Dies thanking the lord that Don Rumsfeld displaced him as Worst. Defense. Secretary. Ever.

More lessons of our country being misled into war….He certainly came clean in the “why we go to war” movie. I think he was tortured by what had happened…sadly, that brings back no ones life.

At least he made the film “Fog of War” and admitted he made mistakes to bad Rummy never saw it.

It’s hard to say anything positive about him.

In his later years he could sometimes be seen shambling around DC, symbolicly wearing sackcloth and ashes. It was unconvincing pose, with its background of millions of dead bodies.

Beats Rummy I’ve read he struts around proud as a pea cock. Sack cloth fits the mistakes Robert made as nothing could make up for his mistakes.

Skunk

During World War Two McNamara served under General Curtis LeMay, “an extraordinary belligerent, many thought brutal, man”. But McNamara cannot help betraying a certain admiration for LeMay’s scientific approach to war. He describes how LeMay “focused solely on the loss of his crews per unit of target destruction”.

Beneath the euphemistic language McNamara is struggling to deal with the horror of his own actions. He chillingly describes the firebombing of Tokyo: “In a single night we burned to death a hundred thousand Japanese civilians – men, women and children.”

But it was not just Tokyo. McNamara claims that the bombing campaign killed 50 to 90 percent of the people in 67 Japanese cities. This, of course, was followed by the dropping of two nuclear bombs. He concedes that this “is not proportional – in the minds of some people – to the objectives we were trying to achieve.” But there is no apology or admission of guilt, and by using the qualification – “in the minds of some people” – McNamara doesn’t even commit to an opinion of his own.

Are there really special places in hell?

After leaving the Pentagon in early 1968, McNamara spent 12 years leading the World Bank. He said little publicly about Vietnam until the publication of a 1995 memoir, ”In Retrospect.”

”You don’t know what I know about how inflammatory my words can appear,” he told Morris. ”A lot of people misunderstand the war, misunderstand me. A lot of people think I’m a son of a bitch.”

Well said.

I suppose in his defense it could be said that he was merely the “architect” of a policy that was ordered up by a pair of careless and bloodthirsty presidents, and endorsed by a grossly negligent Congress.

He was not tortured more that the many Viet vets and there families for whom every day since has been living hell.

Thanks for the memories, Bob.

I’ll say something positive about him:

During JFK’s presidency he loyally carried out the president’s wishes, including during the missile crisis — especially in how he laid down the law to the Navy Chief, who was under the impression that he, not the civilian leaders, would make the key decisions, which could have led to disaster.

Then there was McNamara’s loyalty and skill in carrying out Kennedy’s policy, against the wishes of the Joint Chiefs and virtually all JFK’s nat’l security team, starting in Nov 61 not to send combat units to Nam. He was loyal not only to the extent he continued for the next 2 yrs to faithfully represent JFK’s anti-escalation stance as if it were his own, but he did so after initially in 61 having argued forcefully for sending in the combat troops. In effect, he did a 180 for Kennedy and never let on it was anything other than a view he too shared.

Unfortunately, the loyalty that was effective for one president, sophisticated in assessing the overseas situation and properly cautious, didn’t work so well when he began to serve the next prez, someone who, the record shows, was hell bent on making a stand in VN from the outset.

McN should have stepped down much earlier than he did, probably when he began to doubt Lyndon’s Nam policy roughly late 65/early 66. Johnson was not at all the type to want to hear forceful nonconforming advice from his top aides, and so McN, and the other best and brightest, learned to keep their mouths shut as they became no more than yes men.

Very flawed and tragic figure. But in the end, the responsibility for the decision to escalate was clearly LBJ’s, and no one else’s.

I’m sure the Japanese can join him in hell.

Perhaps the Japanese should have thought about the cost and reality of war before attacking us at Pear Harbor.

Perhaps the Japanese should have thought twice before joining Hitler and Mussolini in their attempt to rule the world and slaughter tens of millions in the process.

Perhaps the Japanese shouldn’t have committed the Nanjing Massacre.

Perhaps the Japanese shouldn’t have forced hundreds of thousands of women into sexual slavery in conquered countries by the Imperial Japanese Army between 1937 and 1945.

Perhaps the Japanese shouldn’t have brutally murdered at least five million captive foreign civilians and prisoners of war between 1937 and 1945.

Perhaps the Japanese shouldn’t have slowly murdered hundreds of thousands of victims by starvation, disease, and beatings in Japanese prisoner of war and internment camps, including hundreds of prisoners of war who were murdered by the Japanese Army’s infamous Unit 731 in the course of horrible biological experiments.

Think there’s room in hell for the Japanese too?

shit rolls downhill

It was not JLBJ’s decision alone. In addition it was the decision of those who enabled Johnson to take that oath of office in the plane, standing next to the blood-soaked wife of JFK.

“enabled”? It was the law.

I believe it’s been said that the CIA operates outside of all laws.

Of course it was LBJ’s decision alone, that’s what makes the job the toughest of them all.

You’re also wrong about the plane-oath. I don’t know what your source is for that, but it’s generally accepted that that decision came from Johnson and his camp. And it didn’t sit well with the grieving Kennedy people sitting at the back of the plane next to the coffin, including Jackie. But Lyndon pressed her, more than once, to come forward to witness the oath.

McN of course wasn’t on that plane — he was on another, over the Pacific, coming back from a high-level conference on VN when they got word. There is no evidence that he, Bobby or anyone else close to Kennedy told Lyndon he needed to take the oath right away in Dallas.

From Halberstam’s The Coldest Winter:

In addition, the Kennedy administration had done something extremely dangerous when it increased the larger mission to Vietnam: it corrupted the truth to suit its political needs for short term political profit-in effect buying time to get through the 1964 election. Because in the process it planted the flag even more deeply, it needed even greater results, for appearances were everything, and it needed them faster. But those results were not forthcoming, because the policy never worked. Never. Therefore, to compensate for the failure to produce the desired results in the field, the Kennedy administration soon created something quite extraordinary, a giant lying machine, one based in Washington, with its major affiliate in Saigon, and machine that not only systematically rejected all pessimistic reports from the field, and punished those who tried to tell the truth, but created it’s own illusion of victories and successes, victories and successes that never existed. It was a great exercise in self-deception: what the great lying machine did in that period was delay the arrival of the truth in Washington by some three years, and of course it also began the process of diminishing the credibility of the government of the United States. What was also lost in those three years was the ability to make wiser judgments about whether the commitment worked.. . .

One day when he came out of an NSC meeting in which they had discussed some disastrous problem handed down by the previous administrations he said, “Oh well, think of what we’ll pass on to the poor fellow who comes after me”.

Well, not really the law. No law dictated that, immediately upon the death of a president, the next in line has to be sworn in to become legally president. The transfer of power occurs constitutionally right away, and the later oath merely formalizes the process. The rushed business on that plane in Dallas was rather peculiar, and it was something which could have been taken care of a couple hours later in D.C. in the WH, without leaving deeply bitter feeling with the Kennedys. Later on, Johnson aide Jack Valenti publicly acknowledged this.

Sorry, I misunderstood.

I am still angry about Vietnam and I am still angry about the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty by Israel in 1967. McNamara and LBJ held off on protecting American servicemen as the Israeli jets and gunboats attacked because they did not want to embarrass Israel. McNamara is one of many policy makers who were able to create death from afar.

Raven, brodie

I was not making reference to the oath itself. I was referring to those who enabled Johnson to be put in that situtation — the ones who arranged for the bullets to enter the body of JFK.

Regarding the body in the back of the plane, there are claims that the body was surrepticiously moved twice, once in Lakeland Hospital and a second time from the plane. The EXIT wound in the back of head was altered (wasn’t Oswald supposed to be shooting from above and behind?).

Raven, haven’t read DH’s last book, but you are aware that Halberstam, in the 63-4 period and when he was NYT reporter over there, was in favor of not abandoning our commitment to VN? Something of a hawk, certainly more hawkish, as the fuller record now makes clear, than Kennedy, who was seeking to get out. DH didn’t want the US to withdraw, thinking that the consequences would damage US credibility with our allies, etc — the usual stupid excuses offered by the nat’l security establishment, people like Rusk for instance.

Now JFK, as he told anti-escalation majority leader Mike Mansfield, had to avoid the Repubs turning the 64 election into a demagogic Who Lost Vietnam? Mansfield agreed that Kennedy couldn’t substantially withdraw until after Nov 64. That was Kennedy’s dilemma. He had to keep the lid on in Nam but without sending over combat troops, while quietly arranging for us to be out of there by the end of 65. So, inevitably some degree of public deception was necessary.

Not an ideal situation, for sure, but far better to deceive on grounds of the goal of withdrawal than to deceive in order to escalate, as LBJ did with the Tonkin Gulf Res.

Regarding the administration of the oath itself in the plane, it has been postulated that that event was a ploy to lure everyone away the back, during which time the casket was surrepticiously removed from the plane.

Very much so. It took some people more time to figure it out than others. I went there knowing it was bullshit but that wasn’t till 68.

Think there’s room in hell for the Japanese too?

I’m sure there’s enough room in hell for all who deserve it.

I’m also sure that the Emperial Japanese are well represented.

That doesn’t change my opinion of McNamara, as close as we’re likely to get to putting a face on the Military-Industrial-Complex.

At the root of all of this was the Cold War mentality of those in power, especially the so-called “Wise men”: Harriman, Dulles, Ike, etc.who were regularly consulted by LBJ. Also, The Domino Theory and the obsession with A) stopping Communism and B) not losing a war. In that sense, Americans generally were guilty-not just McNamara, JFK, LBJ, etc…Sure, hindsight is 20/20 but imagine its 1965 or 1966-virually all the members of the establishment from Ike on down say its the right thing to do.

For a purely politcal consideration, Democrats had to be seen as “tough on Communism” to secure the vote of, thats right-Americans-who were virulently anti-communist.

JFK’s desire to withdraw from Nam surely did not sit will with LBJ’s Texas friends at KBR.

That’s “Parkland” hospital in Dallas…

You left out securing profits for KBR.

Thanks. Just checking to see of anyone’s awake.

.
Bobby, we hardly knew ye! By Jaysus, there’ll be nary a dry eye in Lough Namara tonight. But there’ll be warm place in Hell, close to the fire for our poor wee Bobby. He will be missed, by all the Vietnam Vets who’ve been sharpening their marksmanship these many years, in case he ever came to their town.

But today, there’s funny, scary, weird news, too.
.

I’m sure that McNamara’s place in hell will be crowded.

Not present in that place will be the millions of innocent civilians killed in WWII as a result of the war policies carried out by both sides. I’m not arguing a moral equivalency but surely WWII must stand out as that ghastly moment in human history when both sides agreed it was okay the murder unarmed civilians by the millions.

It was Ike who gave us the domino theory, and LBJ, and cold warrior since the beginning of that peculiar long war, was a firm believer in the DT. There are actual quotes of his to the effect that “If we don’t stop ‘em in Nam, next thing they’ll be in San Francisco.” Another time Johnson analogized, crudely, to a Mexican who makes his way onto your front lawn. Next thing you know, if you don’t stop him, he’s on your front porch, then inside the house.

Johnson is the reason why we need to make sure we’re electing smart people to the office, capable of making independent decisions regardless of what the establishment types are pressing him to do. Kennedy was that type of skeptical independent thinker, once he’d learned his lesson in the BoP about the establishment and the “fruit salad boys” and their overratedness.

For a purely politcal consideration, Democrats had to be seen as “tough on Communism” to secure the vote of, thats right-Americans-who were virulently anti-communist.

Mostly agree. Kennedy was certainly concerned about not being painted as soft on communism. However, he may have underestimated the extent to which he’d already proven himself with the public in his dealings with the communists in the missile crisis.

Arguably, he might have been able to get away politically with pulling the troops out sooner, as opposed to waiting to remove the bulk in 65 as he’d intended. But he was a cautious type and that move probably would have been a roll of the dice. And besides, he’d already rolled the dice, and lost some white support, when in mid63 he sent his civil rts bill to Congress. His polls took a slight dip (all the way down to 59%!) by Nov 63, but on the other hand he expected the Rs to nominate Goldwater, someone he knew, whatever the circumstances, he could beat.

he also actually served in the “shit” unlike LBJ and his bullshit silver star.

I forget who said it (one of Johnson’s staff/advisors I think) but something to the effect of, “what difference does it make to lose a war that should’ve never been fought in the first place?”. LBJ was certainly guilty of needing to win that war. I think your point about JFK being independent-minded after BoP may be true but is ironic-I think Johnson came to the same conclusion re: Vietnam. So, was JFK really that independent?

JFK’s independence after BoP, firing Allan Dulles, is what cost him is life.

KBR was going to have its Vietnam War, just as Halliburton was going to have its Iraq War, and nothing was going to stop them.

I think Johnson came to the same conclusion re: Vietnam. So, was JFK really that independent?

If we judge ultimately by actions and not mere words from a pol, yes Kennedy was far more independent a thinker on FP, much more sophisticated, than Lyndon. Johnson did indeed often express doubts about what he was about to do in the 64 and early 65 period re Nam, especially to his skeptical former senate mentor Dick Russell, who was trying gently to nudge LBJ into not getting too involved in an unwinnable situation.

I interpret LBJ’s occasional doubtful comments as mostly insincere, since the record shows that from his first meeting on Nam following Dallas, he was planning on showing US resolve over there, as he made clear to the Joint Chfs and to McNamara. This was consistent with his hawkish views as VP and before that his strong cold warrior comments while in the senate. He was, in the cold war context of the times, a typical Texan’s Texan. Be a man and don’t back down; show the flag, kick hell outta them commies.

Kennedy, by contrast, rejected the pro-escalation advice of his SecDef, his SoS Rusk, his top nat’l security aide Mac Bundy, the CIA and others, the vast majority of whom wanted to send in the troops. Want more independence? He similarly had rejected the pro-intervention advice of the NS establishment re Laos in 61-2, seeking and achieving instead a negotiated settlement. Missile crisis — he again rejected the advice of nearly everyone to quickly attack/invade Cuba.

McNamara, iirc, was one of the first — another big positive for him — to recommend the wiser approach of blockading the island.

How about the Joint Chiefs’ insane recommendation (twice, iirc) to launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack against the Soviet Union (!), with an “acceptable” 30 million or so American dead in the deal. Again, he nixed it. His SecDef McNamara, to his great credit, strongly was against it too.

Ditto for the absolutely crazy military scheme called Operation Northwoods. (McNamara again sent that one back disapproved.)

That’s sufficient cool-headed, thoughtful independent thinking for me, especially in the context of those crazy times.

I think the level of the evil the world was fighting, as embodied by the atrocities of Hitler, Tojo and Mussolini helped create a win-at-any cost mentality. War is hell and human beings don’t always make the perfect decisions in such circumstances.

Regardless of the outcome, KBR stood to gain heaps in Nam, as Halliburton did in Iraq.

It’s as simple as that.

All wars are business transactions. No more, no less.

Win at any cost” How about, “they can’t bomb a shithouse without my approval”.

I thought it was PA&E?

Hey youse guys,

He gave us the Ford Falcon!!!

Okay it was a crappy car too!!

I joined the Army in 1978, and had front row seats for all the shame heaped on soldiers for “losing” that war. It took ten years for the Army to begin bouncing back and become the force that it is today. I put much of the blame for that right onto Mr. Ford, whizkid, Falcon.

The mea culpa in the movie was good AND not one troop killed in Vietnam heard it. I have many friends who were wounded in that mess he helped create, some of whom are still wounded mentaly.

Hard to tell if the primary motivating factor was Lyndon paying back his financial benefactors at B&R/KBR. At the very least, enriching his friend Geo Brown and KBR certainly was a nice side benefit of the massive escalation and would have neatly repaid them for all their “hard work” in getting Johnson into power and keeping him there.

LBJ was definitely a fascinating, complex and not always moral person who, in the words of RFK (quoting his brother, iirc) was always lying, even when he didn’t have to lie. So, the official record of his presidency will always contain plenty of misdirection, imo, as to what he was really thinking.

McNamara strikes me as a much more honest participant than Lyndon, even with all his flawed advice to Johnson and some of his prior unfortunate participation with LeMay in WWII horrors, as others above have noted. The Fog of War film showed McN’s sympathetic emotional side as he basically owned up to some of the bad things he’d been a part of. Wish he’d done it much sooner, but I’ll take it late rather than never.

I don’t recall Lyndon, in his long-ago post-presidency sit down with Walter or at any time until his death in 73, showing such public anguish over his horribly destructive and unnecessary Nam policy (though it’s been many a year since I saw it). He basically talked with an accommodating Cronkite, revealed little new (except on Dallas and how he implied it might have been some payback by Castro), and then went back to the ranch to live out the rest of his life in private. I thought the public probably deserved at least a semi-mea culpa from Johnson, but I don’t know if Lyndon was capable of it.

Had South Vietnam fallen as a result of Kennedy withdrawing troops, I wonder what the political repercussions for Dems in 1966?

And, LBJ promised not to escalate during the ‘64 campaign and yet he trounced Goldwater. Why go back on that promise?

One thing that hasn’t been discussed much today is foreign reaction to a U.S. withdrawal in S. Vietnam? Would we have broken committments? How would our allies have seen this?

I cannot think of a thing to say that I’d want to see in print later when I’m in better control of my wits.

That’s five down. Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Westmoreland and McNamara. Now if Kissinger will please die, maybe my hate will die down a little, but little shit Obama seems to be intent on stoking it up again.

Last fast talking shyster lawyer for Illinois led us into the worst war we ever fought. No I AM not a Lincoln fan. The last two organized countries with slavery in the America’s were Brazil and the US. Brazil freed their slaves in the 1880s with little trouble. Lincoln was a smooth talking incompetent. Bullshit has consequences.

An absolutely disgusting egoist, one story after the next is bad about this guy. Untold story is that McNamara’s cravings extended into the W administration and being a chummy with Rummy the Dummy. McNamara was at lunch at the Pentagon on the day when the Iraq War started. Rummy actually held a lunch for McNamara.

Just curious, but are you and I among the (apparently) few people who disagree with the McArthur/Truman decision to give Hirohito a free pass for his role in the war? I have a bloodthirsty streak myself, and believe he should have been executed along with the other war criminals.

You have to understand that VN in 63, by the end of Kennedy’s life, just wasn’t quite the #1 priority for most Americans. Small far away country, and the Korea debacle was still a fairly recent memory for most adults. Politically, even some key cong’l moderates and conservatives (I mentioned Dick Russell, vy conservative Dem senator) were against going in with the combat units.

True, Goldwater or whoever JFK would have run against, would have tried to make an issue of it, or the Rs might have tried in 66, but, again, Kennedy had proven his toughness already in the missile crisis — by contrast, LBJ when he became president had not.

One thing that hasn’t been discussed much today is foreign reaction to a U.S. withdrawal in S. Vietnam? Would we have broken committments? How would our allies have seen this?

This is the Halberstam (ca 63-4) argument, somewhat common among some FP conservatives at the time (Rusk et al). But the record shows that our allies the French and the Brits were both against major US military involvement and wanted us to negotiate our way out, as with Laos. Of our allies, iirc only the Aussies sent in troops as per Johnson’s request. Otherwise, our friends elsewhere were more worried about the US repeating the French disaster in Nam than they were about meeting alleged treaty commitments to a tiny insignificant country. There was no more of a clamor among allies for us to go full bore into Nam than there was for us to invade Iraq 40 yrs later.

You’re on the money about Lincoln. Slavery was rapidly becoming economically untenable for the South. Had Lincoln not appeared on the scene, it would have ended on its own, without major bloodshed, before it ended in Brazil.

on Dallas and how he implied it might have been some payback by Castro

It might have been some payback by Castro. But then again, it might not. It would have been all a big secret to him. He know nothing.

/s

Interesting. Thanks for the discussion. So, it would seem LBJ’s protestations of “what will our allies think” were more about protecting himself than reality. So, do you think LBJ’s desire to stay/escalate was mainly based on a desire to prove himself tough on communists?

Makes me wonder about Johnson’s claim that he was being a voice of reason when hawks at the Pentagon wanted to “bomb Vietnam into the stone age” and he was trying to appear moderate? One wonders if there ever was that pressure (outside of a few…)?

I remember reading somewhere that LBJ had deluded himself into thinking he might just “get away with” Vietnam. Hubris.

So, do you think LBJ’s desire to stay/escalate was mainly based on a desire to prove himself tough on communists?

Could be. He was the most personally insecure person to hold in the office in recent times, with the possible exception of Dick Nixon. ANd, like Nixon, he had this thing about proving himself better than Kennedy. He couldn’t get much satisfaction from out-liberalling JFK, though he tried with the CR bills, but he might have gained more relief from out-toughing Kennedy in VN.

We don’t now fully know why the escalation, even as he did so knowing how he was going into a quagmire, nor do we fully know why he was so damn stubborn about further escalation even after he could see that the war effort was cutting deeply into his GS programs and as it was badly splitting the country. Might know more when hard-digging historian Caro publishes his presidential yrs volume, due out hopefully in our lifetimes …

Johnson’s claim that he was being a voice of reason when hawks at the Pentagon wanted to “bomb Vietnam into the stone age” and he was trying to appear moderate? One wonders if there ever was that pressure (outside of a few…)?

LBJ no doubt felt some personal satisfaction in considering himself as having carved out some moderate position — no nukes, no indiscriminate mass bombing of civilians in northern cities.

As to other pressure, there have been a few who’ve posited, darkly, that LBJ was under tremendous pressure from the Pentagon and maybe CIA not to continue with JFK’s withdrawal plans — almost as a personal threat. The implication, from some holding this view anyway, is that if he didn’t go along with their war plans, he would either meet the fate of JFK or some very dark secret of Johnson’s having to do with … (insert your best conspiratorial guess here) would be revealed.

Another view (James K. Galbraith, iirc) is that the threat from the Pentagon had to do with a stark ultimatum from the brass — either give us our war in Nam, or give us that preemptive strike against the Russkies.

It might have been some payback by Castro. But then again, it might not. It would have been all a big secret to him. He know nothing.

I don’t and never have bought the Castro Did It/Payback theory — Fidel was no dummy, and sending out someone like LHO, with Fair Play for Cuba written all over him, plus his alleged “defection” to the USSR, would have been breathtakingly suicidal. Further, literally on the day of Dallas, Kennedy had sent over an approved 3d pty emissary to meet with Castro to break the ice and signal Kennedy’s willingness for a new relationship. They were literally talking when news of Dallas arrived, at which point Castro, clearly shocked by the news, told the emissary that Now everything is changed … and he was right of course …

Interestingly, LBJ at various times in the last decade of his life offered up a few ideas as to who really was behind Dallas (he did it often enough so as to put him squarely in the Conspiracy Theorist category, ironically for the guy responsible for putting together the comm’n that was tasked with putting together the Lone Nut cover story.

To a top LBJ aide, Marvin Watson (who told it to the #2 at the FBI, DeLoach), Johnson believed (ca 1967) that the CIA probably was behind it.

To Walter Cronkite in 69 (edited out of the original broadcast, on bogus nat’l security grounds …. vy strange) he indicated that he’d discovered we’d (the US) been operating some “damn Murder Inc” against Castro, and Castro struck back.

To Earl Warren, trying to get him to head up the Comm’n, he supposedly said there was enough evidence linking the Soviets with Dallas, and indicated to Warren that unless he wanted to allow other investigations in Congress to proceed and uncover that evidence and force his hand, he’d better sit on that damn comm’n and give the right conclusion which would avert the loss of “maybe 60 million Americans in a war”. Or that’s my recollection of that very peculiar Nov 63 meeting in the Oval, the one from which EW allegedly emerged with tears in his eyes.

My sense of it is, Lyndon knew more about Dallas than he ever let on, though his comments to trusted aide M Watson may have come closest to revealing at least a major part of the real story. His other speculations may have been misdirection …

I too am waiting on Caro’s book…

Would Caro address those dark theories? He didn’t shy away from “Landslide Lyndon” in ‘48.

Hmmm…there are some historians who question the idea that slavery would have died out on its own. They speculate that slaves could have been employed profitably in the emerging timber and mining industries of the West.

Rest in hell^Wpeace.