The good option is to withdraw but Obama has painted HIMSELF into a corner. He was the guy who campaigned on escalating the war in Afghanistan (little realizing that radicals would just move into Pakistan further destabiliing that country and little realizing the history of failed empire builders like the Brits and the USSR in Afghanistan). So the “problem” is really of Obama’s own making, not something thrust on him. Obama is an expansionist, Empire driven Democrat with there not being a dimes worth of difference between him and W on foreign policy. Recall that Obama has KEPT ON W’s Defense Secretary and PROMOTED most of W’s generals.

Obama is starting to get smoked out by time and circumstances on Afghanistan and a lot of other issues: jobs-unemployment for instance even as his pathetic position on health “insurance reform” has revealed him to be the DLCer he really is.

Once Obama escalates in Afghanistan, look for him to drop big time in the polls as people realize he’s an empty suit.

The question which will drive that, I would think, is, “How does Karzai stay in power if the U.S. leaves?

Nice breakdown of the Iraq situation, makes a lot of sense. It is quite different from the domestic politics of Afghanistan.

What if instead of negotiating with us Karzai negotiates with the Taliban (and probably comes to some power-sharing agreement)? Tom Hayden’s op-ed from a couple days ago suggests that it might be in Karzai’s electoral interests to negotiate with the Taliban, as he ran as the pro-negotiation candidate (although I guess he could keep winning via fraud). If he successfully negotiated, it would render moot whatever rationale we had for keeping our forces there, especially if the Quetta Shura Taliban forces promised to deny haven to al-Qaeda.

As I state above, the 10-city strategy rumored to be in play (was this McChrystal’s idea) has political implications, one of which is to make US success (and withdrawal) depend less on what happens to Karzai but without pulling the rug from under Karzai. We respect him in the jurisdiction he actually controls.

Maneuvering the politics of the region and the provincial leaders to permit US withdrawal is a Holbrooke job, not a McChrystal job. Surely that is one of the things that Sec. Clinton is asserting. That process coould move in the direction of whatever it takes to get a working consensus of the country’s leadership to ask us to leave negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement. Most likely that would also prompt a loya jirga. The US need not have a presence at the loya jirga, like we did in 2001; in fact, not being there or maneuvering the contents of decisions behind the scenes would make it possible to encourage the participation of the “Taliban” leaders.

As part of that plan, it seems like they had substantial Iranian help in training a military force that wasn’t entirely dependent on the U.S.

That is really the part that cannot be duplicated in Afghanistan, unless that training force is Pakistani. Wait, the Northern Alliance and Iran wouldn’t like that. And you can’t successfully train troops within three spheres of influence like was done in post World War II Germany, or can you? It’s a real stretch that would require a joint command, which would really be a negotiating session to defuse rumors and deal with provocative actions. But you inevitably have the equivalent of a protectorate in each zone. What diplomatic mechanisms would make this work?

In Maliki’s case, the withdrawal agreement happened as part of a long-term plan by Sistani & the rest of the Shiite power structure to hijack U.S. promises of post-invasion democracy. Once they pushed Chalabi/Allawi to the side in 2003-05, the SOFA was merely the other shoe finally dropping.

As part of that plan, it seems like they had substantial Iranian help in training a military force that wasn’t entirely dependent on the U.S. And perhaps most importantly, Sistani apparently served as a moral backstop who wouldn’t allow Maliki to sign a SOFA that didn’t end the occupation on a specific date.

Karzai is more or less analogous to Chalabi/Allawi, and without (to my knowledge) the independent power structure that allowed and/or forced Maliki to take a hard line on the SOFA.

I’m on firmer ground when it comes to Maliki, fortunately. Although I didn’t mention it in this post, I was pointing out Maliki’s agency (and seriousness) about a withdrawal agreement as far back as May 2008 (see this post for an overview). In fact, I don’t know of any observer who backed the idea of Maliki being serious about a U.S. withdrawal earlier or more strongly than I did. I was just trying — for once — not to venture into “I told you so” territory. ;-)

Haha, I can dig some flippancy. And congrats, you were clearly ahead of the curve on Maliki. In fact, I’m not sure the curve has caught up to you yet.

I’m interested in the possibility of Karzai doing the same. Maybe if Pelosi et al keep shitting all over him he’ll negotiate a withdrawal out of spite.

I’m on firmer ground when it comes to Maliki, fortunately. Although I didn’t mention it in this post, I was pointing out Maliki’s agency (and seriousness) about a withdrawal agreement as far back as May 2008 (see this post for an overview). In fact, I don’t know of any observer who backed the idea of Maliki being serious about a U.S. withdrawal earlier or more strongly than I did. I was just trying — for once — not to venture into “I told you so” territory. ;-)

The point of my post is that there are no good options.

Are you serious?

How about negotiating with the Quetta Shura and winning their separation from the al-Qaeda-allied Pakistani Taliban? How about supporting attempts to convene a loya jirga? How about withdrawing troops (and mercenaries)?

Simply bemoaning corruption isn’t going to convince the Obama administration to not escalate and ultimately withdraw. We need to show there are serious, viable alternatives, alternatives that are clearly superior to the status quo as well as escalation. There is a mission left to be accomplished, and it’s stopping the violence that is caused by our occupation and ending the recruitment boon that our occupation is for the Taliban.

I like the Maliki reference, but I think you downplay the agency of Maliki. He didn’t just sign the SOFA. He played a strong hand and forced the Bush administration to agree to withdraw (Bush obviously didn’t want to). Karzai has the ability to do the same, although I’m not sure that he will.