Treasury gave the Congressional Oversight Panel headed by Elizabeth Warren a statement of its strategy, and a statement of the yardsticks it uses to measure its success. The Panel evaluates the metrics:

Credit Default Swap Spreads. Higher spreads on credit default swaps indicate a willingness to pay more for insurance against default, so a higher spread on an institution’s credit default swap means that investors think it is more likely to default on its obligations. Treasury and the Financial Stability Oversight Board (FinSOB) have indicated that falling spreads on the credit default swaps of major financial institutions reflect the perception of a more stable financial sector in which investors are less fearful of such institutions collapsing. However, although these spreads have narrowed, they remain volatile.

LIBOR – OIS Spread. Again, both Treasury and the FinSOB have cited the peak of the spread between three-month LIBOR, a measure of quarterly borrowing costs, over OIS, a measure of exceedingly short-term borrowing costs, as an appropriate metric for evaluating the success of Treasury’s efforts on the broader economy. This figure peaked on October 10, 2008, the day before Treasury announced the CPP, and has substantially declined since. The Financial Stability Oversight Board indicated that this measure also indicates calmer markets that are less fearful of major institution failures. The 1-month LIBOR-OIS spread is below where it stood for most of 2008, and the 3-month LIBOR-OIS spread is only slightly above it. However, both figures are trending upwards in 2009 and remain well above levels that had been stable until late 2007.

FinSOB (stop snickering) is Bernanke’s oversight group. The Congressional Oversight Panel doesn’t seem impressed by the results.

What about the metrics themselves? Neither of them relies on data related to the stability of the actual banks. Instead, they rely on the perception of the banks by investors. And not just any investors, the tiny cabal of Wall Streeters who trade in credit default swaps and overnight interest rate swaps (OIS) in secret markets, known only to the insiders. Among that number are the giant banks themselves. Pretend for a minute that Goldman Sachs is a bank. Stop snickering, it owns a bank with a whole $23bn in US deposits. By way of comparison, the very profitable community bank down the street from me has $3.7bn. At November 28, 2008, the end of their last fiscal year, Goldman Sachs held $175tn in swap assets, and $82tn in swap liabilities, probably not in the bank.

I’m sure there is some explanation for why we would measure the success of TARP based on transactions of the very banks whose stability we are trying to measure. Anyway by Treasury’s metrics, it is doing a great job with TARP.

The Panel discusses a number of other metrics: the state of the residential and commercial real estate markets, corporate bond spreads, and a number of statistics related to the general economy and not subject to manipulation by the banks themselves. Wanna guess how TARP is doing on those metrics? Badly. As if you didn’t know.


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