in today’s Times on how he’s helped cripple efforts to rein in credit care abuses.
Credit Cards and Reluctant Regulators
Given the fact that member banks elect the boards of directors for the regional banks, I’m not sure I’d call the head of the FRBNY part of “government.”
Which is not to contradict your comment about them having . . . how shall we put it? . . . less than stellar memories. I haven’t yet finished your book, but I can see where there might be plenty that Tim Geithner would probably not like to remember.
“too big too fail,” means it is a monopoly and a hold over from the gop laissez faire. the business of america is not business if that means the investor class rules with no regard to the middle class.
Oh, I’m sure the FCIC will talk to Cox. But Bush chose Cox precisely *because* he wanted someone who would do nothing. It’s really Bush’s fault more than Cox’s that the SEC was so utterly useless over the course of the decade.
We’re not going to get it with the corporatist sellout Dems in charge. How many good ideas have already been shot down since Jan 2009? The political system is broken.
GPS today was very much about failures to reform the system or to get the financial services industry to get back to banking basics (as opposed to making high-risk investments and socializing the losses).
Absolutely, I completely agree. Financial innovation is good for financiers; there’s very little evidence that it’s good for the economy more broadly, while there’s strong circumstantial evidence (the crisis, for instance) that it’s actually bad for the economy.
This is just a drive by and I haven’t read the book, but the one really big question I have is why no one asked the most obvious and basic question before letting Lehman go splat and that is who had exposure to it. Even if Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner were busy, they had staff and those staffs had staff. Yet nobody really took a look or thought a second about the repercussions. Now Paulson and Blankfein all knew about GS’s exposure to AIG. But when it came to Lehman, crickets. Stupid, complicit, incompetent, take your pick.
i usually relied on multiple sources for every scene. so when you see a quote, it’s been vetted by various people in the room and contemporaneous notes or emails. that way i could keep people honest. i usually interviewed most of my sources multiple times too so there was a lot of back and forth. i also tried to review quotes with many of the sources prior to publication for accuaracy.
in the case of geithner’s run, he had told that story contemporaneously that wednesday, sepetember 17, to multiple people on his team at a meeting that morning so i felt confident it was true.
I’d love to see some kind of cap on bank size, for starters. That ain’t gonna happen.
Do you think we might get more substantive reform if it weren’t for the 60-vote supermajority required in the Senate? Or is Congress generally just far too beholden to the financial sector these days?
Dodd has to feather his post-senate nest. Imagine that’s the only thing on his mind these days.
i’ve heard the aig-cia rumors for years. i wish i could confirm that, but i couldn’t.
“Beginning the Next Bubble,” title of a report I wrote after the 1998 bailout of LTCM.
interestingly, many of the wall st ceo’s told paulson/geithner that weekend that they’d be okay if lehman went down. many had decreased their exposure to lehman. of course, it was the money market funds and hedge funds — who didn’t have a seat at the table — who had the most exposure to lehman.
One thing I’ve noticed about FCIC hearings is that they are focusing on the bust, not on the bubble that created the bust. MAJOR problem with their whole body of work. Perhaps future sessions?
Lehman was a GS competitor, Paulson, ex-GS head, was in charge. That’s all you need to know.
glass steagall may not be the answer — but the size issue persists.
felix: let’s say you wanted to break up gs, how would you do it? it’s not so easy.
I’m inclined to blame New Dem types like Melissa Bean for ruining the CFPA, by pushing to strip states of their authority to enforce their own regulations (i.e. regulatory preemption).
Is that what you’re referring to when you think the CFPA should be replaced by something more meaningful, that the CFPA should be restored to what it was supposed to be?
Geithner is either telling the truth, or he made up a really good story quickly and it sticking to it.
i’m afraid to say that’s too simplistic a theory.
My feeling is that even if AIG was in fact working with/for the CIA, that would show only that its leadership was working with a level of impunity. But we know that anyway — not only about AIG, but also about all the other TBTF financial institutions. Who was it in the book who asked if Hank Paulson could get him permission to fly his private jet through Russian airspace? These men all seem to have let the billions go to their heads, none of them seem to have their feet on the ground. I don’t suppose you’ve seen much in the way of new humility.
Were the Wall Street CEOs really so stupid and arrogant to believe that the financial system in general, and their shops in particular, would be fine in the wake of a chaotic failure of Lehman? Yikes.
Somewhere between Treasury’s first TARP proposal and Congress’ passage in the Fall 2008, Paulson seems to have had a conversion about how it would be structured — purchasing assets vs recapitalization. How do you account for that shift, and who/what convinced him?
my point is that if the cfpa is not going to happen, some other agency — with the proper oversight and tools — will need to do the job.
Any other new revelations regarding this bombshell?
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/01/the-most-stunning-and-uncommented-on-revelation-in-too-big-too-fail.html
Felix, there is a limit on bank size (10% cap on market share of deposits Nationally, for instance), it was spelled out in the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994. Alas, it;s just been ignored a lot lately http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/merging-banks-surge-past-us-deposit-cap/
Missing almost entirely, except for interruptions for explanation and briefings by Paulson, was President Bush. Was he really so checked out of his Presidency as your readers would infer? Or was he so discouraged at the remedies being proposed by his Treasury Secretary?
I do hope so. And I hope too that they’ll look at other big-picture things like the Chinese capital-account deficit and the massive increase in demand for supposedly risk-free assets.
From the end of the post:
Sounds like Mary Shelley and Frankenstein’s monster. These “forces largely beyond their control” were also forces largely of their own making. No one held a gun to their heads and said “trade or die!”
I was blown away, early in the book, when Aaron wrote about Lewis Glucksman, Dick Fuld’s mentor and predecessor at the top of Lehmann. Both Glucksman and Fuld worked to keep the bankers and the traders from each others’ throats, and one way they did this was to put investment bankers on the trading floor. Said Glucksman “I tried to train the investment bankers to understand the products they were selling.”
Talk about a stunning admission, and it is presented seemingly without irony.
Is there any other industry where this would be tolerated?
But wouldn’t reinstating Glass-Steagal help ensure that FDIC backs up what it’s supposed to back up, rather than wind up socializing the losses from the bad bets of investment banks?
Wouldn’t it help get banks back to lending – a good thing for the economy?
My years on Wall St. certainly taught me that they are VSP (Very Special People) who have no contact with the great unwashed. Or the lesser folks who take showers every day and work like crazy, to earn incomes that afford them only to shop at places that hire workers who can’t even afford to shop where they work.
Very true, you could spin off the investment bankers from the trading side of things, but the traders on their own are still TBTF. You basically want to shrink Goldman, rather than break it up.
Why?
paulson was convinced by one of his treasury colleagues — dan jester (a former deputy cfo of goldman) — to pursue the capital injections. jester had been in ny dealing with aig when the original decision to buy toxic assets was made. i’ve always believed that if he was in dc at the main meeting where they discussed their options, they would have immediately pursued capital injections.
Felix, Andrew, welcome to both of you.
Andrew, your book pleasantly surprised me both for its readability and for the number of details that were not–and really haven’t been–reported independently. The AIG/Yves comment above is one example, so is the way you describe Paulson getting personally involved in setting the price for Bear, though he knew he was not legally authorized to (not to mention the way that remarkably didn’t come out in the Congressional testimony).
To what degree do you think there has been a concerted effort to cover all this stuff up?
i think bush decided to hand over the reigns to paulson. he admitted he didn’t know finance.
And of course it doesn’t stop banks growing in ways which don’t require deposits. Goldman Sachs isn’t constrained by a rule governing how much it can have in the way of deposits, and neither is JP Morgan (a/o/t Chase, the retail arm).
I said it earlier, and I’ll say it again: the political system is broken. If they could screw up the CFPA, why would another agency be created by the same failed politicians that would do the job that they apparently don’t want done?
This is a rhetorical question, as all we can do at this moment is reflect on the problem of politicians who think they are too big to fail.
No, that’s not the way it works for our Senator-overseers nowadays. When they are running for re-election, they are beholden to their FIRE masters for campaign donations. When they aren’t running for re-election anymore, they are currying favor with their FIRE masters to feather their post-political nests.
All in all, it’s a win-win for the little people. /s
So far, sadly, there seems to be very little which can get banks back to lending, especially to individuals and small businesses: they’re much happier sitting on their cash, or lending it to big companies who can borrow in the bond market and where they can hedge their exposure in the CDS market.
there is no question that the government pursued many more intervention efforts than we ever knew about at the time. and yes, they tried to cover them up the entire time. i was shocked as i was doing my reporting how involved they were. the merger efforts to put goldman and wachovia together or jpm and ms were astounding. the invisible hand wasn’t so invisible!
Well, wrt to the proposed Consumer Finance Protection agency, isn’t one of the subplots pre-emption? The original proposal would allow state regulator to be part of the enforcement framework, and private rights of action would be encouraged. But if the agency is replaced by some nominal beefing up of the existing “consumer” divisions within existing agencies — i.e, those agencies who dropped the ball the first time — and they all function under statutes that imposed federal preemption and limit consumer lawsuits, you’ve crippled the protection haven’t you?
Oh ha ha ha. Chinese capital account and the probs their mercantilist economic policy is creating for world imabalances. (Similar rant on U.S. consumerism, but that’s a diff comment.) I was in China with a low-grade U.S. delegation (i.e. U.S. economists you never heard of meeting with Chinese academic & govt types with no power) a decade ago, when the problem was already obvious. Blank stares all round. They had no clue what I was referring to. Think I would get similar reaction today.
Well, maybe FIRE has become FI these days. But it’s still enormous, and far too influential in DC.
Meant to include this in my question above re: NakedCapitalism’s comments on the stash of bonds:
Any new shoes fallen?
Yes.
My money manager found an investment opportunity in that. Yields 10%, buttressed by SBA.
That was during the Bush administration. How has Obama been different? Paulson and Geithner seem to be on Obama’s good side, no?
nope
I’m also interested in the lendingclub.com model, I think it can work very well. Disintermediating the big banks = a good idea!
i wish i knew if there intervention efforts taking place as we speak, but i dunno
Arrogance would appear to be a requirement for senior Wall Street folks. “*Other* firms may fail, but that’s only because *they* are stupid and weak and not as brilliant as we are. That’s why we work here.”
Exhibit A: Goldman Sachs
by the way, nobody’s asked about the aig haircuts (or lack of haircuts)…any interest?
Don’t know about that one, but suspect that it has the same problem as the one my mm found: not scalable. So you might have found one, and I hope my mm found one, as I gave her permission to buy a chunk of stock, but as she sez: It trades by appointment.
When there’s corporate-government collusion, the little people always win! /s
Thanks, President Obama, for delivering on… oh, wait, nothing’s changed.
In response to Andrew Ross Sorking @ 97:
Thanks for the reply to both questions.
Not that my mere opionion counts for much, but I think it is safe to assume that AIG is/was part of black budget maneuvers…
and the black has gone into the red.
So, the next justification for withholding emails/evidence:
National Security.
If it even gets to the point of needing another excuse to not disclose material facts.
Exhibit B: The reports that Citigroup put together for Kenneth Feinberg, saying that all of its senior management were well above average. If even Citi has above-average management, we’re truly in Lake Wobegone territory.
I don’t think you mention them in the book. Will they appear in the second edition?
I’ll bite! :)
How about those haircuts?
I hope this isn’t OT (off-topic):
Have you heard about what France and Great Britain are doing to bankers’ compensation?
“He’s a University of Chicago Democrat, so he’s very attuned to the virtue of free markets and the risks of free-market regulation. He’s not an old-style Democrat who’s excited about regulations” for their own sake.
Cass Sunnstein, WSJ ,Feb,’09
Mr. Sunnstein’s statement about Obama.
Do you agree and how does this bode for reinstating regs like Glass Steagall?
Lendingclub is absolutely scalable, I think. You can’t buy stock in the company — it’s private — but you can certainly lend directly to individual borrowers, and there’s no shortage of high-quality borrowers looking to borrow from the site.
Students routinely polled at prestigious universities; something like 90% think they’ll be in the top half of their class.
haircuts? That was a [white]wash and shampoo. So, Andrew, did your reporting find anyone of our government officials making an argument for not paying off Goldman and Friends at 100%? Are there any good guys? Or do you see that as a “we had no choice” situation?
And which current or former Goldman employees were in the room when that decision was made?
The redacted AIG SEC filings are another datapoint. What’s going on here? Andrew, any idea why the SEC is OK with these filings being redacted until 2018?
I guess what shocks me is that even with your book, people still aren’t talking about stuff for which you’ve got pretty good evidence of a cover-up.
It’s one of those irregular verbs. I’m prudent, you have a culture of secrecy, he’s engaging in a cover-up.
(meant to reply to Felix @ 113)
Yeah, I was suggesting that if that doesn’t hold up, at some point AIG will/might/could graymail similar to what Erik Prince has been up to lately.
Doesn’t seem to interfere with Xe’s bottom line too much.
Yet.
Scalable involves knowing the quality of the borrowers. Investigating the quality of small borrowers, properly done, is labor intensive and the info not available to the average investor. In my case, the SBA has hot & cold running auditors in the firm every month, and they are located in the city where my mm resides, so she & her partners visited them & grilled them. Which is why I said yes. But not something the regular Joe investor can do.
so here’s what i know on the lack of haircuts — and it will deeply unsatisfying to most people:
the fed — geithner/bernanke — really didn’t spend too much time discussing negotiating haircuts. their view — and you can disagree with it — was that if they didn’t pay the full amount, it would undermine confidence in the system even further and raise questions about the credit of the fed.
Right, the one thing that banks do which other institutions can be bad at is underwriting. So far I’m reasonably impressed with Lendingclub’s underwriting abilities, but I guess you’re right that it can be hard to scale such things.
Or ever. By the time Xe is caught up with (if ever), they will have moved on to other “opportunities,” exactly like Wall St. crooks.
Geithner was just working of a Monopoly-board list, it sounded like, going through the options: let’s marry BofA and Merrill, or Citi & Merrill, or GS & Merrill. It was as if he had a Chinese restaurant menu as his model. Those scenes of him butting into delicate negotiations with his stupid, abrupt, rude phonecalls convinced more than anything else that he is entirely captive to the MOTUs and utterly not up to bossing them around.
Unlike Paulson, who thrived as the bossy, tyrannical BMOC. It’s amazing to me what heterosexual men value in their peers within corporate organizations; his gruff antisocial mien, with no tolerance for participating in the political process except for his mocking bended-knee approach to Pelosi taught me all I needed to know about Paulson’s politesse.
The “Lake Wobegon Effect” entered the scholarly literature quite a while ago, if I recall correctly.
More than a few papers have been written on LWE in setting CEO compensation, for example . . .
Except of course that Angelides was a slash-and-burn real estate developer whose need to move units was symptomatic of the beginning of the chain of error that drove our economy over the cliff.
Funny, that.
I think we’ve gone from vampire squids to just vampires.
But of course they suck our blood & keep us half-dead for our own good.
Thanks for the book.
Look forward to the next.
“raise questions about the credit of the fed”? Srsly? That implies, of course, that the Fed had some kind of an obligation to pay AIG’s debts. Depressing.
Andrew — toward the end, you ask, could the financial disaster have been avoided? And if so, how? There’s been a lot of debate about whether the feds monetary policy could/should have tried to choke off the (or at least stop feeding) the bubble, with Bernanke telling America’s economist he doesn’t think that was the problem — we just needed better regulation, but then he didn’t point to the fed’s lack of regulation until a couple days ago. Meanwhile, Bair and others are pointing fingers at the fed’s lack of bank oversight and inattention of credit abuses.
For both of you:
There seem to be lots of things that went wrong, but what do you now think was the most important? If you could single out a single change that, if only the fed or someone else had made that change back when, if would have headed this off, what would it be?
No lack of right hand shaking left hand there. Nope. None whatsoever.
Having said that, compensation is a red herring. A useful one if the left could get its act together (bwahahahaha), but not the crux. The crux is that the finanacial mafia levers up, scoops up all the goodies that leverage can produce in a rising market, then presents the U.S. taxpayer with the bill when the penalties of the crashing market come due.
Andrew
I’m about 1/3 way through.
DO you ever look at the role of the relationship between sovereign wealth funds and pressure on the US? Obviously, it becomes more critical with Citi and the Dubai problems. But I have been wondering how SWF’s play into the pressure to protect the MOTUs.
. . . leaving all the questions about Moral Hazards to be raised only when speaking of GM, Chrysler, etc.
That sounds like schlock. If they had actually acted visibly, that probably would have been more confidence building because it would have shown they were going to do something about the system. And this is precisely why they didn’t. They had no intention of getting involved. Shoveling trillions to the financials, yes. Telling them what they needed to do, no. As a result, the casino stayed open.
Didn’t know that. Thanks so much. Explains a LOT. And not in a good way.
Oh, snap.
yes. i also suspect their was a foreign policy component to this — there was nervousness about the us govt bailing out aig and then picking and choosing how it pays international counter parties
I’ve really appreciated your (and others’) excellent informed questions and insightful comments in this discussion, Felix.
When you get a chance later, do read more, if you haven’t already, about the 60-vote supermajority myth of the current Senate. We desperately need some informed reporting, that puts the pressure on the Senate (and White House) leadership, about that too-convenient, beloved myth.
That notorious supermajority is “required” only so long as Harry Reid (and 15 of his colleagues) insist on filing repeated cloture motions in response to mere objections, or threats to filibuster, in lieu of forcing and confronting an actual filibuster, toe to toe, that would allow the Senate to proceed to simple-majority passage of important legislation to which it is committed (raising, of course, the second caveat in your comment…), like new bank regulations and other vital and overdue reforms.
Just out of curiosity, do organizations like Bilderberg, the CFR, the TC etc. play prominant roles in Too Big to Fail? America’s ruling class in other words.
Does it broach the crisis as a manifestation of political economy in America [yes, in a Marxist sense], or mostly as reflections of greed and corruption and human falibility?
leverage levels — that’s the one and only fix that would have prevented all of this, but we don’t have rules that regulate that specific metric beyond capital requirements, which were already too low.
I think having a single federal institution charged with regulating all lenders. For differing reasons, both investment banks and many subprime mortgage lenders essentially managed to get away with having no regulation at all. And when banks found themselves having to compete with unregulated mortgage lenders, you got a hugely destructive race to the bottom in terms of underwriting standards etc. Other countries with bigger housing bubbles haven’t had crashes as painful as that in the US, because their lenders were more constrained.
Those companies Make Things and employ lower-class Makers of Things.
ewwwwww
Obviously, they didn’t ask the money markets, and they don’t seem to have asked Lehman. It would be interesting to know exactly which CEOs they did ask, Lloyd Blankfein across the table?
Yes, the idea of about the Fed’s credit is just silly. The Fed can’t go broke in a monetary system with a fiat currency.
the book shows the incestuous fraternity of people who were running the world at that time. however, those particular orgs don’t play big roles.
Do you think that any bank (defined as any entity which borrows short and lends long) should ever be allowed to have a trillion-dollar balance sheet? And what would you implement as the maximum leverage level allowed for such a monster?
It’s called fraud.
Until Obama put so many Trilats in position?
http://www.projectcensored.org/top-stories/articles/22-obamas-trilateral-commission-team/
Thanks so much for being here today Andrew, and thanks for hosting, Felix.
Keeping people from losing “confidence” in the system seems to be the one-size-fits-all excuse for making a bunch of people rich who screwed things up in the first place. Small price to pay, I suppose, for peace of mind.
/s
That’s an excellent argument for a return to Glass-Steagall and turning commercial banking into a utility.
Unlike Government Sachs, of course. The Squid is the new Bilderberg/CFR/Trilateral Commission/Global Zionist Conspiracy/etc all rolled into one. Which I think is why Taibbi’s article hit such a nerve.
2 points for the metaphor! I’m stealing it!
The activity word I wanted to see?
Clawbacks. Again. The word is clawbacks. As in, ” We are going to claw back bonuses because…”
Did we see any clawbacks?
Can you imagine the whining from the MOUs and the cheering from the regular people.
that’s a great question. i don’t know what the *right* number would be — but smaller is probably better. the only thing i wrestle with is the whole argument about efficiency. if pfizer, for example, needs to raise $20 billion, should we care that it will have to go hat-in-hand to 30 different institutions rather than just a couple?
Except, if commercial banking becomes a utility, you risk becoming Costa Rica.
If restraining excessive leverage is critical, do you see any of the alternative tax/fee proposals — FDIC’s? Obama’s? — aimed at reinforcing that? And does a limit on leverage need to be coupled with efforts to make sure that those under oversight can’t slip out to some shadow system that avoids the limits but still puts the real system at risk? I still don’t see how that works.
Or maybe a firm that needs to borrow $20B is itself to large and should be broken up as well as the too large banks?
And even the levels that were there were being gamed. Sheila Bair noted in her FCIC testimony that if a bank holds a mortgage, they have to have (IIRC) 4% in reserves against defaults, but if they hold mortgage backed securities, they only have to hold 2%. (Those numbers may have changed since the time period she was speaking about, as she was addressing a specific time in the past, but the concept is still true.)
Or is that a feature rather than a bug? Maybe it’s too easy for Pfizer to issue debt (partly because its interest payments are tax-deductible) and too expensive and difficult for Pfizer to issue equity. I’d love to move to a world (and reportedly Paul Volcker would too) where interest payments weren’t tax-deductible any more, and we had much more equity-heavy corporate capital structures.
Andrew,
One last question I guess…
Drugs/money laundering/liquidity…
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/2009/dec/13/drug-money-banks-saved-un-cfief-claims
Does American solvency depend on Prohibitionomics™?
Could the housing bubble and meltdown been avoided? Absolutely. It took years to put all the pieces of this fiasco in motion and there were turn offs and escape hatches at almost every juncture. There remain workable solutions to most of these problems. Unfortunately, the further we go into bubbles on bubbles and crony casino capitalism, the costs get higher and higher. It is hard to see how we get out of this now without depression or endless Japanification.
Oh perfect. Put all the power into one hand. Makes it so much easier for fincorps to focus their lobbying. I’m guessing you didn’t listen to the state AGs testimony before the FCIC.
What’s the problem with Costa Rica? I hear (though know nothing) that’s it’s about the only garden spot in Central America.
Right. Bringing the shadow banking system under the federal regulatory umbrella is absolutely necessary. Whether we’ll succeed in doing that, of course, remains to be seen.
Andrew – in the next edition of your book are you going to include Fannie & Freddie since they just got that huge injection?
My thinking is that housing values are stagnant, because they’re now approximating their real value, not the exaggerated value when the finance markets were hot.
Now since they’ve gotten their next injection, I’ve had 2 offers to refinance in the mail. One which is verging on fraudulent, at the very least misleading, as it looks like a government document has has “stimulus” on it about 5 times. It’s from a delegated endorser with a direct pipe to Fannie.
In other words, having bailed Fannie/Freddie (Too Big) they’re now set up for even more abuse.
FWIW, I don’t trust that number at all.
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/12/13/drug-money-and-the-financial-crisis/
i’m with felix on that one
The problem is that it has a horribly sclerotic state-owned banking system.
There is no reason to see how that would be the case. You can’t wring the gambling out of the system and still keep the casino. Where will international banking go? London, Dubai? They are even worse off than we are. In fact, US moves for reining in its banking system would be leadership on our part. How many other countries would want to be tarred with keeping their casinos open? How would they justify it to their voters?
I do think that there’s a strong case for narrow banking: keep commercial banks tightly focused and regulated.
I think “shadow” systems are just too appealing, both to the banks and to the government. The banks could take their worst stuff out of view, even hide them from shareholders, and the regulators/rescuers could move gazillions around and never have to go to Congress or face an audit. And the result was exactly what you’d expect: . . . the largest episode of government-sanctioned corporate looting at the public’s expense, ever.
And we have Fannie and Freddie yet to come.
What do you and Andrew make of the Geithner’s Gift of the Magi to F&F?
Well, Drugs/Black Market Proceeds, CIA, AIG, Laundering, Black Budget ops… makes you wonder. Makes me wonder.
To what degree do you (Andrew or Felix) think that American solvency rests on maintaining the liquidity afforded by such proceeds?
To what degree does global solvency depend on it?
Wait, I said before “One last question” didn’t I?
I lied.
Hugh, did you watch the FCIC session, think it was the second panel, where the ex-Bear Stearns guy explained how he has a PP presentation that he presented to management, detailing how if home prices only flattened, forget going down, Bear was toast? He also presented to FRB. Both thought he was nuts. That, as well as WMDs in Iraq, tells you that there is so much hubris in large institutions, that it’s hopeless. Yes, the majority of people, presented with the facts, could have instantly figured out the problems. But not our fearless leaders. Alice Rivlin, interviewing David Wessel on cspan today, a replay I think, seems to be proud of how blind she was.
Sadly, I don’t think he had much choice. But I hate *how* he did it. He should have done it with much more publicity and reluctance, and should have used the opportunity to tell F&F in no uncertain terms that they are still very broken and need to stop getting worse and start getting better.
Your comment makes me wonder: Has anyone brought up MERS? Homeowners should not accept foresclosure. They should demand that the bank produce all of the original paperwork and they should demand to know if that bank or party in court even has standing to be there. As far as I can tell, most bubble mortgages got the promissory note separated from the deed in the securitization process. This turned them into unsecured loans and most of the paper issued on them is essentially worthless.
And I would add small and community oriented.
OK. Thanks. Didn’t know that. Does that prevent Costa Rica from having economic growth? Is Costa Rica’s economy much worse than other Central American ones, which, since you didn’t mention them, I assume do not have scerotic state-owned banking systems?
Are there other countries that have state owned banking systems that have worked? Not worked?
My preference, now, subject to further evidence, is that financiers should be constrained to low leverage & plain vanilla products. Anything you’v done to lend insight?
One of the GREAT ironies of this whole financial mess (and one I fell for) is that geographic diversification was supposed to spread risk. Instead, the process led to geographic financial contagion. A great example of the law of the unintended outcome.
That’s scary: “he didn’t have much choice.” That implies that there are some really big shoes yet to drop — since they’d only used part of the initial $200 billion each so far. What should we be watching for that will require them to have virtually unlimited access to funds? And is it correct to see this as just the F&F version of the AIG back-door bailouts of the largest banks?
Yeah. From reading Andrew’s book it’s pretty clear which “community” the heads of the big commercial banks consider themselves to be part of. Andrew, you’ve had a white badge at Davos for many years now, so can reasonably be considered to be part of that community. Has the financial crisis had any visible effect on Davos Man? Is there a hint of remorse anywhere, a glimmer of recognition that the “global economic community” or whatever it calls itself was a key cause of the biggest global financial crisis since the Depression? Or is it all still a mix of finger-pointing with self-congratulatory cocktailing?
And how about you personally? Do you think that your glamorization of dealmakers contributed at all to the ego problems we see in your book?
I didn’t see the FCIC but I have heard of the guy you are talking about. The only reason Greenspan didn’t hear anything was because they weren’t listening. That people who could be so wrong like Bernanke and Geithner and not be fired but lauded and promoted or kept in place is the main reason I argue for depression in 2011.
As for F&F, I believe that was a move to shore up the housing market (which now is essentially F&F) through the elections.
And Kelly, housing prices probably haven’t bottomed out yet. Lots of games are being played holding houses off the market and going slow on foreclosures.
BTW, what you just said is a word choice that many of us show remember to use, “shadow banking system” so much of the damages happened in this area, but if we just say banks it doesn’t address the group that needs regulation.
I’ve suggested an untouchable squad of people composed of canned MOUs, tax lawyers, private eyes and a PR team that travels the globe busting these shadow bankers. The tv show is already out there, Leverage. Maybe it could be a reality. Or a reality tv show. Track down the shadow bankers in the Caymans and find out what tax laws they broke and get the money back. The fomer MOUs would know the tricks and could punish the people who cost them their jobs. We would have former Bears and Lehmann folks on the team. It would all be legal and the stories of the busts would make great copy/tv. “banksters get their comeuppance!” Who will be hauled off the island this week?
It could happen. I’d sign up for it.
Aaron, what was the biggest surprise to you, in your research for the book?
The biggest state-owned banking system, of course, is China’s. Has it successfully created massive economic growth, or does it have endemic cronyism and an inability to recognize hundreds of billions of dollars in extremely bad loans? Or maybe both?
In a crisis, all correlations go to one, and diversification, along any axis, doesn’t help any more.
NBC is looking for shows to fill their 10PM ET timeslot . . . and reality shows are (relatively speaking) cheap to produce.
Perhaps you could pitch your idea to Jeff Zucker.
Who is the F&F bailout a backdoor bailout of? All homeowners, really. F&F are providing substantially all the mortgage finance in the USA right now. If it weren’t for them, home prices would be MUCH lower than they are.
Ding. As I typed, there were no shortage of folks who percieved the outcome, only VSPs who did’t listen.
Why should Davos Man as you call him change? All that has happened is that implicit governmentl backstops have become explicit. If Dimon, Blankfein, and Mack were in jail cells right now and being treated like the financial terrorists they are then MOTU might be rethinking their actions. But giving them trillions with no strings attached is hardly the way to reform anyone.
Duh.
housing prices probably haven’t bottomed out yet. Lots of games are being played holding houses off the market and going slow on foreclosures.
Agree, but I see more than one problem with the F/F injection.
- Still poor underwriting, add risk to taxpayer
- Back door TARP mechanism
- More opportunity for fraud in regular mortgage market
As we come to the end of this lively Book Salon,
Andrew, Thank you for stopping by the Lake and spending the afternoon with us discussing your new book and Wall Street.
Felix, Thank you very much for Hosting this great Book Salon.
Everyone, if you haven’t bought Andrew’s excellent book yet, here is a link.
Thanks all.
I thought F&F have been purchasing MBS not just from lenders but from other banking institutions. Is that not correct?
thanks for having me! thanks felix and bev! and thanks to everyone for your great questions.
Yes, cheers all! Good chatting, and keep putting those feet to the fire!
Haven’t F&F been set up now to buy “toxic assets” from the rest of the world? Isn’t that almost a text book definition of a back door bailout by taking the toxic assets off the books at nearly full value and forcing the taxpayers to be(once again) the only folks getting haircuts?
And the answer is…?
As I mentioned in an earlier comment, the China Q is still very much in play.
I’m still interested in the factual Q of whether Costa Rica’s scerotic state owned banking system (your words as nearly as I remember them) has led to a worse outcome for CR than for other Central American countries.
Yes, much thanks to Andrew for his book and for Felix for hosting today, with great exchanges. We really appreciate your taking the time to answer questions.
You mean no more floating financial mountains in Pandora? Where will $100 billion annual bonuses come from?
I have been a China skeptic for some time. I just don’t think what they have been doing is sustainable in a world downturn. On top of that, they have created loan, commodity, and stock bubbles. A lot of their investment continues to increase their production overhang. I don’t see how it can go on as it has. And if it doesn’t there is a real potential for political instability.
My guess is that China hits a debt service crisis which pops their growth/investment bubble. That would end the fledgling worldwide recovery in a manner similar to how the US tech bubble pop in 2000 ended the Japanese recovery from the Asian financial crisis.
Ergo, double dip depression… three years of deflation, nationalization of toxified banks… you know the drill.
Any bets? … Anybody? …Bueller?
(Good riddance and no apologies to Ben Stein btw.)
[AHA! Hugh's in -- anybody else?]
It’s not ego you’re speaking of, it’s ‘social problems.’
One of the most useful euphemisms for “I hate that guy’s guts and would never work for him let alone with him” I’ve ever heard.
“Social problems” = the new “big swinging dicks”
I really don’t follow F&F very much so what I would like to know is what their counterparty exposure is on all the securitized paper that went through them.
?? Don’t understand your response to my comment. I was trying to probe why CR’s “scerotic” banking system was bad. I don’t understand how your comment relates to that.
Or worse than what happened here.
Ah Hugh, your just don’t understand. If the U.S. and China do it in symbiosis, how bad can it be? /s
I’d call it “The Spocko Squad” and see if we could get Quinn Martin to produce it. “In Color”
We could wear cool hats while cracking the cases. The real work would be behind the scenes with the tax guys and the former regulators, but for TV we would fly to places like the Caymans for extraditions and perp walks. Like to catch a predator. If we could capture part of the money we recover the show could pay the Former MOUs we need to rat out the guys who screwed them. Those guys are all about the money but I’ll bet some of them are pissed at GS folks.
Unstated, but implied. Thanks for making it explicit.
Great salon, thanks to author & host.
Very enjoyable read. Congratulations. 2 Qs: what about the details behind the take over of well-capitalized WaMu? And, as a journalist, do you feel a wanning of the power of the pen in the fact thatyou, Felix, and many others have exposed serious flAws in the system that have not been addressed and likely won’t?
Thanks.
My mission I suppose is to get as many folks as possible to explore these organizations as manifestations of how political and economic power really does intertwine in sustaining the illusion of democracy [re economic and foreign policy] in America.
My comment wasn’t specific to Costa Rica.
When the financial system becomes dissociated from its underlying economy, the consequences are not unintended. The image in Avatar of Prudential’s Rock floating in space with no visible means of support defies gravity, just as today’s public relations approach to solving the system’s foundational flaws.
“w” learned a lot at Harvard. Amazing.
So… my question…
Is China too big to fail?
Maybe it is
…and maybe it isn’t.
This question lies at the crux of our global society’s well being for many years to come. If you ask me, the next 20-30 years will be cast by the outcome of the next six months with respect to China. It bears discussion!
Last link corrected… Editorials in song:
JEFF BECK’S GUITAR SHOP-DAY IN THE HOUSE
IMHO, “regulatory capture” was not an accident, but rather a design feature of the Bush administration.
Bob in AZ
What I’ve heard is that if CFPA is scrapped, the job will be put somewhere– but probably in Treasury or another agency that seems like a poor steward of the consumer interest. That sounds like really bad news, to me. If not an independent CFPA, which department would be the best place for it?
Bob in AZ
Moral Hazard as Mockery
I agree, Bob. There are no unintended consequences here. Keeping government regulation five steps behind financialization of the economy is Rubin’s and his acolytes’ prime directive.
The idea that these masters of the universe couldn’t see this coming is so ridiculous as to be insulting. They didn’t care any more than Madoff, and with FIRE’s unlimited bailout guarantees, changed accounting rules, opaque fed transaction, trillions of future taxpayer debt service costs, the board is set for the next Hindenburg.