[Welcome Richard McCormack, Scott Paul, and Clyde Prestowitz, Hosted by Marcy - bev] richard-mccormack-manuf-a-better-future.thumbnail.jpg

Since last November, I have unexpectedly found myself blogging the auto crisis and bailout. Between my five years consulting internationally for an automotive company and living in Michigan, I seemed to have the ability to explain the larger causes of the crisis that were largely missed elsewhere in the blogosphere and much of the traditional media. Yet while I could explain how America’s expensive health care and China’s burgeoning auto industry played a role in the crisis, I always felt like I didn’t really have the details to describe precisely how our own economic policies have led to the gutting of our manufacturing industries and the auto crisis.

Manufacturing A Better Future for America provides those details.

The book consists of a series of papers, largely by academics, covering all aspects of the plight of American manufacturing: an overview, a history of US trade policy, a description of how our trading partners cheat, a consideration of what happens when R&D investment moves overseas, a description of deindustrialization on the local and national level, and so on.

The book is thick with data capturing the plight of American manufacturing. This passage, for example, uses shipping container volume to show that the US exports little else tangible besides waste paper, while importing huge amounts of consumer goods. 

The largest U.S. exporter via ocean container was not even an American company, but Chinese: American Chung Nam, which exported 211,300 containers of waste paper to its Chinese sister company, Nine Dragons Paper Industries.

Weyerhauser was America’s second largest exporting company via ocean container in 2007, shipping 165,800 containers filled with paper. Most all of this paper is remanufactured into cardboard to pack valuable manufactured goods for shipment back to the United States. Like the millions of products headed to American shroes, it is cheaper to manufacture cardboard in China than in the United States.

Only one of the top 20 U.S. exporters via ocean container–Procter & Gamble–could be considered a U.S.-based product manufacturer.

Few of America’s top corporate giants were shipping manufactured goods via containers to overseas markets. General Electric was ranked only in the 23rd position in 2007 among American exporters shipping 41,200 containers. But GE imported three times that amount–112,900 containers–and was ranked in 11th place among importers.

Caterpillar, which is one of America’s most successful international companies, was in 27th place among exporters (shipping 37,300 containers) behind 12 wastepaper exporters, according to [the Port Import Export Reporting Service]. General Motors ranked in 68th place, selling little overseas from its U.S. factories: and Deere & Co. ranked in 77th place. The only other U.S. manufacturing company on the container-exporting list was Whirlpool, which ranked 83rd.

Imports into the United States via container ships are another matter. The largest importer in 2007 was Wal-Mart. The world’s largest company (with sales in 2007 of $374.5 billion), imported 720,000 containers of products from overseas markets, followed by Target (435,000 containers), Home Depot (365,300 containers) and Sears, which owns K-Mart (at 248,600). The combined imports of these four retail companies (1,768,900 containers) equaled the exports of containers for the top 21 U.S. exporting companies, again, the majority of which sold paper.

It’s easy to attribute this imbalance to labor cost. But that tells a small part of the story:

The least of American companies’ worries is competing with low-wage labor. The labor cost in a coil of steel produced in the United States is less than the freight cost of a steel coil imported from China, according to Nucor CEO Dan DiMarco. Foreign producers receive subsidies, tax abatements, free buildings, free energy. They do not pay taxes. They don’t have to pay Social Security, workman’s comp, disability, or health care. They don’t have to match a 401(k) contribution. They are able to avoid more than 100 years of government regulations put on American businesses. OSHA does not exist in most developing nations. They use electricity that would never be allowed to be generated in the United States due to lack of pollution controls. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency employs 17,000 workers. China’s State Environmental Protection Administration employs only 300.

Perhaps more important than graphically describing what we all know–that we don’t "make" much anymore as a country–the book also describes the risks of this reality, as we increasingly lose our leadership position in technology, even high-skilled jobs are shipped overseas, and we can’t even sustain our defense industries with our own manufacturing base.

In other words,Manufacturing a Better Future provides a wonky, very current (it was written after last year’s Wall Street crisis) assessment of the current troubles with American manufacturing. 

The book, though, is part of a larger effort on the part of the Alliance for American Manufacturing (a partnership between some US manufacturers and the Steelworkers) to do something about it. AAM has, in turn, partnered with the progressive group Campaign for America’s Future, to start Making it in America, which aims to spur a real public debate about the future of American manufacturing and, with it, our entire economy (I will be doing some blogging on this project). As such, the book aspires to support a much larger conversation.

That said, there are parts of the book that make for tough slogging. For those unfamiliar with the existing manufacturing supply chain (from my auto blogging, I realize that includes a lot of people in the blogosphere and policy world), that chapter relies on a lot of jargon; and I made mr. emptywheel, who is a mechanical engineer, walk me through some details of the defense industrial base chapter. And there are some related issues that get little or no notice: aside from a discussion of energy generally and the role of petroleum in our trade deficit with Mexico and Canada, there’s no discussion of the role of petroleum in our larger balance of trade. There’s no discussion of how our choice to extend empire-like dominance over much of the world dictated our domestic manufacturing choices and our larger trade policies. And there’s little discussion of how a similar lag in broadband and other telecom investment contributes to making us uncompetitive globally.

But since the book is intended to be part of larger conversation, I’m sure those things can and will be included in that conversation. So let’s welcome Richard McCormack, editor of Manufacturing a Better Future; Robert Borosage, co-director of Campaign for America’s Future; and Scott Paul, Executive Director of the Alliance for American Manufacturing, to our conversation.