shiitestingposter_crop2.jpgYesterday, Attackerman wrote about the Iraqi legislature’s approval of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the U.S., noting that the newly-promised public referendum in mid-2009 isn’t much of a concession by the Maliki government.  Even if the referendum rejected the SOFA, the resulting "forced" one-year withdrawal would actually match the 16-month timeline proposed by Barack Obama (and endorsed by Maliki back in July).

Could it be that the Iraqi regime — long thought to be a puppet entity that wouldn’t last more than a few seconds without American support — is really serious about this kicking-us-out stuff?

I think they are.  I wrote in July that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the Shiite religious parties he shepherded into power have intended since 2003 to "use the American military as a contractor of sorts to help cement a Shiite-led government’s power, then nudge us aside when the task was more or less complete."

The relative ease with which the SOFA was passed, ignoring the Sadrists’ objections and buying the support of Sunni and secular parties with only token concessions, suggests that Maliki & Co. truly do have a plausible grasp on the political reins.  (As Reidar Visser writes, "today’s package of legislation is sadly reminiscent of many of the deals that have been cut with the Maliki government since 2006: it bestows ample privileges on the Iraqi government in return for promises of reform that are both vague and without a clearly defined timeline.")  Despite the dissatisfaction of nearly every other party with Maliki’s increasingly apparent authoritarian ambitions, he’s been able to keep them all sufficiently off balance, and suspicious of each others’ motives, that they can’t find a way to unite against him.

Whether Maliki can protect himself militarily without U.S. troops is a much taller order, one that many observers see as overly ambitious.  But that’s why it’s valuable to him to have the 16-month (or whatever) transition period in which American soldiers continue to help him entrench his power. 

And it’s just as important (if under-discussed) that the SOFA aids this process by placing the U.S. military in a subordinate role during the transition.  Whereas earlier this year the Bushites could try to restrain Maliki by arresting members of his party/government for crimes, or establishing external sources of power such as the "Sons of Iraq" militias, the text of the SOFA eliminates that authority.  It’s no coincidence that as the SOFA neared approval, Maliki has celebrated by firing American-installed oversight officials in government ministries.

An Associated Press article today casts doubts on Maliki’s momentary dominance, quoting Juan Cole: "Assuming [the next elections] are free and fair … I am not sure al-Maliki can survive them and get re-elected."  But with Iraq’s cities due to be clear of foreign troops several months before the next national elections in late 2009, what reason is there to think the voting will be free and fair?

One of the tragedies foreseen by people who opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq was that our soldiers (not to mention far more Iraqis) would die not to remove an authoritarian regime, but simply to set up a different one.  One message of the Bush administration reluctantly agreeing to a withdrawal timeline in the SOFA is tha they’ve finally conceded this obvious, sad result.

Related posts:

  1. The End of the Delusion in Iraq
  2. Remember Iraq or Ray Odierno is Still Wrong
  3. Valuing Democracy: Iran, Iraq and the War Supplemental
  4. In Iraq, As in So Many Contexts, Withdrawal is Victory
  5. Four People Face Federal Prison for Passing Out Leaflets and Chalking Slogans