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(Please welcome Rep. Jim Himes in the comments — jh)

As a member of the House Financial Services Committee, Jim Himes (D-CT4) has been active trying to tackle the problem of executive compensation for TARP recipients. A former Goldman-Sachs executive, he also serves as co-chair with Melissa Bean of the task force drafting financial regulatory reform recommendations for the New Democrat Coalition.

While the AIGFP bonuses were certainly a flash point for public anger, the problem of executive compensation is a serious flaw in our financial system and no one wants to stand up to Wall Street and fix it. In his paper "Surreal Fiddling While Rome Burns," white collar criminologist William Black quotes a report from the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Reinforcement about a pattern they saw in failed Savings & Loans:

The failed institution typically had experienced a change of control and was tightly held, dominated by an individual with substantial conflicts of interest. … In the typical large failure, every accounting trick available was used to make the institution look profitable, safe, and solvent. Evidence of fraud was invariably present as was the ability of the operators to "milk" the organization through high dividends and salaries, bonuses, perks and other means. In short, the typical large failure was one in which management exploited virtually all the perverse incentives created by government policy.

Bill quotes James Pierce, NCFIRRE’s Executive Director on the "perverse incentive" that performance bonuses for short-term profits creates:

Accounting abuses also provided the ultimate perverse incentive: it paid to seek out bad loans because only those who had no intention of repaying would be willing to offer the high loan fees and interest required for the best looting. It was rational for operators to drive their institutions ever deeper into insolvency as they looted them.

That report was issued in 1993 in response to the S&L crisis. Did we learn anything? Evidently not — much to the dismay of Washington Mutual shareholders, who learned too late that they had invested in little more than a ponzi scheme:

The shareholder complaint depicts WaMu’s mortgage lending operation as a boiler room where volume was paramount and questionable loans were pushed through because they were more profitable to the company.

When underwriters refused to approve dubious loans, they were punished, she says.

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Ms. Cooper said the team manager told her to “restructure” the loan to make it work. “I said, how can you restructure fraud? This is a fraudulent loan” she recalls.

Ms. Cooper says that her bosses placed her on probation for 30 days for refusing to approve the loan and that her team manager signed off on the loan.

WaMu is also being investigated by the FBI for overvalued home appraisals, shoddy lending practices and other areas of mortgage loan fraud. WaMu’s Kerry Killinger, however, pulled $88 million out of the company between 2001-2007. Stanford Kurland "milked" Countrywide for $200 million and got out at the height of the housing bubble, and has now returned to reap another fortune buying up toxic mortgages.

Jim’s bill, the Grayson-Himes Pay for Performance Act (cosponsored with Alan Grayson), can be read here (PDF). It went through mark-up today, however, so Jim can let us know what changes he sees coming out of Committee.

It freezes bonuses for any company receiving TARP funds until those companies have repaid the government. The companies are free to renegotiate bonuses, but they have to be reasonable and performance-based. It seems to have Barney Frank’s support and finally does something to address the problem of $1 billion in AIG bonuses still to be paid out this year.

Please welcome Rep. Jim Himes in the comments.