[Welcome Bradley Graham, and Host, Paul McLeary - bev] 
By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld
In the spring and summer of 2001, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld busied himself putting together a detailed briefing for Congressional leaders and national security officials that would outline where he saw threats in the post Cold War world. In many respects, he was on the money, focusing his presentation on terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyberwarfare, and rogue nations. The plan was to alarm Congress enough to give Rumsfeld the political backing he needed to undertake a massive overhaul of how the Pentagon did business, and to drag the American military out of its Cold War mindset and into the realm of complex 21st century threats.
It was to be Rumsfeld’s blueprint for his tenure as Secretary of Defense, the “next Mr. X article” as one of his aides said, comparing it to the famous 1947 Foreign Affairs article by George F. Keenan that laid out the policy of containment that the United States would largely follow until the collapse of the Soviet Union.
But the briefings were never presented as Rumsfeld had planned. The first one was scheduled for September 17, 2001, but by that point the case that Rumsfeld wanted to present had already been made in the form of jetliners used as missiles aimed at American civilian and military targets. While the 9/11 attacks in one sense interrupted Rumsfeld’s plans for the transformation of the American military from a heavy force structured to fight two near peer competitors simultaneously into a lighter, networked force that uses the latest technologies to move quickly across several theaters; in another sense the technological revolution spurred by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan helped to bring the Rumsfeld dream into reality—though he never seemed able to fully grasp how to manage this change.
Rumsfeld is a study in infuriating contradictions. An intelligent, driven, energetic man who was successful both in a previous stint in government—he was a Congressman, then Chief of Staff and Secretary of Defense in the Ford administration—as well as in the private sector, he seemed to fall apart as Bush’s SecDef. During the critical years from 2001-2006, Rumsfeld is revealed in Bradley Graham’s book to be a bullying micromanager who complains about the number of water glasses on the table for Pentagon lunch meetings and sends so many needling memos—some of them about how to write memos—that underlings in the Pentagon referred to them as “snowflakes.” He becomes involved in so many of the mundane staffing decisions at the Pentagon, and forces his way into so many beuracratic turf battles with other members of the Bush administration and Congress, that you wonder where he found the time to plan two wars. To take on all these tasks while continuing to push for transformation of the Pentagon’s culture, hardware, strategic concepts and daily operations is a nearly impossible task, and Rumsfeld’s ultimate failure is that while pushing in so many directions, he rarely seemed interested in answers, instead confining himself to keep pushing for more ideas, and asking more questions. He was a micromanager who also was fond of asking the big questions, but never actually got around to doing the heavy lifting of answering them. Robert Soule, the Pentagon’s chief program analyst at the time, told Graham that “Rumsfeld had the reputation coming in as a really decisive guy, but he wasn’t at all.”
He also undermined his own plans by insisting on insulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff in surprisingly large and pathetically small ways. He refused to meet with them in “the Tank,” the meeting room where the Chiefs hold their meetings; would call the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Richard Myers, away during his own meetings with the Chiefs; cut them out of the loop in his dealings with the Pentagon’s regional commanders; shut them out of the planning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; and continually inserted himself in decisions over which officers to promote, which has traditionally been the responsibility of the service chiefs. If all that sounds like a lot of energy to expend on proving a point, he also would also do small things like seat the Chiefs in the back row at some meetings, just to prove a point.
The tragedy of all of this is that Rumsfeld’s head was in the right place when he took the helm in 2001. The Pentagon was mired in its own groupthink, with expensive and obsolete weapons systems designed to defeat a Soviet enemy that no longer existed being pushed by a system that didn’t know any other way. His forward-looking reform agenda actually resembles, in some respects, the one current Secretary of Defense Bob Gates is successfully pushing through Congress and the Pentagon. But Rumsfeld’s problem was that he never tired of asking questions, always putting off answers until he had more information—and when more information was provided, finding more questions to ask. Overall, Graham paints a picture of a Pentagon staff that was forced into constant battle against a bullying and obtuse boss who spent more energy on issuing blunt dismissals of their briefings and producing a constant hail of snowflakes, than actually doing the work of leading.
Related posts:
- FDL Book Salon Welcomes Dahr Jamail, The Will to Resist: Soldiers Who Refuse to Fight in Iraq and Afghanistan
- FDL Book Salon Welcomes Adam Gopnik – Angels and Ages: A Short Book About Darwin, Lincoln, and Modern Life
- Rumsfeld Blames General Counsel Jim Haynes for Torture Policy
- FDL Book Salon Welcomes Robert D. Auerbach, Deception and Abuse at the Fed: Henry B. Gonzalez Battles Alan Greenspan’s Bank
- FDL Book Salon Welcomes Dr. Steven Miles, Oath Betrayed: America’s Torture Doctors
Spotlight
Support this site!
Subscribe to the newsletter
Advertise on Firedoglake
Send
us your tips
Make us your homepage
About Firedoglake
Advanced search
Bradley, Welcome to the Lake.
Paul, Thank you for Hosting today’s Book Salon.
Welcome everyone, and welcome to Mr. Bradley Graham, author of the excellent new biography of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld.”
Mr. Graham sat down for several interviews with Rumsfeld and his wife while writing the book, and to start things off, Mr. Graham, could you give us a sense of the Don Rumsfeld you met when researching the book? Does he seem changed from the man who held all of those combative press conferences?
Welcome to Firedoglake – glad you could be with us today!
Hey Bradley, have you ever met Midge Decter?
Thanks. Happy to be here today. Ready for everyone’s comments and questions.
No, Paul, Rumsfeld didn’t seem much different during the eight interviews that I did with him for the book. He does have a range of moods, and they were all on display in my meetings with him.
Never met her but did of course read her book about Rumsfeld.
Good afternoon and welcome to FDL Bradley and Paul
Bradley, I have not read your book (honestly, I find it difficult to read about folks like Rumsfeld, when I have lived through the actions he has pulled that lead us to where we are right now.)
Did Rumsfeld have any idea of how badly he had screwed so many things up or did he just believe that it was only the faults of others that caused all the miseries? In other words, was he at all remorseful over his time period as SecDef?
What strikes me about the early shots at trying to pin down Rumsfeld’s legacy is that we often forget about his original plans to reform the Pentagon’s Byzantine management and weapons acquisition structure. Did he lose sight of this because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, or did he continue to peck away at reform? And if so, were there any notable successes that you found?
Rumsfeld wouldn’t be drawn out on the question of whether he had any regrets, though naturally I tried to get him to address it. He may yet offer some in his own memoir, which he’s working on. But he continues to be quite vocal about, in his view, having been wrongly portrayed in the media. He thinks the news media generally was overly critical of him and not critical enough of some others in the administration–notably, Powell and Rice.
Thank you for writing this extraordinary book. I’m about 100 pages shy of finishing it, but I don’t expect to find what’s missing from Donald Rumsfeld’s character: any sense of compassion from the warmaker for his victims. In fact, in a most infuriating anecdote, Rumsfeld is portrayed as forgiving of military error when the “wrong” house is bombed in a raid, recommending to the general who reports the mistake that perhaps his warfighters should simply hit more houses.
No anecdote in this book stood out for me more than this one: a general reports an error that resulted in the loss of innocent life and the home of noncombatants, expecting to be chewed out by the perfectionist who relies on ever more granular data from his underlings to conceptualize his war. Yet, instead, the general gets a reaction that can only be characterized as a war crime: bomb more houses belonging to civilians, the ones whose country we are hoping they will rebuild as we attempt to win their hearts and minds, to increase the odds of getting the bad guys.
In your book, Mr Graham, does Donald Rumsfeld ever recognize the fundamental error of his ways? Does he ever understand that he engaged the world’s greatest fighting force against an innocent people for reasons that were lies? Do you think putting him in the dock at his war crimes trial will help him understand the horror he has done in the world?
His “snowflake” management style, confrontational approach to underlings, and data-driven decision mask the scope of the evil he perpetrated on American troops, our reputation in the world, and our ability to ever approach any international problem with clean hands.
Did Rumsfeld ever get that?
Good afternoon,Bradley.
I found it heartening that there was a hue and cry against Stanford University-by its own staff and student body-when the University provided Rumsfeld a “Chair” upon his departure from the White House.
Oddly, that same snug(smug?) harbor,Stanford reclaimed its alumna,Condoleeza Rice upon her exit from D.C.
By any chance do you have any input about this time frame,and if Rumsfeld expressed any opinion on his successor,former CIA guy,Gates?
Word has it,Gates is just as much a micro managing,control freak as Rumsfeld.
Thanks to all at FDL,and the guest author, for the opportunity to participate.
Rumsfeld certainly didn’t lose sight of his transformation mission. In fact, as I discuss in the book, some of his administration colleagues felt he was perhaps at times overly focused on this at the expense of paying more attention to the war in Iraq. He also is frequently faulted for having stuck with his transformation drive even after the Iraq war worsened, putting too great a burden on the U.S. military. Rumsfeld contends, though, that the war actually energized his efforts at bringing about change in the military. As for how much he succeeded at transformation, the results are definitely mixed. He can be credited with bringing about some altered attitudes, but in terms of concrete change in programs and weapons systems, even he has given himself only a five on a scale of ten.
Teddy, points taken but let’s not lose sight of the fact that the President makes the decision to go to war, and the SecDef carries out his orders.
The anecdote about the wrong house being bombed is illustrative of the extent to which Rumsfeld backed up his generals. And they were very appreciative of that. But Abizaid, Casey and others also stressed in interviews with me that Rumsfeld was quite sensitive to casualties, both civilian and U.S. military. It was one reason, they said, that he was often reluctant to see increases in U.S. troop levels in the war zones. As for Rumsfeld recognizing the fundamental error of his ways, he wouldn’t acknowledge much with me.
How close was the working relationship between Cheney and Rumsfeld? Did Cheney give him his marching orders?
I heard that Rumsfeld the athlete, primarily a wrestler, was reflected in his strategic style. Could you comment on that idea.
I could easily apply the word sociopath to him. The “bad apples” labeling, causing lower echelon officers to be serving time in jail, one MP at this point, from Abu Ghraib, while they were following the diabolical torture/interrogation policy. He and Cheney can lie into the camera with the best of them. SOP
Also, the story of him callously extending stress positioning torture longer since he himself stood so many hours a day. He sounds to me like an amoral nightmare of a human being. Grand leader of the war on empathy.
Was it his order to Gitmoize Iraq, too, sending Gen. Miller over there?
I have a question about Rumsfled’s vaunted ethical standards, too. Many people come into public service with wealth invested in any number of industries. Most approach the problem by immediately putting everything into a blind trust, administered without their knowledge, and then proceed to do the job they were hired to do in the government. Rumsfeld, quite differently, took a hands-off approach to many decisions begging to be made at the Secretary level, while waiting for his investments to be unwound from private partnerships and other vehicles.
Why do you think he continued to monitor his own investments, knowing as he must have that they weren’t uncoupled yet from decisions being made in his department, instead of turning these decisions over to a trustee who wouldn’t keep him informed at all about what was happening? Like Dianne Feinstein’s inside-out advisements in order to know what defense acquisitions affected her husband’s companies, Rumsfeld’s attempt to appear ethically pure can also be seen as crippling his new department’s ability to transform, lacking his guidance and leadership.
Can’t enlighten you any about Rice v. Rumsfeld at Stanford. But on the question of Gates, it does appear in some ways he’s come to mirror his predecessor. His own micromanaging and instances of overruling of the military chiefs are just a couple of examples. But in personal style, Gates has remained distinctly different from Rumsfeld, and this has been a key to his success. He has shown little of the arrogance, the dismissiveness, the abrasiveness of Rumsfeld. He has managed to convey firmness and decisiveness without being overbearing and offensive. Most significantly, he has restored a measure of accountability without breeding deep resentment and making himself as unpopular as Rumsfeld ended up.
Setting aside the concern about civilian casualties unmentioned in the book, a Secretary of Defense truly wrought over U.S. military killed on his watch would never delegate family notification letters to the autopen.
Was it Rumsfeld who has a lot of stock in an immunization drug? Certainly conflict of interest.
Mr. Graham — I think we can combine emerson and libby liberal’s questions into one:
How would you characterize the relationship between the VP and SecDef, and how much personal control did Rumsfeld exert over detention and interrogation policies?
The two had a very close working relationship. But from what I could discern, they regarded each other more as equals. I don’t have any impression of Rumsfeld taking orders from Cheney, although particularly in the area of detainee affairs, the defense secretary appears to have deferred to the vice president’s interest in taking the lead.
Speaking of investments, doesn’t Rumsfeld own a lot of stock in the flu vaccine?
I mention the autopen episode in the book. Rumsfeld’s senior aide, Larry Di Rita, has taken the blame for that.
Yes, he does. He got involved early with Gilead, which markets Tamiflu.
yes, especially on a flu pandemic publicized as threatening global chaos and based on fear. Does your book address these investments and how Rumsfeld beoame aware of them?
How is it possible for the micro-manager SecDef to see his orders regarding the announcement of Saddam’s capture flagrantly disobeyed, and then characterize those order to his generals as “guidance?” (p447) The need he had to not leave fingerprints while still wanting to be seen as the “Rumstud” of warmaking betrayed Rumsfeld’s essentially bureaucratic nature, I think. Do you suppose he let CPA head Bremer slip out of his control because he could see the viceroy taking the whole enterprise sideways?
When interviewing Rumsfeld for the book, did you talk at all about the “Surge” in Iraq, or events there after he left office? If so, what were his thoughts?
I think the issue of Rumsfeld’s investments only complicated his ability to make decisions on Pentagon programs for a short while at the start of his term. He did continue to maintain stock in Gilead, but did so on the advice of his lawyers and recused himself from administration decisions involving Tamiflu.
You mention others whom you interviewed for the book. Can you name some of them?
You portray the soldiers’ Town Hall when Rumsfeld talked about going to war with “the army you have.” Wasn’t there another, more poignant Town Hall with Alaska Stryker brigade families who’d just heard about extended/additional deployments, where Rumsfeld faced hostile questions? Did you get a reaction from him about this meeting, also?
What actions did Rumsfeld think Powell and Rice should have taken the hits on? Did he ever admit to the mistakes of not having enough soldiers, or really , any plan at all for Iraq- and for the outdated protective gear given to the troops?
In the book, I devote a significant amount of space looking at the Rumsfeld-Bremer relationship. It’s a very important one, given the extent to which decisions made during the first year of the U.S. occupation came to complicate America’s involvement in Iraq. Even some of Rumsfeld’s closest advisors were troubled by his refusal to try to exert more control over Bremer. But Rumsfeld was mindful that Bremer had developed his own relationship with Bush, and the secretary didn’t want to challenge that. Further, as the situation in Iraq worsened, I think Rumsfeld saw some political value in distancing himself from Bremer and letting the CPA leader take the blame.
Rumsfeld and Daddy Bush apparently had a rivarly during the Ford years.
Was that advantageous for him in George W.’s eyes and his need to have his own “strategy” away from the shadow of his father? And that was presumably used by Rove, Cheney and Rumsfeld to push their own agendas?
He played the tough, in your face, I can take the blame guy, even when he martyrishly told George W. to fire him, and won the bluff, but was really a profound hypocrit and weasle when it came to taking true responsibility. Nixon once called him a “ruthless little bastard.” How he survived so long in so many administrations. He could really talk the talk. Walking the honorable walk, not so much.
I do address Rumsfeld’s views on whether to surge forces in Iraq in late 2006. The record shows that he didn’t think adding more troops was the way to go–and neither did the Joint Chiefs. Rumsfeld worried that a military surge would slow the process of getting the Iraqis to take charge of their own security. But before leaving office, he endorsed the idea of adding more forces provided the State Department and other U.S. government agencies also contributed more civilian officials to Iraq.
Has Rummy ever read the art of war?
More than 300 people were interviewed for the book. And nearly all agreed to put their comments on the record. You will find some anonymous quotes, but very few of them. And all the quotes are footnoted.
What I rarely see mentioned ,and perhaps you can address it, is that Hussein was Reagans BFF BEFORE he became ,25 years later, the top capo of the axis of evil.
Rumsfeld was Reagan’s envoy to Hussein.
The Boston Globe did a superlative piece on it a couple of years back.
Incidentally, that poison gas Saddam used on the Kurds,wonder if Rumsfeld owned stock in that company ,too?
The true Iraq appeasers
By Peter W. Galbraith | August 31, 2006
Snip…
In 1983, President Reagan initiated a strategic opening to Iraq, then in the third year of a war of attrition with neighboring Iran. Although Iraq had started the war with a blitzkrieg attack in 1980, the tide had turned by 1982 in favor of much larger Iran, and the Reagan administration was afraid Iraq might actually lose.
Reagan chose Rumsfeld as his emissary to Hussein, whom he visited in December 1983 and March 1984. Inconveniently, Iraq had begun to use chemical weapons against Iran in November 1983, the first sustained use of poison gas since a 1925 treaty banning that.
Snip…
This message was reinforced by US conduct after the Rumsfeld missions. The Reagan administration offered Hussein financial credits that eventually made Iraq the third-largest recipient of US assistance. It normalized diplomatic relations and, most significantly, began providing Iraq with battlefield intelligence. Iraq used this information to target Iranian troops with chemical weapons. And when Iraq turned its chemical weapons on the Kurds in 1988, killing 5,000 in the town of Halabja, the Reagan administration sought to obscure responsibility by falsely suggesting Iran was also responsible.
Snip..
The next year, President George H.W. Bush’s administration actually doubled US financial credits for Iraq. A week before Hussein invaded Kuwait, the administration vociferously opposed legislation that would have conditioned US assistance to Iraq on a commitment not to use chemical weapons and to stop the genocide against the Kurds.
http://www.boston.com/news/glo…..ped…
Thank you. Did Rumsfeld discuss the Continuity of Government (COG)?
Jack Keane, as we saw in Angler, ran a very successful back-channel between Cheney and the generals in Iraq, even before Petraeus came on the scene. Keane plays an important but shadowy narrative in your book. Do you think Rumsfeld knew about Keane’s dealings outside the chain of command, something Rumsfeld himself was quite zealous in guarding?
Did Rummy’s congressional district included Crystal Lake Illinois? I know Phil Crane the drunk took over after Rummy left but districts do get changed around.
I’m wondering if Rummy was ever my Congressman. I’m also wondering if Rummy selected Phil the drunk the Mchenry County GOP is a Private club.
Phil was such a drunk the GOP his own party never led him lead any congress commitites despite having seniority.
I don’t think any congressman has ever before or since been passed over like that. Still Rummy at the very least gave Phil the Nod.
Which I think shows just what a bad judge of character Rummy is.
I will grant that maybe Phil wasn’t drinking back then when he replaced Rummy but news reports are hard to find that far back.
To take Teddy P. and Emerson’s questions as one, did you get any sense of how he reacted to these criticisms? I think that the shortage of armor and other anti-IED equipment is directly related to Rumsfeld’s transformation initiative, and his firm conviction that we can do more with less, so to speak. This also draws in his desire to get out of Iraq as quickly as possible, so he could continue with his plan to make the Pentagon leaner and lighter, by adding high-tech weaponry to its arsenal.
Yes, Rumsfeld did meet with the families of that Stryker brigade after the brigade’s tour was abruptly extended. It was an emotional meeting for both Rumsfeld and the relatives. The extension came at a time of escalating violence in Iraq, and Rumsfeld had reluctantly agreed to the move at the urging of Gen. Casey, the senior U.S. commander in Iraq. In the book I quote a memo from Rumsfeld to Casey in which the secretary scolded the general for the late change in plans.
Why what role did they play how was their role any where near the size of his role? Funny he did not mention Cheney his role was as big or bigger is Rummy afraid of Cheney?
Most of the back-channel dealings that you refer to, I think, occurred after Rumsfeld left. Rumsfeld regarded Keane very highly.
Thanks for this! Wish the US background history with Hussein was common knowledge!
Rumsfeld’s involvement in the COG program is mentioned only in passing in the book. It’s been dealt with at greater length in other books.
So Rummy was responsible and you tell us why Great responsibility and why are things I have not heard in 8 years. If you have time could you expand on this point?
You discuss the spate of news stories that Rumsfeld attributed to State Department officials, that disparaged the Pentagon’s warmaking in Iraq. This was of such concern that Rumsfeld took it to the President. And yet shortly after (p440) a “musing” of Rumsfeld’s that had a very restricted audience appears on the front page of USA Today. What steps did Rumsfeld take within his own department to stop leaks? Or was he only concerned about them when the source was outside his arena, and therefore fodder for inter-agency angst?
It’s an amazing contrast: to see the SecDef take his worries about Powell’s team’s undermining him to the President — while immediately afterward his own team leaks a “winning or losing?” thought piece to USA Today.
To round up a few of the questions here: How would you describe Rumsfeld the bureaucratic in fighter? He seems to have complicated things terribly in the administration by sparring with Rice and Powell, in particular. Did this undermine the administration’s goals in any way?
A few days ago, emptywheel put the NY Times article “Bush Weighed Using Military in Arrests “ up for discussion in her post “Suspension of Posse Comitatus for 9/11 Anniversary?”
There were unattributed quotes in the article and one of them was this quote:
Googling “What would it look like” produced several quotes from Rumsfeld in various interviews. It would seem to be one of his signature phrasings.
Can you confirm this propensity to evaluate appearances using those precise terms?
If you agree that the NYT quote is his, then that suggest that Rummy actually thwarted the effort on Cheney’s part to use military force against Americans. (Unllike Condi.)
Rummy worked for Bush, but it is easy to believe he was in Cheney’s thrall.
Maybe he did play by his own rules and thus averted disaster. Hard to believe Rumsfeld was the adult in the situation, but you may have some insight into this.
He’s always come across as a big liar to me, but perhaps there was, after all, an ounce of loyalty to the rule of law.
Thank you. I’ve read several accounts about his involvement in COG, but none directly attributed to him.
Did he discuss his whereabouts during the critical 20-25 minutes on the morning of 9/11?
Did Rumsfeld have anything to do with having retired generals placed with Fox and CNN as an aid in selling the Iraq war to Americans, or was that more Rove and Ailes’ department? If this is not your area of expertise, I apologize in advance.
You are more than welcome.
Old news to some-history to some of us others.
History always repeats itself-look at the bailout.
Bush redux of BCCI and S&l of ’80’s.
I felt it necessary to interject the background,because,with all due respect to our guest, I personally take somewhat of an issue with the statement….
“The tragedy of all of this is that Rumsfeld’s head was in the right place when he took the helm in 2001.”
Snowflake Management Style,? and data-driven decision?
data-driven Decision making? like Robert McNamara.
Entering the Bush administration, Rumsfeld certainly had a reputation as a skilled bureaucratic maneuverer. And those who observed him during the Bush years at high-level, behind-the-scenes meetings noted a number of techniques he would use to get his way or to block things that weren’t going his way. He appeared careful about his relationship with Bush, but he allowed relations with Powell and Rice to sour, which contributed to an overall sense of dysfunction in interagency coordination. In the book I quote the late Wayne Downing, a retired four-star general and former NSC official in the Bush administration, describing Rumsfeld as having been “toxic” to the interagency process because of his lack of cooperation too many times.
(Thank you for keeping up so well, Mr Graham. We are an interrogative group, and there’s lots more of us than there are of you. Thanks also to Paul for summarizing and aggregating some of our questions.)
Thanks Teddy — and thanks for the great questions.
To touch one one important point you made in the book: While he has a reputation for being tough, Rumsfeld still only fired one person during his tenure as SecDef, despite the mistakes made in Iraq. Why was he so adverse to letting go underperformers, when he was perhaps mildly obsessed with personnel issues in other matters?
A list of companies Rummy traded in and a list of new defense contracts approved when he was in charge could prove interesting.
Crony Capitalism its not who has the best product who gets the contract its who has the best connections.
If Rummy had stock in any armor vehicle company that could not produce enough armored vehicles for the troops on time like the contract said. Any connections to bad helmets, late arriving bullet proof vests the army choosing one bullet proof vest company when Dragon Fly I think was the name was so much better the troops and their parents were buying it themselves.
Oh and the electric shower company KBR.
Then Rummy is in so much trouble.
Don’t know about Rumsfeld’s involvement in the particular situation that the NYT wrote about. But I do know that he was very wary of employing U.S. troops in domestic emergencies. That accounts for his initial reluctance to dispatch active-duty forces to New Orleans in the wake of Katrina, which I talk about in the book.
In the book I describe in some detail Rumsfeld’s actions on September 11, 2001.
Could you expand on Rumsfeld’s actions on 9/11? He was a the Penagon wasn’t he?
Rumsfeld backed the Pentagon’s program to cultivate a number of retired officers, who then appeared on broadcast programs often articulating the Defense Department’s views. It was one way Rumsfeld and his staff sought to counter what they saw as a negative media bias.
Didn’t Rumsfeld use his “toxicity” and reputation for same very skillfully, though, to slow down or even abort proposals he disfavored? Again leaving no fingerprints or memos attributable but him, but using the bureaucracy or (in cases where he simply would neither attend nor send underlings) misusing it to his own ends?
What was Rummy’s reaction to the tornado damage that hit Mchenry county and was declared a Disaster area?
Late 60’s early 70’s Raven ( a regular here came to help clean up) but it was right around the time Rummy would have been congressman or had just left.
Meaning he probably still had personal connections back there.
Do you think Rumsfeld knew about the retired generals’ connections to defense contractors that stood to profit from America’s warmaking, though? There are two prongs of corruption to the spokesgeneral controversy: the propaganda and the profiteering. While he planned and managed the propaganda to counter the negative media bias, do you think he saw the crony angle?
Yes, he fired only one person–Tom White, the secretary of the Army. By contrast, Gates, who has been in office less than half as long as Rumsfeld was, has removed six. Rumsfeld’s own record in the corporate world had been different. At Searle and General Instrument, which he ran, he oversaw dozens of firings. But in those positions, he had been driven by pressures to downsize and other economic considerations. At the Pentagon, he often saw issues of accountability and punishment as best left to the military services themselves to sort out. And he tended to feel a certain loyalty to people who were loyal to him.
I’m curious to know how you felt about Rumsfeld. Was he warm and likable or not? What was Mrs. Rumfeld like?
Yes, he was in the Pentagon, even stepped outside immediately after the building was hit to survey the damage, then went back inside to join other senior staff in a military command center.
On April 11, 1965, during the Palm Sunday tornado outbreak, a large and devastating tornado damaged or destroyed large portions of the city. Six people were killed by the tornado, and a further 75 wounded. Damages in the city totaled over $1.5 million, as 80 homes and a shopping center were completely destroyed. Disaster shelters were set up to house the homeless, and then-governor of Illinois, Otto Kerner, Jr., personally visited the city to view the damage.
“Rumsfeld was elected to the United States House of Representatives for Illinois’ 13th congressional district in 1962, at the age of 30, and was re-elected by large majorities in 1964, 1966, and 1968.[12]”
Teddy and Emerson — the Govt Accountability Office just came out with a report about the retired generals in the media:
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/316443.htm
Mr. Graham, I think Teddy’s question here is a good one to expand on:
“Didn’t Rumsfeld use his “toxicity” and reputation for same very skillfully, though, to slow down or even abort proposals he disfavored? Again leaving no fingerprints or memos attributable but him, but using the bureaucracy or (in cases where he simply would neither attend nor send underlings) misusing it to his own ends?”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Rumsfeld
Thanks Raven! So just what did Rummy have to say when his Congressional District was destroyed?
Was the National Guard or any army troops called out to help? If so did Rummy complain ?
Rumsfeld can be very affable and engaging, quite at odds with his image as a gruff, abrasive figure. His wife, Joyce, is especially charming. In high school, where she and Rumsfeld met, Joyce at one point headed a school group known as the Friendly Committee, which was responsible for reaching out and making other students feel included. She still has an impressive ability to make people feel welcomed.
Yes, Rumsfeld was indeed adept at using the bureaucracy to his own ends. Andy Card, who was Bush’s chief of staff, observed this fundamental irony about Rumsfeld: Although a complicated person, Rumsfeld believed simply that others should just follow his rules.
I bet they were nicer than FEMA trailers and I bet the County was rebuilt quick too.
As we begin to wrap things up, what do you see as Rumsfeld’s lasting contribution to the culture of Pentagon? Surely he changed it in some way, for better or worse.
Welcome to FDL.
Did the military people at the Pentagon really respect Rumsfeld? Or did they just show respect because they had to?
Certainly a number did respect him. But many also found him difficult to deal with.
As we come to the end of this Book Salon,
Bradley, Thank you for stopping by the Lake and spending the afternoon with us discussing your new book and Donald Rumsfeld’s life.
Paul, Thank you very much for Hosting this great Book Salon.
Everyone, if you haven’t bought this outstanding book yet, here is a link.
Thanks all.
Great question Snark! Let me add to it Is there a difference between what the Troops and the Generals feel toward him?
All those troops some on their 4th, 5th deployment how do they feel about Rummy and the way the war was run?
Teddy you rocked today with the questions!
Thank you for a wonderful chat today. I really appreciate your taking the opportunity to talk with us today about this very complicated subject.
Rummy: “gosh, whatever’s happening? gosh, guess i’ll go outside and help the fire department” on 9/11.
Thinks nothing of 5 million people with lives and jobs like himself, homeless.
Will live out his days and die in total comfort.
What has happened to the law of karma? Why are Kissinger and Kissingers-lite allowed to roam free, let alone suffer nothing against the epic, monumental suffering they casually cause?
Rumsfeld’s incessant emphasis on the need to change and better adjust to 21st century challenges has had a lasting impact, although the Pentagon remains a tough bureaucracy to reform. The sheer number of initiatives that Rumsfeld undertook as defense secretary was dizzying–the restructuring of major regional commands, the redesign of the Army, the repositioning of forces overseas and the revamping of the intelligence apparatus, just to name a few. But for all his transformational efforts, Rumsfeld will be judged most by his faulty handling of the Iraq war and by his harsh management style.
Thanks everyone, and thanks to Bradley Graham for writing such a great book.
And my thanks as well to everyone who participated.
Thanks.
Although the exceptional journalist Jeremy Scahill has of late been forever linked to his reporting on Blackwater, the truth is he has been doing yeoman’s work reporting on the Middle East for years now.
If you are so inclined,this common dreams article from several years back is well worth a visit.
The Saddam in Rumsfeld’s ClosetAug 2, 2002 … —Donald Rumsfeld. Five years before Saddam Hussein’s now infamous 1988 gassing of the Kurds, a key meeting took place in Baghdad that would …
http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0802-01.htm – Cached – Similar
For rich powerful men Respect is key. Kissinger knows people don’t respect him heck he still is keeping his stash of WH papers secret why because he knows his reputation would suffer more.
Rummy is all about success growing up where I did I know his type. For him to know that history will blame him (remember its always all about him) for America’s loss in Iran and Iraq 2 wars.
Well all his other success his life’s work won’t blot out that stain.
Sure guys like Kissinger and Rummy ignore us now but they know that we write and read history and thats all they care about.
They know that even future Conservatives will back away from their failures.
Denial is all they have left. Sad is what they are.
Thanks, Gitch, have been in and out since I am at work. But will followup as soon as I have time.
Thanks all. Very provocative salon!
It is awesome how much the needs of a manager’s ego can dismantle and demoralize an effective working team. Been there on such teams and it is crazymaking to recognize the needs of the tasks are placed second to the ego need to control of the manager and how profoundly that sabotages task momentum and team morale, causes laissez faire behavior and detachment to the point of people quitting. Also, he didn’t seem to be able to play with other teams. All those years in government. What will history say and also the people who worked with and beneath him.
He should be serving time if the people who followed his orders at Abu Ghraib are serving time. There is lying and there is breaking the law by defying Geneva Convention.
scahill articles are awesome. interview with him and moyers on privitization of army terrifying.
man, I am really upset I missed this thread, this was a great conversation and to which I had total enjoyment
my comments, to which I am surely sorry they will not be ansered as I am late however I do need to document these points for those who read this thread;
this to me is a bizarre statement, “success” in the ford administration all depends on what a person means by success
rumsfeld, with cheney, (cheney was the underling) manufactured “evidence” designed to undermine nixon’s the treaty of detant, they made believe there was information “so” top secret even the cia didn’t know about it, and rumsfeld with cheney created a false cia they called “team b”
this fake cia was a joke and they made up crap because they could not have peace.
they did it before and they did it again in Iraq, it’s what they do, to call this treason some kind of “success” is a stretch of the word
the term is “little man syndrome” and if you want a perfect example then look to rumsfeld
here’s an example of a man refusing to acknowledge his own ideas need to be fine tuned
a smaller more modern force is of course preferred in general however when you are occupying a country against their will you need man power or you need to get out
he refused to acknowledge this differance in his philosophy or wasn’t strong enough to admit in certain situations his philosophy would fail, and it was brutally obvious to everyone his philosophy would fail as an occupying force
as mentioned before in comments, you CANNOT “win the hearts and minds” of a land you occupy if you bomb civilian households, nor if you have policies condoning torture
and again, it becomes brutally obvious he had no intentions of any kind of success in Iraq when he refused to guard their social treasures, their museums, their mosques, their infrastructure
and to have the nerve saying “free people are free to commit crimes” or whatever depraved thing it was he said, I don’t have time to google it
in any event it is brutally obvious “success” in Iraq to him was not succes in Iraq to the Iraqi’s
more;
rumsfeld did not work for bush, he worked “with” cheney, not “for” cheney either since rumsfeld had the lead, they allowed bush to think they were working for him but they were working for themselves, rummy was proud how easy it was to manipulate the boyking.
anyway, I wish I was here while this thread was active but I am left to type and talk to myself
great thread, great read
great share, perris, thanks!
Excellent points. I still lean to Cheney directing traffic rather than sharing co-equal responsibilities with Rumsfeld.
That’s where the real change had taken place since the 70’s when, as you pointed out, Rumsfeld was in the superior position.
Cheney, now nearly 30 years later, had virtually unlimited power and dominated the pretender occupying the Oval Office. The Dick had no reason to share power with anyone, including Rummy, IMO.
I found this entire page fascinating, but tend to side with Clarke.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/…..dotes.html