The Congressional Oversight Panel, headed by Elizabeth Warren, has been after the Treasury to explain its strategy since its first report. It never got an answer from the Paulson Treasury, perhaps because as Phillip Swagel explains, they were shooting from the hip, with a barely coherent strategy. The switch in the TARP from purchase of toxic assets to capital injections is a perfect example. Despite the “break the glass” analysis, which should have provided a policy-based plan for the disaster, when it happened, Paulson proposed a plan based on asset purchases in large part because he was philosophically opposed to government owning an equity stakes in banks. Shortly after TARP passed, he did it anyway.

A few days before the Panel’s latest report was due, the Obama/Geithner Treasury finally responded with a letter explaining the strategy. The Panel did not have much time to consider that response, but it produced an excellent analysis. The Treasury Plan, Warren tells us, is based on Treasury’s

… belief that the system-wide deleveraging resulting from the decline in asset values, leading to an accompanying drop in net wealth across the country, is in large part the product of temporary liquidity constraints resulting from nonfunctioning markets for troubled assets. The debate turns on whether current prices, particularly for mortgage-related assets, reflect fundamental values or whether prices are artificially depressed by a liquidity discount due to frozen markets – or some combination of the two.

If Treasury is right, their strategy might work. On the other hand, if Treasury is wrong in this assumption, it won’t work. And there is plenty of evidence that Treasury is wrong. So, the panel provides an instruction set for policy-making:

This report takes up four related topics: (1) an analysis of Treasury’s strategy, (2) a preliminary assessment of the direction of key financial and economic indicators since the inception of the TARP, (3) a detailed analysis, comprising the majority of this report, of approaches to bank crises historically, and (4) an analysis of the alternatives facing Treasury.

See, Paulson and Swagel (and I’m looking at you, Summers and Geithner), that’s how it’s done. You gather all the facts you can, then look at the past to learn how other people dealt with similar problems, then you think, and then you act.

The question of whether the problem of the banking sector is liquidity, as the Treasury believes, or solvency, as critics think, is central to the decision about what to do. If Treasury is right, dealing with toxic assets is a good plan. If the assets are really valuable, but there isn’t any money out there willing to buy them, it would be good to buy them, or lend against them. That will put cash in the bank at low or no risk to taxpayers. It restores liquidity at minimal cost.

If the banks are insolvent, buying the assets at their value won’t help. They need cash. If taxpayers are putting up that cash, we get ownership. That would really upset Paulson and the Republicans (and some Blue Dogs).

This is a question of fact, not faith. One crucial issue is the value of the toxic waste. Swagel tells us that in 2007, Treasury recognized the importance of this issue. They proposed to set up a data bank with information about each individual mortgage packaged into CDOs. This didn’t happen. As Swagel says:

The paradox was that this database did not exist already—that investors in mortgage-backed securities had not demanded the information from the beginning.

The Obama team understands the importance of facts in this area. The PPIP requires the FDIC to examine any pools of securities submitted for purchase. The stress tests, weak as they may be, will form the basis for action. As the President said in his Georgetown address on the economy:

That is the purpose of the stress tests that will soon tell us how much additional capital will be needed to support lending at our largest banks. Ideally, these needs will be met by private investors. But where this is not possible, and banks require substantial additional resources from the government, we will hold accountable those responsible, force the necessary adjustments, provide the support to clean up their balance sheets, and assure the continuity of a strong, viable institution that can serve our people and our economy.

Isn’t it a pleasure to have a smart President and at least one smart person on the Congressional Oversight Panel?


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