I don’t think Chris Bowers owes anyone an apology for backing Tom Geoghegan, he’s a great guy and a true progressive who really inspired people. I also understand that people are upset. I appreciate Chris offering his thoughts on what his decision making process was in supporting Tom, so I thought I would offer mine as to why I didn’t.
There will no doubt be endless stupid stories about how "the netroots can’t win an election" focusing on this race, but the fact is that the two biggest netroots Act Blue fundraising efforts — Kos’s Orange to Blue and our Blue America — didn’t endorse Geoghegan. Many wonderful, smart people endorsed Geoghegan, and I support that decision completely, he’s an inspirational guy who has been a guest here on FDL before with his book. I can only speak to my own decision making process and let people know why I didn’t feel right about backing him.
When we first started endorsing progressive candidates and raising money for them in early 2006, the Republicans controlled the White House and had majorities in both houses of Congress. The Democrats were trying to grow their ranks by recruiting more and more conservative candidates. We knew we were going to get our asses kicked, but we felt we had to make a stand for progressive values, so we backed people who were willing to run, even if we didn’t think they could win. We needed to send a message that if progressive candidates were willing to stand up, we’d support them.
But the playing field shifted after the 2006 election; at that point, we began seeing a country that was growing tired of Republicans. We needed to keep the corporatists who had ruined the GOP from repackaging themselves as Democrats and making the same mistakes on the other side of the aisle. We often supported primary challenges just because we didn’t like the incumbents they were running against, without due consideration as to whether they could run a good campaign or had a reasonable chance to win. Sometimes, as with Donna Edwards, we got lucky. Other times, as with Mark Pera and Ed Fallon, we didn’t.
I feel strongly that the next step in our evolution is to be able to accurately assess the ability of candidates we support to actually win, and be honest with our readers about the chances of that happening before we ask them to buy into the race. Sometimes we might choose to back a challenger who probably can’t win just on principle, because there can be good reasons to do so — it can be worthwhile to tie someone up in a race where they must spend time raising money and campaigning, answering questions about dubious activity highlighted by their opponents, and are at least partially sidelined from doing more damage. It can also be a great way to raise someone’s profile or get a particular message out, and those things have value. But when we do that, we should be honest about it.
If we’re going to ask people to give money and time to support a candidate, we need to be willing to devote serious energy to evaluating a campaign, and let them now whether or not we feel confident that there’s a plan in place that can work. I talked with a lot of people in Illinois, staffers from the Geoghagen campaign, and others who were supporting him, and I did not feel that I could make that case to our readers. I didn’t want to hurt Tom’s chances by saying something that might well not be true before the election because they were only my suspicions, but this was my assessment:
1) As Chris says, an early poll showed Mike Quigley with a commanding lead given the number of people in the race. Geoghagen wasn’t included in that poll, but it seemed worthwhile to wait and see if another came out. I kept looking for one, but it never materialized.
2) I spoke with a number of people in Chicago who all said that this would come down to a field race. Given the time constraints limiting everyone’s ability to raise money, this was not a surprise.
3) Many others in the race had a history in politics; Tom did not. In a short race with a crowded field where name recognition would be critical, he was at a disadvantage.
4) I spoke to the person on the campaign running the field operation. I did not get a sense that there was a solid plan in place, though I certainly did not know the district well enough to make that judgment definitively. As I recall, their plan was to get 20,000 contacts in the district through a volunteer network they had not started building at the time I spoke with them, which was shortly before the end of January. I was also getting information from Emily’s List which indicated Sara Feigenholtz had already made that many contacts, had a big fundraising advantage, and the somewhat formidable power of their organization behind her. With little time to make up the difference and no real plan for doing so that I could see, it appeared Tom could be heavily out-gunned.
5) With no political background and no business network he could tap for support, Tom’s fundraising and publicity opportunities seemed to be limited to national blogs. I wasn’t convinced that this alone would be enough, especially since we usually need time to build a narrative sufficient to raise someone’s profile and make people take action in meaningful numbers.
6) As time went on and the fundraising gap with other candidates grew more pronounced, people who worked closely with the campaign were expressing doubts about its organizational prowess. If I’d made the decision to "wait and see" early in the race, I wasn’t seeing anything that made me change my mind.
7) With so many candidates in the race, I feared that getting behind Tom might mean we pulled votes away from another progressive, and could wind up throwing the race to someone more conservative. Since the numbers needed to win were low and it was hard to know the kind of impact we could have if we entered the race, this was the thing that concerned me the most.
Again, it was such a short race nobody could say with any degree of confidence where it would wind up. It wasn’t really measurable by the usual barometers that are applied to congressional primaries, and in the end I felt like a reasonable person could have just as easily reached the conclusion Bowers did. I wasn’t confident enough about my conclusions that I felt it warranted sending up any red flags, especially since they could wind up hurting Tom’s race for no good reason. But they were strong enough that I didn’t want to move off the sidelines.
I respect the people who supported Tom and worked hard. It was an honorable effort. But before anyone writes any articles about "netroots failures," they need to allow for the fact that the netroots is a broad and heterogeneous group that doesn’t run in lockstep. At any given time any number of people or groups with a netroots presence can get behind a particular candidate. When candidates win, they usually do so based on a number of factors, one of which can be "netroots support." That doesn’t mean we deserve credit for their victories, any more than we should be saddled with their failures due to factors beyond our control.
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Booyah!
Though we must remember that 225 votes is enough. *g*
Let’s hope it is enough!
when i’ve contributed to races i’ve often done it through the sierra club political committee because they have always assessed not only if the candidate will support environmental causes but also if they have a good chance to win. i’m going to suggest that blue america speak with them during the election cycles to find out who they’re supporting and giving money to and why. it could eliminate some of the re-invent the wheel factor since they’re already doing research on viability. i understand that fdl has broader issue areas than the sierra club, but i’m willing to bet that a lot of the candidates the sierra club supports are good all the way around.
the sierra club political committee’s track record is excellent in terms of the candidates they support getting elected.
Bullsye, Jane, as always. Thanks.
Oh, sister, ain’t it so?! Even here at FDL. Sometimes day to day or comment to comment. We bring a whole new meaning to herding chipmunks, don’t we?!
Thanks Jane.
I’ve been more than a little curious about the overall silence in a few of my favorite haunts on this race. Sure agree with you on many points… Especially Bowers need not apologize.
Pretty stunning… that race cost a hundred bucks a vote across the board.
Personally I think the most important work that bloggers can do (netroots is a big term that includes many non-bloggers) is exactly the sort of bird dogging legislation that you have been doing. Knowing every twist and turn legislation takes as it goes through committee is extremely valuable.
Jane,
Thanks very much for this update, and for giving us an overview of the “evolution.” Your post is a keeper, for my files.
Bob in HI
.
Help change the “Mainstream” media, while you’re at it:
Boycott the pigs: Rush & Rupert’s excellent corp[orate & sponsor contact info.
.
At the risk of being rude, the DCCC makes those assessments, too. And we see the Democrats that has gotten us. And I’m pretty sure that BA assessments will garner much the same results, because, heck, “progressive ” polls about as well as “commie pinko” Perhaps instead of just money, BA could be offering expertise for running a winnable progressive campaign.
At this point, blogs are more organizational than actual campaign tools
I think point 4) is particularly important – the campaign wasn’t organized at a time when it should have been. Assuming you’re trying to win an election, backing such a candidate really will be a waste of time, unless he can already count on name recognition.
Anyway, not backing this candidate at this time was a good decision.
Frankly, I wouldn’t have it any other way. Discussion and disagreement produce correct decisions, not lockstep adherence to the wishes of the leaders. That’s what The Other Guys do, and it’s not working too well for them.
Hey, even Chris Bowers can be wrong.
I should also mention that often times when you make a decision can be the difference between being right and wrong. I could see myself early in this process backing someone like Geoghegan, thinking that he was good on the issues and therefore worth backing. I can also see myself, later in the process, asking the same questions Jane did: Where’s the organization? What’s the plan? Do we have resources in place? If I could see that the answers to those questions were unsatisfactory, I’d conclude that this candidacy wasn’t a happening thing.
Recognizing signs of trouble early on will be key to ensuring that we don’t waste time and effort on campaigns that won’t work.
Thanks, Jane. To win races, one must have a ground game and allies willing to help you with it. We found that out with Dean in 2003-4 and again with Edwards four years later.
Thank you, Jane. I don’t regret my pittance to Tom Geoghegan, because I was quite taken with his view that Social Security benefits need to increase in the wake of the collapse of the American peoples’ pension plans and 401(k)s. His statement did an excellent job of moving the “increase benefits” position in from the sphere of deviance.
I am sorry he lost, but I am glad he made the race, and glad I sent him a little money. I would do it again, and hope to see better races run by candidates like him in the future.
No apology is required from Bowers, and no blame of the “netroots” need be ascribed.
Sometimes tilting at windmills is important.
Geoghegan did not run a stunning ground game, but I wrote a decent sized check 2 days before the election, not because Chris Bowers or anyone else said so, but because after meeting the man I couldn’t help it.
A genuinely good and smart fellow.
I ended up making some calls for Tom.
I’d seen polling that had him coming in below 4th place. The response I had on calls was bad, many of the contacts didn’t know about him. The script I was using initially had me ask if they supported Tom, assuming the voter had some knowledge of the race and Tom’s positions. It would have been very helpful to lead with positions , or to lead with asking what the voter’s biggest concern is and then saying what Tom’s position is.
After my first 5 calls I called Tom’s campaign office and told them the script wasn’t working for me and gave them suggestions like the above. I did get more details on Tom’s positions, script didn’t change. I ended up making another 5 calls.
Initially I had planned on making about 60 calls.
My thoughts exactly, Teddy. Thanks for saying them so eloquently.