Like a lot of people, I think I first took notice of Dexter Filkins’ work for the New York Times in Iraq during the Marines’ November 2004 invasion of Falluja. Filkins didn’t just cover that story. He brought it to you block by block, matching the intensity of the fighting that took place, and took place for an uncertain goal.
Last week I attended a counterinsurgency conference in Kansas that the Army and the Marine Corps jointly sponsored, and one of the case studies was that battle, which the military tends to bloodlessly call 2nd Fallujah. The instructor, an Army lieutenant colonel named Mark Ulrich, took as a given that when the counterinsurgent force pressed into the city, the insurgents dispersed outward, north to Mosul, where for two weeks they actually took control of one of Iraq’s most populous cities, and eastward to Samarra and Ramadi. But at the time, the senior Marine commander, Lt. Gen. John Sattler, boasted that his forces had "broken the back of the insurgency."
Conscientious and careful reporters, Filkins paramount among them, dutifully explored the reasons why that wasn’t true, seeding the bed for case-study assessments like the one Ulrich delivered to young counterinsurgents last week.
That commitment to diligence runs through The Forever War, Filkins’ chronicle of his journeys through Iraq and Afghanistan, which makes it as excellent as you’d expect. Unlike what I consider the two previous classics of the Iraq war, Night Draws Near by Anthony Shadid and The Assassin’s Gate by George Packer, Filkins isn’t reluctant to make himself a character in the story. (In fairness, Packer sort of recurs throughout his book, but not to the extent of The Forever War.)
This is half-history and half-memoir, a guided tour through a war of limitless complexity, and the result is an immediacy that’s hard to match. A 22-year old Marine is killed helping Filkins and photographer Ashley Robertson get a picture in a Fallujah mosque’s minaret. A barefoot Mahdi Army commander shows the soles of his feet to Filkins and his translator and talks about on his calluses right before one of the defining moments of the war. An Army captain advertises that he’ll auction off one of his company’s woman soldiers to distract the male population of an Iraqi town in order to conduct house-to-house raids.
That narrative choice has its implications. There’s not a hint of polemic in Filkins’ book, which is probably as it should be. I don’t know what Filkins thinks about the Iraq war — I might think I know, but I don’t, really. Some have compared The Forever War to Michael Herr’s classic Vietnam reportage/memoir Dispatches, but that book has an undercurrent of rage at the Vietnam war that doesn’t appear to motivate Filkins.
If there’s a criticism to be made of The Forever War, it’s that sometimes it can be difficult to move from the ground truth Filkins presents to a larger picture of the Iraq war. Perhaps Filkins thought it wasn’t appropriate to give one. Perhaps he thought his audience has already drawn its own conclusions. Perhaps, like many of us, he isn’t entirely sure what to make of the whole painful endeavor.
In any event, we’re lucky to have him here at FDL to discuss this all with us. On the two occasions I’ve reported from Iraq and the one occasion I’ve reported from Afghanistan, I’ve marvelled at how a journalist could remain in countries so dangerous and so unfamiliar for so long and keep not only his or her professionalism, but a hold on sanity. War doesn’t only afflict the combatants and the innocents, as Chris Hedges confessed, but also the chroniclers. I’ll confess to feeling guilty over the privilege I had to leave Iraq and Afghanistan, and further felt guilty about spending insufficient time there to cover wars of such sprawling, awful magnitude.
Right before I left for Afghanistan this fall, I read this Filkins piece from the Times, a tour through the now-largely (but not entirely) pacified city of Falluja, and wondered how it must have felt for him to return. Few have seen as much, or been as much a credit to the finest traditions of their profession, as Dexter Filkins. His book isn’t just a portrait of two wars, it’s an example of how journalism ought to operate.
Related posts:
- FDL Book Salon Welcomes Nicholas Schmidle, To Live or to Perish Forever: Two Tumultuous Years in Pakistan
- FDL Book Salon Welcomes Dahr Jamail, The Will to Resist: Soldiers Who Refuse to Fight in Iraq and Afghanistan
- FDL Book Salon Welcomes Thomas Ricks – The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008
- FDL Book Salon Welcomes Jurgen Todenhofer, Why Do You Kill?: The Untold Story of the Iraqi Resistance
- FDL Book Salon Welcomes Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld
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Dexter, Welcome to the Lake.
Spencer, Thank you for Hosting today’s Book Salon.
Hi guys. I’ve never done this so let’s hope I’m not too lame.
Dexter thanks for being here.
I heard you are going back overseas soon, to where?
Yes, I am going to Afghanistan in a couple of weeks. Yay!
Hey Dexter, welcome to firedoglake!
I have not been there in quite a while, and I’m curious to see how things have changed. I was in Pakistan over the summer, and it was very grim.
This seems like a really painful topic to write on. How did you keep going?
How long have you been covering Afghanistan and Iraq?
Dexter, welcome to FDL. You’ll do fine!
I have not read your book but do have a question. Many of the Army and politicians during Vietnam era used the spin that reporters “caused us to lose the war” because they had the audacity to print the truth and show the American public what was going on.
When your reporting conflicted with the official storyline (as I have to believe it did), did you receive much grief from the Army/Marines and the various PIOs who wanted you to present only the DoD side of things? How do you respond to that pressure?
Thank you for joining us today, Mr. Filkins!
Bev, Spencer, as always…
Is Pak about to explode?
That’s a good question. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq–they are very dangerous. But they are very interesting, too; each of them endlessly fascinating and always changing. I do get tired, though. Afghanistan really takes it out of you.
Digg this excellent post please
So aside from giving you something to write about, have all these wars you covered been worth it?
Thanks, Dakine. Another good question. Let me answer it in two ways. In my experience, I found the military to be very straight. They called things as they saw them. It was the civilians–the politicans–that I had the most trouble with.
The main difference I had with the military is that I was rarely embedded. I was trying to take in the whole thing. When you’re a soldier or a marine, you see, inevitably, a very limited slice of life in these places. So often I felt that whatever take I had on the country was broader and more comprehensive than theirs. I just got to talk to a lot more people than your typical colonel did.
Welcome Mr. Filkins & thank you for all your reporting on Iraq.
IIRC, the prewar population of Fallujah was about half a million. What is it today and what is the economy like?
Dexter — thanks so much for all of the effort put into this book and so much of your work. The detail is enormously helpful in trying to piece together the whole, but the humanity of the people you meet in this book really drives the desire to know so much more rather than to turn away from so many of the horrors you see on the ground.
I’m curious to know if there are particular reporters — either print or media — or sources (either books or blogs) which you have found to be better than others? I know there are shades of difference in all of the work that comes out of reporting something as messy as Iraq and Afghanistan have been, but I’m always curious as to who folks on the ground turn to for their reading and information? Would love it if you could share who or what you tend to consult or read.
I haven’t had a chance to finish the book, so this gave me a do what? moment. Whose idea was this? How did she react to it?
On Pakistan, well, I don’t like to predict the future in that part of the world. It’s a fool’s game. So take this with a grain of salt. Pakistan has been on the brink for years. I remember thinking in 1999 when I was there that it was going to disintegrate. But it’s always had this kind of speed governor that saved it from going over.
But I think it’s very bad, yes. Very bad. The worst I’ve ever seen it.
And you expect him to be able to truly answer that question in the course of a single book salon chat how, exactly? Given the enormity of all the problems faced in both Afghanistan and Iraq? I mean, honestly, lets not try and sandbag the guest from the outset, shall we?
Welcome, Dexter — I remember reading many excellent articles by you from Iraq.
Was there ever a point where you realized (or at least thought for the moment) that the war in Iraq was lost from the U.S. point of view? I’m thinking particularly about April 2004, where I seem to remember you were in the middle of a fierce insurgent offensive.
Julia, well, there was this marine unit that I hung out with in Ramadi. One of the officers told me that they had devised an engenious way to search Iraqi villages: put a blonde woman soldier on top of a tank and take her helmet off, put her up for sale, and while the Iraqi men gathered round, the other soldiers would search the rest of the village.
You gotta admit: pretty clever.
Hugh:
Yes, covering wars has been worth it. I mean worth my time. I’ve had a front-row seat at history in the making. It’s a rare and amazing thing.
Ican, you asked about Fallujah. I have not returned since I went in with the Marines in 2004. It was in ruins then. I understand it is much better now, much more quiet. But I can’t really speak with any authority on that.
Hello Dexter, and welcome. What was the most challenging aspect of your coverage – i.e being away from friends and family, the conditions on the ground there, the food (okay that is kind of a joke; although for me it wouldn’t be), dealing with the US military or what?
Thanks so much for being here today, Dexter.
How did it work as a journalist in Iraq who was not embedded? Do you think you missed anything because of that, and how do you think it helped?
Not to clever, I’m afraid. That is one reason those folks hate us so much. They don’t take kindly to being laughed at.
Dexter, can you talk a bit about the logistics involved in living in Baghdad for an extended period? You describe your security staff in detail in the book, but, like, who’s your tech support, how do you do your laundry, etc. What really goes into working out of a large bureau in a war zone that also has to be your home?
Dear Christy, good question, sources. You know, I read a lot of books before I went to Iraq, and they helped, but there is nothing like being on the ground. The one really indespensible book on the Middle East for me was “A Peace to End All Peace” by David Fromkin. The essential text.
Dear Swopa, good question–did I ever think the war was lost. In 2004, no, I didn’t think so. In 2005, I did not think so. In 2006, I thought it was probably gone, yes. That was when the civil war was really at its pitch. It was a terrible time. I did not really think the country could step back from that.
Why not?
As Spencer Ackerman writes in his introduction:
Given that the Iraq war has been going on for 5 1/2 years now, I think he has had time to form an opinion. I am surprised that his writing reflects no assessment of it. Was he not paying attention?
Dear Brnaz, what was the most challenging thing of being there. Good questions. Two answers, I think. The personal was, well, just being so far from home. Being in Iraq was like being on another planet. And when I came back it was never the same.
Professionally, the hardest thing was just being a foreigner there. I mean, I could never really know the entirety of what was going on. Iraq is vast, complicated and always moving. It was just a kalaidescope.
Dear Jane, on being embedded. I used to embed occassionally. It was always extremely interesting when I did. I always learned a lot. But hanging out with the American military was only one small slice of a very, very large pie. There were many other things to do.
Dear California, on being laughed at. Maybe, but you need to be there. Laptops don’t do it.
Seems like a fair question. Maybe he wants to stay above the fray.
Yes, I know military expediancy. Thanks.
What’s the question?
Bravo. Whenever I recomment that book, the other person rejects it because no book written so long ago (I see a hardcover date of 1989 on amazon, but I thought it originally came out even earlier) could possibly still be relevant. Makes me laugh, in a sad way, because that response so accurately points out that Americans are history morons and that’s why they make so many mistakes in foreign policy.
Some would say that if you have to pay your enemy not to shoot at you, you’ve lost the war.
Ecahn, that’s not a question.
On the complexity issue, I’m curious if you ever got a real sense on how underestimated that was going in from the command and/or governmental levels. I know you talk a bit about this in the book, but I wonder how much of that filtered into the conversations you were having on the ground, especially early on — I would have thought the British, especially, having slogged through this during WWII to some extent, would have had a very good idea of just how difficult holding all these disparate political, religious and tribal interests into any sort of coherent whole would be once the regime was gone.
But it seemed, at least from the outward attempts at swaggering bravado, that the Bushies went out of their way not to even think about it beyond the superficial. Is that how it appeared on the ground, or was that taken much more seriously from the outset? That seemed so foolhardy and dangerously slack from an outsider standpoint, anyway…
So aside from giving you something to write about, have all these wars you covered been worth it?
That was Hugh’s question to you.
Do you find it hard to remain neutral at times in your reporting? If so, are there specific instance in the book could you relate to us where you made decisions to remain as neutral as possible…or where you are still not sure about when it comes to a neutral perspective?
Christy, I concluded pretty quickly that what the people in the American government and military felt and thought about Iraq didn’t really matter very much. What they did often didn’t matter very much. Iraq is a big place. It was its own country. The Americans were just visitors, and there weren’t very many of them. Iraq went its own way.
I’ll go again. Your book doesn’t really make an argument about the war, preferring to let the reporting drive the narrative. (Or maybe you dispute the premise.) Why’d you make that choice, and how much did it depend on the New York Times placing a continued premium on objectivity?
Neutrality was less important to me than humility. Iraq was big, complex, foreign, violent and changing by the minute. How could any intelligent person be so opinionated about something like that? And the answer is, only someone in the U.S could be, far away from the reality of it. Up close, it’s too complex.
I’ve heard something very similar about Afghanistan as well. Funny how that works in cultures with ancient and very complex intertwined histories, ties, and people with their own minds, isn’t it? *g*
Hi Spencer, I’m a big fan. I think I just answered your question above. Humility uber alles. It’s too complex. I wrote what I saw. Most things I missed.
Dexter,
What did you think of the book (or show) Generation Kill?
Racy, I have been out of the U.S. for many years, so the only TV I’ve seen is old Jean-Claude Van Damme movies in hotel rooms.
But the book I did not read. I SHOULD have, and I will, but I have not.
Just saw another article somewhere in the last couple of days claiming how marginalized Sadr is and how he is struggling for relevance in Iraq. Somehow this doesn’t ring true to me. My guess is that he is still critical to any “success”and is still a major force. What is your take?
Obviously, you couldn’t stay neutral. But my question is, where did you debate, in your editing of the book how to express yourself in perhaps more or less rational terms so as to stay on the good side of the people you may have to interview again. There are several types of journalism…one of which is to just report what is going on and to try to remain to be perceived as neutral as possible to the things that others are doing so as to continue to have access to events, information, people. My question was trying to get a sense of how much you had to try to remain neutral…how much of a drain was it on you, both in writing the book (again, looking for specific passages there that us readers might take a look at) and also in general.
Hmmm… very similar to a reply I got the last time I asked a FDL blogger about a popular media event :). I was looking for you to render an opinion on another embedded reporter’s account.
Brnaz, good question, Muqtada. He’s the ultimate mysetery, the man with many faces.
I think he’s definitely not the force he was. He’s been out of the country for more than a year. Iraq has moved on. I was in Sadr City recently, his old stronghold, and it’s very different now.
It’s an excellent answer, and one whose advice I too rarely heed. Part of that, I sometimes think, is just out of the need to make sense of what’s happening in a place you can’t easily visit. So I wonder: while you were in Iraq, what was your view of the decisions made by the Bush administration that supposedly impacted the events unfolding before you? Did the other end of the so-called 7000-mile Screwdriver seem inscrutable to you?
Timbo, I think we disgaree. I called things as I saw them; damn the torpedoes.
One vivid example. Falluja April 2004. The contractors were burned, the Mainres were ordered to take the city. (Population 250,000). The Marines went in, were almost there, and they were ordered to stop.
I met the Marine commander afterwards. He was so angry he could barely speak. He said: it wasn’t our idea to go in, but we went in, and then they told us to stop. It was a disaster. The U.S. made things worse, and they looked weak and dumb doing it.
I asked the commander what happened. He said: “The 4,000-mile screwdrive.”
That is, Washington. The White House.
When you go to Afghanistan, what aspect of the conflict will you cover?
My interest is in the hypothesis that the Pashtuns are underrepresented in the government, and therefore it is a typical insurgency against an occupying power. With a political, not military, potential solution. Do you have any thoughts on that yet?
Echan, on Afghanistan, your theory about the Pashtuns may be right, but it will be very difficult to find out. The Pashtuns areas are very, very dangerous right now, most of them under Taliban control.
If there is still time…
Spencer has written a little about the possibility of Robert Gates staying on as SecDef, thinking maybe this is not necessarily a bad idea in large part because of his possible role in the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Any thoughts on this, Dexter?
Dexter,
In his introduction, Spencer mentioned Chris Hedges’ book War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning. Have you read that book, and if so, what is your opinion of it in general? More specifically, do you personally “relate” to what Hedges wrote there?
I don’t know about that. But I have great respect for Gates. I saw him this year at a promotion ceremony, and he was absolutely what you would want a secretary of defense to me: serious, sober and of few words. He was very impressive for that. I wouldn’t be surprised if there were some Democrats who wanted him to stay.
4 words: Michael Gordon, John Burns.
And if I’m not mistaken, you were the first to report that. I remember how confusing the non-attack — 1st Fallujah — was at the time.
Here’s another question, and it comes out of a discussion I had with an Army major at the COIN Leaders’ Conference last week. You wrote a massive NYTM profile of Lt. Col. Nathan Sassaman, a once-promising Army commander who — as you write in The Forever War — was lucky to escape Iraq without being prosecuted after allowing his men to throw Iraqi civilians off of bridges as an intimidation factor. Sassaman is out with a new book, and while I haven’t yet read it, Tom Ricks recently wrote that Sassaman is still under the impression that what he did was right and that counterinsurgency is a fool’s errand.
With the benefit of some distance, what’s your overall impression of Sassaman? Have you read his book, and if so, what did you make of his explanations of himself and his experiences?
On Hedges, can you be a little more specific in your question? I read the book and it says many things.
Thank you for being here, Mr.Filkins. You may not hae and answer, but I’ve always been curious about something I saw on CNN, probably about 1225. Michael Ware, the CNN correspondent, was escorted to a meeting with Iraqi Sunni insurgeants. He was threatened by foreing fighters, but the Sunni’s got him by. Anyway, accordingly to the subtitle translations, every time the insurgeants referred to the Iraqi Shia, they called them Iranians. That gave me the impression that the Sunni simply thought of the Iraqi Shia as an extension of Iran. In your experience, would there be any validity to that perception?
Hugh, why did I make what choice?
On objectivity, people: it’s not that complicated. It’s easy to overthink this stuff.
This touches on a question I wanted to ask: How do you cope? I’ve spent a grand total of 3 months in Iraq & Afghanistan, cumulatively, and sometimes I honestly feel like it’s had an emotional impact, and the worst it ever got for me was being an avenue block away from a car bomb while interviewing a police captain. I don’t mean to get too personal, but how do you keep it together?
Crosstimbers, yes, a lot of the hard-core Sunnis in Iraq referred to the Shia as Iranians. That was their way of denying them validity, I think.
On keeping it together. Well, I don’t know. I’ve seen a lot of death, a lot of suffering. I’ve seen a civilization implode. I’m haunted by it. I’m troubled by these things. I am not the same person I was.
Isn’t this saying that incountry reporting is impossible because you don’t know or understand what is happening?
I’ll take host’s privilege and ask the final question. We’re going through a period of serious financial retrenchment in the news business. Are you seeing the impact of the industry-wide turmoil on the New York Times‘ ability to report in resource-intensive places like Iraq and Afghanistan?
Thanks to Dexter for spending the hour with us, and thanks to everyone for showing up for a really engaging chat with one of the brightest lights in the field.
I hate to be so contrarian but wouldn’t the policies he supports have just a little to do with whether Gates is a good or bad SecDef?
Hugh, try not to be disrespectful. I know it’s hard. :)
Does Joe Haldeman’s brilliant science fiction novel get some kind of reference?
Hugh, it says the opposite. The only way you can know anything–anything–is to see it, feel it and hold it in your hands. All else is folly. God is in the details.
Hugh, that’s really massive leap, and not expressed in a particularly respectful way. One can perceive and report things to the best of one’s ability and still want to shy away from making broad generalizations about the wisdom/folly of them.
Spencer, all I can say is not yet. The Times still has huge bureaus in both countries, and we are staffing them at the same levels that we did five years ago.
Ah, everyone ignore what I said about the last question! We’re going until 4:30 EST/1:30 Pacific. Oy, what a day I’m having…
I was replying to Spencer Ackerman’s point that the NYT placed a premium on objectivity. I think that Michael Gordon and John Burns are two powerful arguments that the Times never considered objectivity terribly important in its Iraq coverage. I would add the hawkish Bill Keller to that list.
One thing I took from Hedges’ book (it’s been a while since I read it) is that – at least for him – participation in war (in his case, covering it as a journalist) became an addiction of sorts, one which he ultimately decided he had to get away from for his own sake, and (as I recall) as a matter of principle.*
*[I think that latter ‘on principle’ bit came about in him when he found himself liking the thrill of it all, well beyond the mindset of just doing his journalist job. Could have been a mid-life crisis sort of thing - which I can relate to - although Hedges has actually taken action and moved on to new endeavors.]
If it’s not too personal a question, is there any part of that you might relate to from time-to-time?
And yet after 5 1/2 years of details we are still there.
Hugh, really, I don’t know what you’re talking about. “Objectivity” to me means, above all, fairness and soundness of judgement. Burns and Gordon are both of those things.
It sounds to me as if what you are really looking for is someone who writes what you agree with. I think the world is a little too complicated for that, and I hope we are all a little too mature for that.
LuuMarr, war is many things. It can be thrilling and intoxicating. It’s not that big a deal to me, though. I’m not trying to write about the war, not myself.
Finally. That is the point and I don’t think you can shy away from those kinds of judgments.
A nervous question…
Our troops are still dying. What are the main killers of US troops in these later months? How much tactical adjustment have we made against the insurgents, how quickly do they adjust to our tactical changes?
I will cop to a bit of a hopeless feeling on this issue. The home team (the ones who live there in Iraq) would seem to have too many advantages.
Really, Hugh, with all due respect, this is nonsense. Writing and thinking means making judgements. Journalism is not a priesthood. It’s life.
Dexter, have you gotten the chance to interview Gen. Odierno? Lots of people wonder about his capability to manage what seems in some ways like a continuation of Petraeus’ population-protection strategy with 30,000 fewer troops than Petraeus had. Still others — like myself — wonder whether Odierno really has embraced counterinsurgency or is still more like the 4ID commander Sassaman recognizes. Any sense?
Well, Racy, that’s a good question. The main killer of American troops at the moment is Afghanistan, not Iraq. The commanders there are tryingn to figure things out there. It’s very, very hard. The terrain is mind-boggling. The end seems far away.
What I was trying to do was get beyond the happy talk and get at what you actually think. That you think that Michael Gordon with all of his unnamed sources and spouting of military and Administration talking points or that Burns with his Iraq is bad but we should stay there forever are fair and sound, that tells me what I need to know about you. Thanks.
Spencer, yes, I saw Odierno a couple of months ago, just as he took over in Iraq. And I asked him all those questions, including the conduct of his men in 2003 and 2004. It was a long interview. Suffice to say, I think he’s done a lot of thinking. He helped execute the surge. I think gets it. But, of course, whether that means the Americans can hold things together in Iraq is another question. There is only so much that they control.
You know, Hugh, what concerns me about the Internet is just this sort of self-isolating, self-justifying sort of rant. I hope you can find a website where no one ever says anything that you disagree with.
Thank you for responding to my question. Take care of yourself in Afghanistan. I can’t help but remember that the Soviets occupied Kabul and set up a puppet government. Ultimately, it was overthrown and they had to get out.
Yes, that is what the Russians and British figured out. What is the solution for Afg as far as the US is concerned? I personally don’t think it can be done.
Welcome to the Lake Dexter Filkins – thank you for your time today and all of your work
was going to ask you about Odierno but I see Spencer beat me to it – appreciate your answer as I was about to ask about “the conduct of his men in 2003 and 2004″
That is another slice on the Q I asked earlier. I’ll never forget seeing US military hiking up mountains (how many thousands of feet above sea level?) in 2002, searching for OBL. I collapsed on the floor laughing. It was sooo absurd. I have done extensive hiking in friendly US mountains, and from that, know that OBL could be hanging around a few more bends in the trail and never be found. In other words, the whole idea of a military solution in Afghanistan seems like a ghastly joke. (Another alternative is bombing civilians, of course.)
Will you talk to military leaders there about how they think they can overcome the geographic obstacles?
Dear Califnoria, yes, I think things are pretty grim in Afghanistan. But I have to tell you, if anyone would have told me, in late 2006, that in two years Iraq would be calm–relatively, fragilely, all that–I would have thought they were out of their minds.
So let’s see.
the 101st Fighting Keyboarders would tell you Odierno “wrote the book on counter insurgency”
eCAHN, well, I don’t know which was more absurd, the military hiking up mountains to find OBL or dropping bombs on him from 30,000 feet. Personally, I think the former is the only way they will ever find him.
On Odierno, he’s a very smart and very tough guy. As I said, I he and Petraeus carried out the surge together in late 2006 and 2007. These are thinking generals. They change their minds. That’s what we want, right?
Oh, another time honored antiinsurgency technique is total warfare. I understand that the Soviets divided Afghanistan in grids, and conducted total warfare (i.e., killing everything that moves) in some of them. Does U.S. policy have that in it’s Afghan future?
On Moqtada: Ned Parker, another excellent Iraq reporter with the Los Angeles Times and formerly with the Times of London, wrote a piece the other day suggesting that Sadr’s been fairly marginalized. We seem to read that one a lot. Is this another round of wishful thinking on the part of Americans & Sadr’s rivals, or do you perceive something really changing with regard to Sadr’s fortunes in Iraq?
Iraq is playing the old Ali “rope a dope” with us. I don’t buy it. Sorry, I just do the laptop investigations.
I don’t think so, echan. We’re a little too good for that, I think.
Spencer, good question on Muqtada. I think he is not the man he was. He hasn’t even been in the country for well over a year. He’s lost control of large parts of movement. Sadr City–I was there in September–is very different now. Very different.
Could he come back? Probably, but probably not in the way that he was before.
I don’t care whether you disagree with or not. What I look for is a reasonable explanation for your position. I don’t know you but what you have said so far reminds me of the Bob Woodward school of journalism which takes a pseudo-non-judgmental approach. It recounts with out explaining. Since it establishes no narrative of its own, it is very vulnerable to taking on the narratives of others, those to whom the journalist is talking to.
As we come to the end of this great Book Salon,
Dexter, Thank you for stopping by the Lake today and spending the afternoon discussing your new book and time in the middle east.
Spencer, Thank you for Hosting this Book Salon.
Everyone, if you haven’t bought this great book yet, there is link above.
Thanks all.
California, well, I think your instincts are good. Can Iraq carry on in a calm way without 150,000 American troops around? That’s the ulitmate question. We don’t know the answer yet, but we’re going to find out.
I know a number of Christian Iraqis here in the US who are mad as hell with us. Have you talked with any?
Hugh, you should get a Phd in semiotics.
On your last stint in Iraq, were you able to talk to any members of the so-called Sons of Iraq, the mostly-Sunni quasi-militia groups that comprise significant numbers of ex-insurgents? If so, do you have any sense about whether they pose a threat once integrated into the security apparatus? A lot of the policy concerns about the SOI have to do with the Maliki government not embracing them, but friends of mine who’ve embedded over the past six months have talked to SOI commanders who say their plans are to infiltrate the Shiite-led government and overthrow it from within.
California, the Christians in Iraq are getting hammered very hard. They are a tiny minority–less than 2 percent of the population–and the Sunni insurgents in particuar have come down on them very hard. Many if not most have left the country.
Dexter, thanks so much for stopping by.
Thank you Dexter. Just go do your job. Without YOU we got nothin.
Good afternoon, Dexter,
Thank you for coming and facing the tough-questioning bunch at Firedoglake.
Would you subscribe to the view that it is America’s burden to stay in Iraq until asrable, civil democracy has been established, or do you think there might be merit in leaving when the Iraki people, the majority of Iraki people, would like us to leave?
Spencer, really good question. It’s the key to the peace in Iraq right now. Yes, I did talk to members of the Sons of Iraq. It’s pretty incredible. There are 100,000 Sunni gunmen on the American payroll–many of those guys were killing Americans eighteen months ago.
The Shiite government does not like these guys. They want to arest them, kill them, marginalize them. The Americans have been pushing Maliki and company very hard to integrate the Sons of Iraq into the security services, but they have met a lot of resistance.
Of course, if the Iraqi govt starts going after these guys, that will push them right back undergound.
looseheadprop upstairs
edit – ‘a stable, civil …’
Re Moqtada, I don’t think anyone knows. The Mahdi Army has been quiet recently but Moqtada may simply be playing the long game and waiting for us to leave. His influence is still felt in significant ways. He has made it difficult for Maliki to agree to the SOFA. Since Moqtada opposes it, Maliki looks like a puppet if he agrees to it. So Maliki is going through gymnastics trying to get a SOFA but not seem an appeaser.
Bartoo, well, I think your questions, good as it is, is fast becoming moot. The Shiite government wants us out (they have their own plans for the country). The Americans wants us out. So I think we’ll be out soon, come what may.
And you one in journalism.
Never.
~~~[Mod Note: Please do not insult other commenters - Thank You]~~~
And this was a great discussion for we humble lurkers.
Well, then, onto more current battle-grounds, although, frankly I am hopeful that you, Dexter will not need to be called to attend too many more ‘American’ “wars”.
Peace.
Thanks DWbartoo! I’m off to Afghanistan. I’ll come back here when I return.
Thanks for an outstanding discussion, Dexter, safe travel and come back to see us when you return.
And please accept our apologies for commenters who do not show respect for someone who has taken the time to research and write such a fine book and to come here for discussion. I think we’re all still a little overwrought from the election.
Oh, my first time being moderated…cool! Sorry mods. I should have used a different word.
Great title for a book.
Do you at least mention Joe Haldeman somewhere for appropriating it?
wow, i’m sorry i missed this thread – would have brought fainting couches, it seems they would have come in handy.
deep in epu land, but will comment anyway.
one aspect of today’s conversation i especially wish i’d been around to ask about is on reporting at the NYT and the concept of objectivity, because i don’t understand it at all. in fact, it seems to me a serious weakness and not a strength of the reporting. i like to joke that the first commandment at the NYT must be: Thou shall not connect the dots, although it’s really no joke. i completely agree with the the idea that the details need to be reported and are the foundation of good reporting. however, it strikes me as strange if there is no attempt to connect the dots, to try to make sense of the details. is journalism not intended to extend the knowledge and understanding of the reader? it’s like saying that darwin should have gone on his trips but only collected samples and described what he saw but never tried to make sense of or explain his observations.
even more than that though, i disagree that objectivity is about “fairness and soundness of judgement.” i think gould had it exactly right:
we all have points of view, opinions and biases. objectivity, imo, has nothing to do with denying this about ourselves or suppressing it – instead it’s about attempting to identify our biases, etc and then take them into account as gould describes.
is journalism really so very different? should it be?
I’m with you. xxoo
Okay, I had to leave but I can see that Hugh and a few others noticed the similarities between Mr. Filkins “objectivity” and Bob Woodward. That’s what I was getting at…the idea that you simply report what is occurring…without trying to understand the actual outcome of what has occurred and may occur as a result.
Frankly, I believe (on mere faith!) that Mr. Filkins books will be helpful more as a war travelogue, rather than as a means for a serious understanding of the wars he observed. He tries to imply that understanding is up to the reader…but by failing to acknowledge his own complicity in the events he describes…that is the fact that there were certain people he could not talk to and could not observe…or that, if he did talk to them or observe them, he could not report on them…he fails to acknowledge the boundaries of his objectivity…and continued to maintain that he was completely objective and not subjective in his observations. That having been said, I might read his book, but I certainly won’t believe that what he is describing is what actually occurred. He is somehow raising himself to that of the ultimate impartial observer…an impossibility in any human interaction, let alone a war. And certainly a stance that should never be trusted, especially when he does not relate his thoughts or “prism”, if you will, through which would or might influence his journalism. Of course, he can claim that he was “entirely objective” but the fact remains that that is, as we all should know by now, an impossibility. Further, I find his stance that he is more objective than others on this board to be…offensive. Perhaps if he was less arrogant?
Ah well. No doubt he mentions his interactions with Judith Miller in his book? I mean, wasn’t she assigned to the Iraq desk for NYT for awhile? If anyone has read the book, is she mentioned in there at all?
Another interesting thing…his first reporting for the Times, according to their public website was Oct 26, 2000. That would be about ten days before the Florida debacle…which he wrote extensively about…again according to the NYT’s website.
cit. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/…..?s=oldest&