jane-delivers-lettersphoto_03.thumbnail.jpgI’m at the Rayburn Office Building for the House Financial Services Committee hearing on AIG. I’m delivering 20,000 signatures from readers, with their comments, calling for more transparency in the bank bailout. When we started our series of chats with experts last week, the issue of AIG bonuses hadn’t erupted, nor had it become evident much of the money that supposedly went to AIG to help encourage lending had in fact gone to foreign banks.

The fact that the bonuses existed, however, seems to have been well known by everyone who could read a newspaper, a group that does not include Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner and Robert Gibbs:

November 14, 2008

Reid unhappy with bonuses for AIG execs

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) is not happy with reports that employees at insurance giant AIG, which has received $152 billion in federal funds to stay afloat, are slated to receive more than $500 million in bonuses.

[]

AIG officials defend the payments, which could cover thousands of employees, are a way to prevent top talent from leaving the firm, which has lost more than $37 billion in the first nine months of 2008 alone.

The FDL team has a group of lawyers and other writers who have followed the AIG situation closely. Last night we submitted a memo to the Financial Services Committee about questions we’d like to see answered today. We hope you, and the Committee find it informative:

TO: HOUSE FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE

FROM: FDL Research Team

DATE: Wednesday, March 18, 2009

RE: AIG Hearing

________________________________________________________________________

In November 2007, Joseph Cassano, head of AIG’s Financial Products division, said on a conference call with Wall Street that he didn’t expect AIG to lose a single dollar.

http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/28/croesus-aig-credit-biz-cx_rl_0928croesus.html

One week later, AIG was forced to write down the value of its CDS by $5 billion because of "mark-to-market" accounting rules. The markets froze, and they had to take another $20 billion write-down the following summer.

Nevertheless, according to the white paper written by AIG to justify its payment of bonuses to AIGFP, in the first quarter of 2008 AIGPF adopted a retention plan "that provided guaranteed payments to employes if they worked through specific payment dates." It was implemented "because there was a significant risk of departures among employees at AIGFP, and given the $2.7 trillion of derivative positions at AIGFP at that time, retention incentives appeared to be in the best interest of all AIG stakeholders."

http://static1.firedoglake.com/1/files//2009/03/ny12532-_432294-v7-white_paper_-_aigfp_retention_plan.pdf

What did Cassano know about the losses that AIGFP would soon incur at the time he said that he didn’t expect AIG to lose a single dollar? And when these bonus contracts were being written in early 2008, was it done in order to lock the company into paying exorbitant salaries because they knew revenues would be falling as the markets for CDS froze?

From AIG’s 2007 10-K, filed 2/28/08:

As of December 31, 2007, controls over the AIGFP super senior credit default swap portfolio valuation process and oversight thereof were not effective. AIG had insufficient resources to design and carry out effective controls to prevent or detect errors and to determine appropriate disclosures on a timely basis with respect to the processes and models introduced in the fourth quarter of 2007. As a result, AIG had not fully developed its controls to assess, on a timely basis, the relevance to its valuation of all third party information. Also, controls to permit the appropriate oversight and monitoring of the AIGFP super senior credit default swap portfolio valuation process, including timely sharing of information at the appropriate levels of the organization, did not operate effectively.

As a result, controls over the AIGFP super senior credit default swap portfolio valuation process and oversight thereof were not adequate to prevent or detect misstatements in the accuracy of management’s fair value estimates and disclosures on a timely basis, resulting in adjustments for purposes of AIG’s December 31, 2007 consolidated financial statements. In addition, this deficiency could result in a misstatement in management’s fair value estimates or disclosures that could be material to AIG’s annual or interim consolidated financial statements that would not be prevented or detected on a timely basis.

Solely as a result of the material weakness in internal control over the fair value valuation of the AIGFP super senior credit default swap portfolio described above, AIG management has concluded that, as of December 31, 2007, AIG’s internal control over financial reporting was not effective based on the criteria in Internal Control — Integrated Framework issued by the COSO.

AIG is actively engaged in the development and implementation of a remediation plan to address the material weakness in controls over the fair value valuation of the AIGFP super senior credit default swap portfolio and oversight thereof as of December 31, 2007. The components of this remediation plan, once implemented, are intended to ensure that the key controls over the valuation process are operating effectively and are sustainable. These components include assigning dedicated and experienced resources at AIGFP with the responsibility for valuation, enhancing the technical resources at AIG over the valuation of the super senior credit default swap portfolio and strengthening corporate oversight over the valuation methodologies and processes. AIG management continues to assign the highest priority to AIG’s remediation efforts in this area, with the goal of remediating this material weakness by year-end 2008.

The retention plan was set up in the first quarter of 2008. The AIG people knew there were problems, and were trying to fix them.

Some other questions:

1) Take us through the timeline of how these bonus contracts came to be and why.

2) Is there a standard policy or boilerplate language for determining bonuses at AIG? Were those policies followed in the case of the Financial Products division?

3) Is there a standard time to sign contracts like this? What is that time? Were these contracts signed at that time, or were they “bespoke?”

4) Where are the opinion memos from AIG outside counsel and from Treasury?

5) Did Treasury do due diligence on the AIG contracts? Was Treasury aware of the terms prior to agreeing to payout?

6) Was TeasSec Geithner aware of the terms of the AIG contracts while he was distributing funds as head of the NY Federal Reserve?

7) When was President Obama informed of these terms?

8) What are the jurisdictional limitations of these contracts?

9) Are any of the people who negotiated these bonus contracts on behalf of AIG also beneficiaries of these bonuses?

10) Were these bonus contracts approved by or even referred for review to AIG’s audit committee or oversight committee?

11) How closely is knowledge concentrated in one person? How much of a paper trail have those individuals been required to keep? Are there any redundancies in institutional knowledge of these deals in case of death or illness of the deal originators?

12) Would you be prepared to submit to the committee a list of each employee who received one of these deals with an explanation of why it was and would be essential to retain each employee?

13) What is the overlap in people on the list of those contracts with the list of AIG counterparties?

14) Did Liddy, AIG’s current CEO, and before that an employee at Goldman Sachs, ever have any contacts with the current Goldman CEO, Blankfein, or anyone else at Goldman, about AIG or the $20 billion in bonds that Goldman would have lost out on if AIG collapsed?

15) Did Liddy still own any Goldman stock whose value would have been protected by the government’s AIG takeover? Did/does he have any kind of severance package or personal holdings in Goldman stock that made the propping up of GS by AIG in his own interest?

16) How much of this has been a means to use AIG as a pass-through for

17) funds to Goldman Sachs and others? Is AIG, in effect, a shell for

18) underplaying CDSs at this point? (Because, if so, the public deserves

19) substantial transparency above and beyond the little bit we’ve gotten.)

20) How many of the counterparties who could terminate contracts are among the list released this weekend?

21) How many counterparties are getting Fed or Treasury money in their own right?

22) How many are foreign banks getting such money from their own government?

23) What is the supervisory structure in the hedging operation? How much oversight do the supervisors have over the winding down activities? How much knowledge do they have of those hedging strategies? What is the plan to get out of these hedging strategies and how long will it take?

24) What is the supervisory structure over the "bespoke" strategies? How much oversight do the supervisors have over the winding down activities? How much knowledge do they have of those strategies? What is the plan to get out of these strategies and how long will it take? Why is AIG still in them? Who are the counterparties to these strategies?

25) Why would counterparties cease trading with AIG just because its traders left? What are ways to mitigate this risk, if it is even remotely real?

26) Name the ways the recipients of bonuses might trigger any default operation (such as the one described in the French context). What efforts has AIG taken to mitigate this risk? Is there any evidence these traders will in fact trigger such default operations? What are the legal means of preventing this?

27) Why has AIG been paying off in-full obligations that weren’t even in default?

28) Has AIG been paying off any naked CDSs? Has it demanded proof of whether a CDS was naked or equity backed? How many of the CDSs it sold were of the naked variety? How many are still on its books?

29) Why did AIG say it could not release the names of those it paid off? And then why did it then do so? Were any of the payouts to banks for obligations held by third parties (like hedge funds)? Did it demand this information? If not, why not?

30) Do any of AIG’s divisions have any direct exposure to what AIGFP was doing or is their exposure limited to that of the parent holding company?

31) How many new staff and regulators have been added to the AIGFP unit to learn and monitor its activities?

32) The White Paper says those who got bonuses were either still at the company, had been “terminated without cause,” or had left "for good reasons." Cuomo says that 11 people getting over $1 million in bonuses (in one case over $4 million) are no longer there. So, were these people wrongfully terminated (knowing they’d still get these payouts) or did they leave "for good reasons," and what were those "good reasons" in each of the 11 cases?

33) After focusing on contractual issues in the first paragraph and a half, the White Paper says, “In addition to this and other legal obstacles, business requirements necessitate payment.” What are the "other legal obstacles"? Are they laid out in the White Paper? If not why?

34) Has anyone from Treasury read the terms and conditions of the Credit Default Swaps of AIG?

The response is probably that there are too many of them. Recognizing that probably a lot of them are based on the International Swaps and Derivative Association form, this is the next question:

1) Has anyone from Treasury read the terms and conditions of the bespoke credit default swaps? (These are the forms that are particularized to a specific customer. They are likely the dangerous ones.)

2) Does AIG have a computerized system for managing its CDSs and its interest rate swaps? (This is designed to figure out if we really need the traders that are there, or if we could hire some new ones to take over.)

3) Are any of the employees who are getting retention bonuses employees of Banque AIG? (This is designed to figure out if the threat of mass walk-outs triggering defaults is real.)

4) Is the Banque AIG provision in all of the ISDA or bespoke contracts?

Now, with regards to the proposed tax penalties to recoup bonuses:

1) Doesn’t so hyper-specifically targeting such an oppressive tax on such few individual set a horrible precedent?

2) If you enlarge the target class, doesn’t that punish unintended targets?

3) Isn’t such a punitive and specifically targeted tax really effectively a bill of attainder?

4) Doesn’t such a proposal offend the concept of equal protection at least in spirit? (Except for the criteria of having a history of discrimination, this is pretty much what creating a "suspect class" is all about.)

5) Supposedly some, if not most, of the individuals are in foreign countries, how will the tax work as to them?

6) Once given this new “special tax” tool, who else might be a target of this strategy?

Related posts:

  1. Hilda Sarkisyan Faces the Cameras, Representatives on Capitol Hill
  2. Mike Stark on Capitol Hill: Know Your Birthers
  3. AIG: First Credit Default Swaps, Now Insurance Companies
  4. Who Benefits from Financial Innovation? Not You, Silly Taxpayer
  5. Goldman Sachs: Insurance Stocks Would Drop 36% by 2019 with House Public Option