Cheney would have turned to the CIA. He might have, on his own initiative, spoken to Special Forces officers. But the interconnections between CIA and SF on a covert level are quite tight. It’s my belief the CIA was in charge of setting up Mitchell-Jessen, or setting those wheels in motion. Later, when they asked for OLC opinions for cover, they withheld information about what they were doing and what they already knew about SERE techniques. OLC could then say, “we’re relying on what you tell us.” The whole thing was a shadow play.

The Air Force got involved in 51-52 when its flyers got shot down in Korea/China, and “confessed” to dropping bio weapons on Korea/China, an accusation which may or may not have been “false.”

The Office of Naval Research sponsored a lot of the MKULTRA research, or the CIA filtered it through Navy auspices. The Army had its own programs, but they are less known.

One problem in our understanding what occurred in the 1950s and 1960s is that many of the documents were destroyed, or remain classified.

It’s hard to say where torture started, since it has such an octopus-like existence. D. Rejali’s book Torture and Democracy shows how the spread of torture, like any other cultural phenomenon, is difficult to trace, and is idiosyncratic in its development.

One, each service battled to develop its own version of a SERE, just as each battled to have its own Specia Ops unit, so as not to be beholden on another service for its special needs. Each SERE team was fostered by its own brood of psychologist-cum-special warfare specialists. From a taxpayers’ perspective, this seems like wasteful duplication of effort, since the scenarios to be trained in seem to have more similarities than differences. This might be put down to traditional, inter-service rivalry, always expensive for taxpayers.

Two, the “first to torture” appears to have been the Air Force. The service that always seems to be third place, after the institutionally older Army and Navy seems to have an Avis-size chip on its shoulder boards. That was especially true after the demise of the Cold War, around which the AF built its missiles, bombers, fighters, bases and budgets. After that no longer provided a reason for being, or for gigantic budgets, the AF needed a new enemy worthy of attacking (or “defending” ourselves from) by using the Air Force’s men, women and machines.

It suggests a deep-seated cultural problem beyond inter-service rivalry. The Air Force’s super macho fighter jock model seems more strained that its service rivals. It may be the least adaptable of its peers. The AF’s service academy in Colorado Springs is also home to an ueber-Christian, sexist sect that produces officers in its image and denigrates those without it.

Thank you, terrific work in this series you’re doing.