Mike, Welcome to the Lake.

Mark, Thank you for Hosting today’s Book Salon.

Greetings.

Hi all glad to be hosting. Maybe to get us started, Mike, you can weigh in on Dear Leader’s health? As readers may be aware he may have had a stroke recently.

Welcome to FDL Mike and Mark.

Haven’t I seen something in the news that NK is kicking inspectors out again?

As best I can tell, it appears that Kim Jong Il suffered a stroke in mid-August that left his somewhat physically incapacitated. However, he does not appear to be at death’s door and seems to remain in charge for now. Indeed, over the weekend, the North Koreans released new photos that show Kim, in what appears to be an autumn-like setting, attending a soccer match. So he seems to be alive for now, but the whole situation has underscored the fact that the succession is is now in play, both in North Korea and beyond.

Hi Mike and Mark, welcome to the Lake.

First off, what is the status of the dear leader’s health? And if he is no longer capable of ruling the country, who takes his place and what difference will that make?

What would his succession look like? He took over from his father in 1994, but is there a clear line of succession? And what would that succession portend for DPRK’s nuclear ambitions?

No, the NOrth is not kicking inspectors out again. There was a kind of “mini-crisis” between August and early October, during which the North Koreans halted the disabling of their Yongbyon nuclear complex, restricted activities of international inspectors there, and took some moves to restart the facility. This was done because the Bush administration was refusing to take the North off Washington’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. The North said that the US insistence that Pyongyang accept an intrusive set of measures to verify a June declaration the North made about its nuclear facilities BEFORE the administration would delist amounted the the US reneging on a commitment to delist once the declaration was handed over. A compromise deal agreed in early October, however, prompted the NOrth to resume disabling at Yongbyon and allow inspectors to remain.

Welcome Mike, and thank you Mark.

Mike, how do you see the looming food shortages in North Korea affecting the situation? How do you feel about the aid-for-disarmament deal that the US is pursuing?

Thanks, that must have been what I was seeing reported.

Not that TradMed ever presents things in a confusing or mis-leading fashion.

Is Jimmy Carter’s version of events accurate, re: his successful negotiations during the Clinton Administration? Carter said that Clinton did not want him to make the attempt, he did it anyway, Clinton gave Carter the cold shoulder upon his return, eventually saw that Carter had achieved success.

Clinton did not uphold our end of the bargain. And Dubya threw the whole deal out the window.

There is considerable uncertainty about the nature of the succession process. Kim Jong Il has three sons from two different women. All have various “issues.” (The oldest, for example, was detained by Japanese immigration officials at Tokyo airport some years ago while traveling on a fake Dominican Republic passport, saying he was going to visit Tokyo Disneyland.) And we know next to nothing about the two younger sons. My own best guess is that senior figures in the military and the ruling Korean Workers Party would run the government,. invoking the name of Kim Jong Il and his father, Kim Il Song, and possibly putting the older son forward to lend legitimacy. But that is just a guess. The reality is that we simply can’t be sure. I do think a transition of any kind will make North Korea less easy to deal with on the nuclear issue.

Yes, Carter’s version is pretty accurate. I was the only journalist to accompany Carter on his trip to Pyongyang in 1994, which I honestly think helped avoid a new Korean war and laid the groundwork for the “Agreed Framework” deal signed by the US and NK in October of that year. The Clinton administration’s relations with NK went up and down (shaped, in part, by the fact that the Republicans gained control of Congress in November of 1994 and frequently balked at authorizing funds for the shipments of fuel oil the US had pledged to give the North under the Agreed Framework. But by the end of the Clinton administration, there was real movement on the diplomatic front toward a possible deal to end 50 years of hostility and confrontation. And it is true that the Bush administration’s confrontation attitude meant those previous efforts came to nought.

This is the subject of “Meltdown,” and I chronicle in great and often colorful detail how the efforts to achieve a deal came off the rails.

The food situation in North Korea is grim, and until recently was getting worse. However, they appear to have had a halfway-decent harvest this fall, so things have eased a bit. But it is still very difficult, with widespread malnutrition and suffering. The US has been providing food aid separately from the negotiations over the nuclear issue, which, for humanitarian reasons, I think is the right thing to do.

After the October 2006 detonation, the Security Council applied limited sanctions on DRPK. Do you think this security council action was helpful at all in bringing the North back to the negotiating table? What were the effects of those sanctions within decision-making elite of DPRK?

It is an exciting and colorful story as told by Carter, Rosalyn and a third politician (I can’t recall his name now) on CSPAN. Your book will be an entertaining read. Did you enjoy your time in North Korea?

We have lots of food to get rid of. One the one hand, its good that people can eat it who would otherwise starve to death. OTOH, our food is genetically modified and/or full of chemicals. The EU doesn’t want much do do with it for good reason.

One of the conclusions I reached after conducting the research for “Meltdown” is that sanctions don’t work with North Korea. The north Korean tendency is that, when pushed, they push back even harder. Moreover, this is a system where the ruling elite don’t care very much about the plight of ordinary people. So if you look at the pattern of events over the last eight years, it becomes very clear.

In late 2002, the US stopped deliveries of heavy fuel oil promised to the North as part of the Agreed Framework. In response, the North restarted operations at Yongbyon and began making more weapons-grade plutonium.

In 2005, the US Treasury Department targeted a bank in the former Portuguese territory of Macau called Banco Delta Asia, saying it had been used by the North Koreans for counterfeiting and money-laundering. (Inidentally, in “Meltdown” I report that senior State Department official had serious doubts about the reliability of the Treasury’s assertions.) In any case, in response, the North Koreans boycotted the six-party talks.

In 2006, as the US continued to refuse to discuss a resolution of the Banco Delta Asia issue and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Christopher Hill was forbidden from holding a bilateral meeting with his North Korean counterpart, as Pyongyang had asked, the North staged a series of missile tests.

In response to the UN Security Council’s decision to impose sanctions for the missile tests, and despite Chinese appeals for restraint, the North staged its nuclear test.

HOWEVER, when, three weeks after the nuclear test, Hill met with the North bilaterally and promised a resolution of the Banco Delta Asia issue, the North returned to the six-party talks and a deal was reached within four months.

And once the North got its money back from Macau, it readmitted international inspectors and began to follow through of promises to shut down Yongbyon and begin disabling.

I am not sure one can use the word “enjoy” in discussing a visit to North Korea, but is is extremely interesting. Moreover, despite all its weirdness, I have found that I have been able to have very stimulating discussions with senior North Korean officials (although they make it next to impossible to have meaningful contact with ordinary citizens, as government minders go with you everywhere.)

Mike,
With the Chinese and Vietnamese having become more capitalist in a lot of operations over these past few years, is North Korea possibly heading down this path at some point in the future? Is this more likely if Kim Jong Il lives or if he is gone and someone else is running things?

Do you get a sense that any of the people who pushed for the hard line no negotiations approach on North Korea perhaps have softened their position at all in the face of evidence that their preferred set of policies were not at all effective?

It seems that the snarky point to make is that appeasement works :)

That is a very interesting question. The Chinese have consistently urged the North to adopt similar market-style reforms. Indeed, during a couple of Kim Jong Il’s visits to China over the past few years, the Chinese took him to see the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone near Hong Kong, which was the initial laboratory for China’s experiment with the market, as well as joint venture factories in Shanghai. And senior North Korean officials have also visited Vietnam.

There is a debate over the extent to which Kim Jong Il is open to such reforms. Some foreign diplomats and aid workers in Pyongyang argue that Kim is indeed interested in taking such steps. Others disagree. One problem for the North is that if any reform process is to be effective in halting or reversing the country’s catastrophic economic decline, it will have to tolerate a significant degree of openness, foreign investment, giving citizens more authority to determine their economic future — in short, steps that could erode the regime’s extremely tight political control. I suspect a leadership transition would make the regime, at least in the short term, more, rather than less uptight.

Thanks for writing this book Mike – and Mark thanks for hosting. I have a copy here but was travelling and did not get to read yet – still its so important that we begin to learn about those spots in the world we are treating as enemies. So often our posture gets in the way of real progress.

I wouldn’t call it “appeasement.” One needs to make a rational calculation o national interest, based on reality and not on ideology. (One of the flaws of the “neocon” hardliners in the Bush administration is that their confrontation approach to the North was ideologically driven, and not based on a serious understanding of the situation.)

The point is: the North has nukes. We want the North to abandon them.
The North wants aid, recognition and security guarantees from the US. That might offer the prospect of a deal. Given how awful the alternatives are (a third Korean war on top of Iraq and Afghanistan and financial collapse???) it makes sense to play this out and see if a deal is possible.

People who talk about “appeasement” miss a crucial point. It is in fact the North which is giving up something it has long seen as critical to its national security – the ability to make weapons-grade plutonium at Yongbyon. What has the US given in return? Some oil, a little aid, a change in a piece of paper about being a terrorist state- nothing that can’t be rescinded if the diplomatic process fails. So I think this is a false kind of characterization.

As one of the people I interviewed observed: for much of its time in office, the Bush administration has had an “attitude, not a policy” when it has come to North Korea.

Good line – that seems all too true for many regions!

That is a great line!

this is a system where the ruling elite don’t care very much about the plight of ordinary people.

Not unique to DPRK. Many difficult countries have leaders that resemble that.

One needs to make a rational calculation o national interest, based on reality and not on ideology. (One of the flaws of the “neocon” hardliners in the Bush administration is that their confrontation approach to the North was ideologically driven, and not based on a serious understanding of the situation.)

It wasn’t just their confrontation approach against the North Koreans. It was their confrontation approach against any country or entity that did not support their ‘world-view’. They’ve shown no indications at any point of understanding any situations in any part of the world.

My $.02

So assuming we have an Obama administration in January, is there something they need to do (or stop doing) immediately? How would you advise them?

The “hardliners” represent a pretty wide-ranging group of people, often from different backgrounds and from different places in the government bureaucracy. There are clearly some- the Vice President’s office, John Bolton and others who worked with him on non-proliferation, some folks in conservative think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute or the HEritage Foundation- whose views have not changed. But two of the most important people do appear to have changed their views- Condoleezza Rice and George W, Bush. In his first term, and well into his second term, the President was very dubious about negotiations. When she was National Security Adviser, Rice was also very hard-line. But, as a chronicle in “Meltdown,” she did modify her views after becoming Secretary of State, influenced heavily by the lobbying of her Assistant Secretary for East Asia, Christopher Hill, who was a consistent proponent of genuine negotiations.

Does Pyongyang consider South Korea to be more or less a US Puppet Regime?
If that is the case, wouldn’t this consideration have a major effect on the North’s negative attitude regarding globalization and so-called market economics?

Too little, too late. The malaise of incrementalism.

The point is: the North has nukes. We want the North to abandon them.

The North doesn’t have nukes. It has a potential for them. Their first and only test was a fizzle. This indicates that they either had a design or engineering flaw. And there is still a considerable distance from a working design to the miniaturization needed for a deliverable weapon.

Both Obama and his key advisers generally support a diplomatic approach. Some of his advisers were asociated with Clinton.

One problem has been that the whole diplomatic process has all too frequently gotten bogged down in mechanics and details. I think it would make a lot of sense for the new president to send a high-level delegation to Pyongyang (one suggestion I’ve heard is Clinton’s former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, along with Colin Powell) to lay out a way forward that would involve genuine North Korean denuclearization in return for a genuine breakthrough in relations with the US. This would be one way to show good faith to the North and also test their repeated claims that they wouldn’t need nukes if the US ended its “hostile policy.” Such an initiative could also make clear to Pyongyang the heavy proce it would have to pay if it was not prepared to engage.

That’s one idea, and I think it makes a lot of sense.

So assuming we have an Obama administration in January, is there something they need to do (or stop doing) immediately? How would you advise them?

I think the lesson about North Korea is that even a bad process is better than no process at all.

Yep. Besides which, what country would DPRK use the nukes against? Does KJI have a bunker 2-3 miles underground where he thinks he could survive the back attack? In other words, who cares if DPRK has nukes?

How do you factor in the South Koreans into all this?

The North has a complicated relationship with the South. Relations under the South’s previous two presidents were better because both supported the “sunshine policy” of engaging the North. The new President, Lee Myung-bak, who took office in February, is more cautious and skeptical. Moreover, he and his team have not handled their dealings with the North skillfully. The upshot was relations are now very strained. I do not think the North has either the interest or capability to successfully attack the South, however belligerent its rhetoric. It does try periodically to divide the South from the US, and that is an issue the US needs to manage carefully.

It does seem clear that, if tensions do ease, the South will lead the way in terms of investment and trade with the North, and it could have an important role to play in drawing the North further into the international system.

I’m just wondering is this is an immediate issue or one that might actually benefit from a little benign neglect. The next Prez has a few things to think about: rescue the financial system, restart the economy, protect the victims, wind down the Iraq occupation as the Republicans yell treason, decide how to “rescue” the situation in Afghanistan — and fight the Republicans every step. Can they also focus on N. Korea, and if they can’t, is it okay to wait a while?

It is most unlikely the North would ever use its nukes in a military conflict with the US or South Korea or Japan. Pyongyang knows what would happen to it. But there is genuine concern about the North making fissile material available to “bad actors” – terrorists, rogue regimes etc. That is certainly reason to worry.

In addition, if the North is successful in getting away with its nuclear breakout, as, for example, Pakistan was, it would be a further blow against an already fraying international non-proliferation system. Moreover, it could prompt Japan to consider going nuclear, and that could trigger a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia.

It does seem clear that, if tensions do ease, the South will lead the way in terms of investment and trade with the North, and it could have an important role to play in drawing the North further into the international system.

After seeing the problems with the East German integration, I thought the South Koreans had lost a lot of their enthusiasm for re-unification. They like the idea but the real economics scare them.

This is a good point. Its not that big a deal. Noam Chomsky says that all the nations of the world have witnessed that those which have nukes do not get attacked (by the USA!). Everybody wants their own nookyuler deterrent to avoid being attacked (by the USA!).

As long as the promised aid continues to flow and the disabling activity at the Yongbyon facility continues, there is definitely a bit of a window. And for sure the next president will have an enormous number of other problems to deal with. But at some point, a decision will have to be made about how/whether/under what circumstances to try to engage the North Koreans. And Pyongyang is certainly capable of stirring the pot if it feels it is being ignored!

How, if at all, do you think human rights concerns can be included in discussions with the North? Is there a sense that if we push them too hard on human rights that they might renege on their promises to de-nuclearize?

The South Koreans, even the conservatives now in charge, don’t want to discard engagement. They all agree with your point about being worried over having to cope with the consequences of a North Korean collapse, which would make the burdens confronted by West Germany in absorbing the east pale in comparison.

I had North Korean officials say to me that the lesson they learned from the invasion of Iraq is that Saddam Hussein did not have nuclear weapons and he was toppled. They made clear they would not permit Kim Jong Il to suffer the same fate.

I would not recommend neglect. As Chris Hill has shown, an effective policy probably works better outside the spotlights. It may be slow and full of pitfalls but much safer and cheaper in the long run.

As Hackworth sez in 44, DPRK has nukes to avoid getting attacked. Until the US and other nuke powers abandon their own nuke weapons, every country who has any prospect of being on the US “darkside” would want nukes. So the key to ending proliferation is for the US to change its aggressive policy, not for the DPRK to change. The latter would make a difference of one country. The former would end nuclear proliferation altogether. (I know, that’s the simple version, but I frame it that way to make a point.)

it would be a further blow against an already fraying international non-proliferation system

To be honest, after the US-India nuclear deal (and our varying attitudes toward Israel, Iran, and Pakistan on nuclear issues), I’m not sure there is any substance left to the NPT.

Also, I’ve heard the worries about DPRK selling nuke tech on the black market. But as Hugh points out, DPRK seems not too have too much nuke accomplishment to make it likely that they could sell their failures to anyone. Is there any evidence that they are or intend to do so, or is that just another fear mongering story?

Ding. Ding. Ding.

Human rights is a tough issue.

There is no question that the human rights situation in North Korea is appalling. There are no political freedoms, many prison camps, a rigidly enforced system of conformity and indoctrination that really is “brain-washing.”

The problem is that the North Korean leadership sees US pressure on human rights to be part of Washington’s effort to push for “regime change.” And indeed, some of the most vocal critics of North Korea’s human rights record are also among those most closely associated with the overall hard-line position on the NOrth. Moreover, there are few levers to coerce the North into modifying its behavior.

If you look at places like China and Vietnam, where we have seen a significant improvement in the lives of ordinary folks and a flowering of PERSONAL liberty – as distinct from POLITICAL freedom – much has been the result of the economic liberalization in both places. That leads me to two conclusions. First, a rapprochment with North Korea, which could lead to greater trade, investment, student exchanges, cultural exchanges etc- could have an important, if gradual impact on softening some of the worst aspects of the North Korean system. Second, if relations between the US and North Korea took a genuine step forward, it might, in a more positive atmosphere, be possible for a US administration to initiate a discussion with the North Koreans on the issue.

I’ve sometimes thought the neocon strategy was to publicly lump three adversarial nations together, the so-called Axis of Evil, then make an example of the weakest country (Iraq) the theory being that when the other two saw how easy it was, they would fall into line. Needless to say, it was a miscalculation of epic proportions.

The North does seem to have helped Syria try to build a nuclear reactor that looked very much like it was modeled on Yongbyon. And a terrorist doesn’t need a sophisticated device, just a lump of fissile material, to make a “dirty bomb.”

Given the NOrth’s dire economic situation and long track record on selling missiles and other military technology to countries like Syria, Libya, Iran etc, one cannot rule out the possibility of the North making bomb material available to others.

But the North Korean leadership is, I think, aware the risk of doing so, and I suspect they would only consider such a radical step if the regime was in real danger of collapsing due to US pressure, or if there was a collapse, civil war/conflict where the current centralized control over the North’s nuclear arsenal was called into question.

What lessons for US policy toward other would-be proliferators like Iran can be drawn from our experience with North Korea? Are the situations at all comparable? Do you think they should be compared?

I thought you could get a lump of fissile material from a hospital’s nuke waste to make a dirty bomb.

I won’t regard the Syrian story as accurate until I see a lot more evidence.

The real story behind the “Axis of Evil” shows less sophistication. (For all the details, see chapter four of “Meltdown.” But basically, those involved told me that Bush and Cheney, as they geared up to invade Iraq, were looking for language to be used in the 2002 State of the Union message that blurred the fact that Iraq was the only target. Bush speech-writer David Frum came up with the idea using the term “axis,” with its evocation of the Nazis/Japanese in World War Two, to link Washington adversaries together. Speech-writer Michael Gerson, who did the final draft, says he was asked at the last minute by Condoleezza Rice to add both Iran North Korea “in order to avoid focusing solely on Iraq.” Frum told me he assumed, when he heard the speech, there was a real strategy behind the reference to North Korea. In fact, it was just an addition to make it look less the Bush was only targeting Islamic countries.

There are many outstanding questions about the Syria story- about the intelligence (much of which came initially from Israel, which had its own agenda,) about the way the information was handled by Washington, and, fo course, about what, if anything the North Koreans were up to.

I think the damage from a “dirty bomb” has been oversold. It really isn’t a very effective weapon. Terrorists want something that causes a lot of immediate casualties. Aside from the initial blast and immediate exposure, casualties would probably not show anywhere but on actuarial charts and maybe not even there.

Thanks for providing the insight. Looking forward to reading Meltdown.

Along these lines, Russia and former Soviet Nations have unaccounted loose nukes already. In addition, there are many underemployed nuclear scientists. When Bush and Friends had the opportunity to hire these guys or find them something constructive to do, they turned a blind eye to the problem. Russian Loose Nukes are a more pressing concern probably.

I am not an Iran expert. But it does seem that in relation to North Korea, it was the Bush administration’s refusal to engage in direct,face-to-face, give-and-take negotiations that prompted Kim Jong Il to stage his nuclear breakout.

Clearly, the circumstances in the Middle East, and the nature of the Iran nuclear program and its leadership, are very different. But the logic of trying to have high-level talks to see what, if anything, can be achieved before moving on to other, possibly harsher steps, make a lot of sense to me.

Maybe. But I wouldn’t want to have to find out. And even if the actual physical damage was minimal, the political/psychological consequences would be immense.

What lessons for US policy toward other would-be proliferators like Iran

I’m missing the part about Iran being a proliferator as in there is no evidence for this, a purchaser yes, a proliferator, especially of nuclear weapons technologies no.

Thanks. I tried to write it so it is accessible to a general audience– “diplomatic history that reads like a spy thriller,” as one of those who read the manuscript described it. Hope you enjoy it.

The issue isn’t Iran being a proliferator, but what lessons, if any, might be learned from the the way the Bush administration did, or did not, deal with North Korea that could be usefully applied to the current situation with Iran.

Those individual radioactive “pills” that Putin uses on his old friends are quite deadly. Care for some English tea in your hotel room?

indoctrination that really is “brain-washing.”

that’s an effective way to put it.

Proliferater? Aren’t McCain/Palin proliferators?

One of the endlessly intriguing questions to which- after 14 visits to North Korea and all the research I conducted for “Meltdown” – I still don;t really have an answer is: what do ordinary North Koreans really think? On one level, it is a fact that the regime has been in power since the mid-1940s. There are no north Koreans under the age of 70 pr 75 with any memory of any other system. Moreover, the regime has tapped into some strong themes in Korean history to bolster its legitimacy- the tradition of the all-powerful emperor who was seen as the “son of heaven” and whose word was law; a deep sense of national pride and national grievance, fueled by the fact that Korea is surrounded by bigger, stronger nations with whom it has had an unhappy history; the fact that the Korean peninsula was divided arbitrarily in 1945 and no Koreans had a say; the fact that foreign (U.S.) troops are stationed in the southern half of the peninsula. All this is helpful to the regime as it “brains-washes” the population. But with more and more North Koreans going in and out of China, with the spread of SOuth Korean DVDs and videos etc, it will be interesting to see how public attitudes change, and with what kind of political consequences.

And consider how effectively the right has brain washed a slew of Americans using Rush Limbaugh and friends — and we are an open society, we can change the channel or turn it off. What if all we had to listen to was that kind of propaganda? I feel so sorry for those people.

Will you be returning soon. what’s next?

I continue to watch the Korean situation closely, and am also starting work on a new book, looking at the past couple of years of US decision-making on Pakistan. Should be very interesting!

Interesting and timely. Obama’s recent interviews suggest he’s focused on Pakistan as the key to deal with the Afghan situation — and is anxious to signal the new Pak. democratic regime of his willingness to improve those relations. We’ll look forward to your next book.

Many thanks!

thank you.

I definitely look forward to your forthcoming book on Pakistan. As I mentioned upfront, Meltdown is exquisitely written. A “diplomatic history that reads like a spy novel” is spot on. Congratulations and thanks for writing this book. I would recommend it not only for people interested in North Korea, but for anyone interested in how governments make decisions and how foreign policy is actually made. It is a tremendous work.

Thank you Mike. Really good discussion. And thanks to Mark for the excellent write up.

As we come to the end of this great Book Salon,

Mike,Thank you for stopping by the Lake and spending the afternoon with us discussing your new book.

Mark, Thank you very much for Hosting today’s Book Salon.

Everyone,if you haven’t bought this great book yet,there is a link above.

Thanks all.

Many thanks to all of you.