Steve, Welcome to the Lake.

Jerome, Thank you for Hosting the Book Salon today.

Hello everybody!

Jerome thanks for being here and Hosting today.

Steve is here and writing already.

Thanks to Beverly Wright for inviting me to Firedog Lake, and to Jerome Guillet for generously hosting today. I want to get right to the questions, but do want to say a couple of things first. I respect Jerome as a vigorous commentator on Russia. However, I think there needs to be distance made clear between official western commentary about Russia and private, journalistic. Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are horrific, but are relevant in a discussion only of the official western position. Jerome’s arguments about hypocrisy are a slender reed when the discussion goes outside official channels. I represent no one but myself, and the 11 years I lived in and worked from the region, and the five subsequent years in which I have traveled there.
I wanted to add that I am glad that Jerome has cited Robert Amsterdam’s remarks on Labyrinth. This is the first time I have had a chance to respond. I respect Bob for his work on the staff of oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, defending him as a lawyer, advocate and spokesman. However, it is amusing that a person whose livelihood centers on vilification of Putin can question another person’s objectivity with a straight face. Bob complains that I say that Russians are powerless victims of a brutal Russia. But in Labyrinth I actually argue the opposite — that, given the choice between the chaos of the Yeltsin years and Putin, they resoundingly voted for the latter. With open eyes, they have selected Putin and his chosen successor.
The takeaway is that Putin is ultimately defending and pursuing Russian interests, and he should be, and that the West simply needs to recognize that often these interests confict with the West.

Steve, I absolutely agree with your distinction between what the “official” West says and what Westerners, trying to defend Western values, say. If I did not make it clear enough that this distinction applies here, let me state it again -indeed, that was the reason why I specifically flagged your work in Chechnya, ie before it became the official line to be very critical of Russia.

In reply to Jerome’s question: Putin is not all-powerful (neither was Stalin). However he has his chosen centers of gravity, mainly Gazprom, which he wields with alacrity. And he has created the atmosphere in which the others who wield power act. He is at no one’s mercy. I hope no one believes he is a victim of a system larger than himself (though I agree that the system is larger than one man).

With respect to Robert’s criticism that I endorsed, it is the notion that the several individual – and admittedly high profile – murder cases that constitute the heart of your book are not really enough to make the case that murder, or at least a tolerance for unchecke violence, is at the heart of Putin’s Russia. Statistics tend to show that violent crime has actuall receded compared to the Yeltsin years. To some extent, that reflects the consolidation of the business of violence, and a lesser need to actually exert violence to hold power, but it is still seen by ordinary Russians as progress, and the few high pofile exemples that are at the heart of your book do not change *their* perception of this.

As long as we are waiting, may I say that I’m highly interested in the state of affairs since the global economic meltdown. It seems to me that this shakes up matters. It creates new openings, new opportunities, and makes what previously seemed hard-and-fast seem less so. For instance, it seems to me that Putin seems a lot further than it previously appeared to be the victor in the European pipeline contest — it may be some time before there is the finance to build South Stream and Nord Stream. As a second thought, Russia might be drawn in tighter into the West as a source of credit for strapped countries. Jerome?

Welcome, Mr. Levine.

I’m curious about the thuggish takeovers of several multi-billion dollar
energy joint ventures in recent years. Has Putin strategically decided that he has gotten
what all he needs in technical expertise from the West to develop Russia’s oil and gas fields,
or are these takeover activities things that he merely tolerates in order to continue
being supported by the oligarchs?

I finished the book last night, and found it fascinating. In the 90’s I predicted that the army would eventually line people up and start shooting, out of disgust at the outight gangsterism. I expected a return to authoritarianism. What happened was somewhat different.

Which leads to the main difference between Steve and Jerome, I think. My impression from the book is that Steve believes Putin tolerates most of the murders and that usually, if folks know Putin is clearly against a murder, it won’t happen. On the Jerome seems to thinks that many of them happen against his will, and that indeed major policy acts occur without Putin’s approval.

I’m curious if I’m reading this correctly. Is this an accurate assessment of the two positions? If so, Jerome, what major policy acts do you think have been done against Putin’s will, leaving him to scramble to keep up?

I’ve personally always assumed that Putin more or less gets his way on things that are important to him…

Re Gazprom – I’d argue (and indeed I have argued before) that Putin has never fully controlled Gazprom, and has never been able to prevent the infighting within Gazprom, and within the Kremlin over control of the juiciest bits of Gazprom.

The 2006 crisis is a case in point. It demonstrated that the oilgarhs around Putin had forgotten the lesson from 1992-1994: never let the infighting about who controls the Ukrainian gas booty show up in public, for fear of a Western backlash. I described this in much more detail here for those that may be interested, but to my mind, that incident, together with simple facts like the split ownership of the Russian State’s stake in Gazprom (why are 12% of Gazprom shares controlled by a Rosneft-related entity rather than the State Investment Fund, like the other 38%?) show that Putin barely controls Gazprom and its feudalities.

Steve and Jerome, welcome to FDL this afternoon.

I have not had the chance to read the book but would have to believe that Mr Putin’s background in the KGB has some bearing on things.

And I would hope that having a president who has not “gazed into Putin’s eyes and seen/measured his soul” will allow us to formulate some semblance of a rational policy with Russia (and the rest of the world)

Violence is not the definition of Putin’s Russia. It is an important lens through which to understand it, and how it differs from the states with which it wishes to be compared, namely the Group of 7. Regarding the history of violence, it is not sufficient to compare the Putin and Yeltsin eras. The violence in their respective times were characteristic of the long arc of Russian history. That is the derivation of the title — Putin’s Labyrinth is the Russian continuum. The continuum is an indifference toward the lives of the Russian people, and the glorification and defense of the state above all else. Consider Nord-Ost — when one seeks to end a hostage situation in Russia, one’s priority is killing the terrorists; saving the victims is secondary.

Hi all. Alan, the takeovers (mainly of Yukos but also of significant shares of Shell’s, Total’s and BP’s holdings) are state policy. They are not outside Putin’s realm of control. And not incidentally, they are in line with what is happening around the world — petro-states feel far less need to accept participation by Big Oil. Putin is looking for critical mass; that is where power is found.

Dakine01: the KGB background is important in terms of Putin’s discipline, his determination, and his no-nonsense approach toward Russia’s interests. Anything goes in the defense of the state and those interests.

Re: pipelines, let me bring on the table another notion: every new (gas) pipeline from Russia to Europe is a victory foir Europe because it means that Russian gas can go nowhere but to Europe.

Nabucco is a joke: it will never be built unless it is filled by Russian gas, because there is no other credible source (from the bankers’ perspective, Azerbaijan provides volumes that are too small, Iran is not in a position, internally, to export gas, and Turkmenistan has no pipeline linking it to Azerbaijan, and none that will be built in the future because they cannot credibly commit to delivering the corresponding gas for the next 25 years: Russia will always undercut any such contract, with the existing pipeline).

South Stream and Nord Stream (starting with this last one) will happen, becaus they make sense and they are supported by storng industrial parties that can credibly carry the necessary contracts that make these pipelines possible: ie, you have the gas seller AND the ga buyer in agreement on what thye want. They will be easy to finance, and today’s crisis will have no impact on that (these projects are, however odd that may sound, the kind of safe, boring banking that is most likely to be amongst the first activities to restart once the markets unfreeze).

Thank you for this wonderful and informed introduction, Jerome. I am really enjoying this book. It makes me wonder whether the West (America, maybe) will ever understand Russia and Russians. The reaction, in Russia, to the Nor-Est victims’ activism struck me, especially when compared, for instance, to the reaction to victims of Katrina in America.

There seems, at least in the portrayal in Labyrinth, to be some discount on human life that we don’t apply, at least to the lives of our own people. Is this something Russia can get past, do you think, or is it by now a fundamental element of national character?

Thanks for this book.

If I can go ahead and respond to Ian Welsh, with the understanding that Jerome no doubt is typing away as well: I do think that the Paul Klebnikov murder shows that the system can be larger than Putin. The events show I think that Putin did not want Klebnikov killed. He issued a statement mourning Klebnikov. He visited Klebnikov’s widow, Musa, in New York to express condolences. But in the end, one of the accused shooters has disappeared, and as with all the other major killings, no one knows who ordered it. My own experience looking at the Russian police is that they have first-rate investigators, and the investigator assigned to both the Klebnikov and Politkovskaya murders — Pyotr Garibyan — was world class. That he is unable to discover who ordered the killing — the zakazshik — is preposterous.

Re BP and Shelll: it needs to be said that they ended up with very fair deals. That may sound strange given all the hoopla that surrounded these deals, but it’s true.

- Shell had been wanting to bring Gazprom in Sakhalin 2 for a long time, and the disagreement was over price. The change in the overall geopolitical context, and the fact that Shell ran into massive cost overruns which, due to the existing prevailing contract sturcture, would have been borne almost exclusively by the Russian government (in the form of delayed receipts) gave strong arguments for the Russian side to pay less for a bigger stake of the project. Gazprom cannot do LNG on its own – not for technology reasons, but because of the need to credibly build the contractual chain all the way to the final market, including regazification terminal and LNG tankers and thus Shell’s position as operator of the project was safe.

- BP knew from the start, any years ago, that they needed to reach an accomodation with Gazprom for their Kotyvka field. They delayed doing so, in the expectation of being in a stronger bargaining position; sadly, that was not a good bet, and they got stuck in a contractual mess all of their own (they had a limited period to get field development started, would only do so with acces to export; exports are controlled by law by Gazpom – time was running against them and for Gazprom) – inland, Gazprom is able to do field development and pipelines on its own very easily. BP got a good deal in the end given the situation on the ground.

That the UK government has sought ot portray these deals as extortionary does not make them so.

I’ve never been to Russia, but one of my best friends has done quite a bit of business there. He describes it, simply, as a Mafia state. You can be killed for a $1,000 over a minor dispute. Yes, statistical levels of violence have dropped, but it remains a place that is profoundly dangerous.

As for Putin, his words were “even the Chinese are scared of Putin”.

Hi Teddy Partridge: thanks on the book and again I invite Jerome’s comment (and also thank Jerome for his comprehensive approach to his intro and his links). What you raise on Katrina is relevant: the Bush administration simply could not muster any sympathy for the victims; in front of the world, America looked like the worst of the world’s powerless states. However, there are also sharp distinctions: Katrina is not an example of putting the welfare of the state above that of ordinary people; rather it was simply an apparent reflection of Bush’s consideration of ordinary Americans.

On this Jerome and I can agree: Big Oil is not a victim, in particular BP. These companies know the lay of the land abroad, and especially in Russia. They attempted to go as far as they could using muscle and bluster, and those tactics didn’t work. Exxon has argued that in the end oil is still a cyclical business, and that the petro-states still need Big Oil companies to do their most difficult projects. I await the future events at Sakhalin I.

I’d like to throw out a question rooted in Ian’s latest: what role will China play as a regional balancer? Some smart voices have said that, given the tension between the U.S. and Russia, China will not want to appear too close to Washington on Central Asia.

Interesting -

They will be easy to finance, and today’s crisis will have no impact on that (these projects are, however odd that may sound, the kind of safe, boring banking that is most likely to be amongst the first activities to restart once the markets unfreeze).

This means that oil is going to stabilize the world markets, financial crisis?

I’ll defer to Jerome’s long investment banking experience in and outside Russia, but oil is suffering along with everything else. Nord Ost will be built (though there is opposition even within Germany), but I have strong doubts about South Stream, which after all was proposed by Putin only in 2006, and specifically as a response to Nord Ost (which I agree is a joke).

Let me state that I mostly agree with the notion that Russians value life differently from us. There can be appalling indifference to human death (indeed, one of the exile.ru’s most idiosyncratic columns was “death porn” – its gathering of the most atrocious, weird or appalling deaths reported in the Russian media). People will simply not care much about what happens to strangers – the concept of “nash”, which can apply to Russians vs everybody else, alos applies at lower scales – me, my family and close friends vs the rest of the world. People care about others in concentric waves, but in Russia, the relationships – and care – goes less far (it is also usually far more intense, which makes Russians amazingly warm and nice people once you get to really know them)

“Nord Ost” is an interesting typo… yes Nord Stream is highly likely to go ahead soon, while south stream is not quite as certain yet.

Hahaha. Nord Stream indeed!

Thanks for being here, Steve.

I’d like to interject something into the conversation re:sanctioned killings in Russia.

I don’t think Americans should be so quick to impute political murders to Putin when we still don’t know how Paul Wellstone died aside from a bogus FBI investigation. I am in Russia regularly, mostly Saint-Petersburg, and, although the police presence is strong if you look for it (especially the traffic police), it’s not much different than other cities.

Looking back at the cronyism in our govt since the 1963 murder of JFK, one could extrapolate that Texas politicians of both parties are responsible for the thievery that’s occurred here the past 45 years.

oil is going to stabilize the world markets, financial crisis?

No, I was actually referring to project finance, whereby individual projects (not necessarily in the oil sector) are financed on the basis of their own cashflow and not on the basis of the strength of the investors in the projects. Such financings require the banks to be satisfied that all risks associated with the project (technical, legal, political) be understood correctly, their likelihood properly estimated, and they be allocated to the party most able to bear them under very precise contracts.

Risk allocation is the real job of a banker, and that has been lost in the frenzy of trading and deal-making of the recent years. So those financing tools that are fundamentally based on risk analysis are likely to re-start before anything else.

Oil is certainly a sector where risks are well understood, so it will be one where things could happen; and the Gazprom deals are typical of that – indeed, in 1998-99, Gazprom was essentially the only entity able to borrow money in Russia, because that risk (on gas exports) was well understood and bearable by foreign banks, even if Russian State risk was not.

Hi James, thanks for being here. There is certainly abundant room for circumspection and modesty when looking at other countries and leaders. However, as I flicked at above, the multitude of crime, corruption and murder in one’s own country does not, I don’t think, discredit or diminish the study of another. When governments point the finger, it’s another matter.

As for whether one can blame Putin for political murder — one cannot say anything concrete with confidence. One can only say that Putin created the atmosphere, and has at minimum tolerated it. Why dress up the main suspect in a sensational British murder investigation in the clothes of patriotism? Because, as has been noted by others above, murder is seen differently in Russia.

I think it’s very telling when John McCain says in his stump speech that he looked into Putin’s eyes and saw three letters: K-G-B. It sits well with his supporters who scream “communist” and “socialist” at Obama partisans. It’s as if McCain and his voters have an outdated, stale way of looking at the world.

On the other hand, Putin is both ambitious for a place on the world stage and defensive of encroachment he sees on Russia’s sphere. Do you think Putin (along with our mil-industrial complex) could easily goad McCain into something resembling another Cold War?

Hi Jerome and Steve, welcome to the Lake. I just got here and only skimmed the comments so forgive me if this has been asked before. But regarding controlling the gas pipelines:
Surely Cheney & Co. have been trying to circumvent Russia’s control with the Caspian pipeline. Do you know anything about the group, that included Cheney, called C.A.S.P.I.A.N. ?

In the last six months until now, what was Putin’s role in the Georgian / Russian conflict? Was it purely military, political, or oil/energy based?

Did the US provoke the situation with training and arms?

Wow, excellent discussion. This may be a bit off the book; but Steve, what is your take on the Russian Georgian war recently? As discussed above, the media really don’t facilitate an accurate read on anything from that sector of the world. The reporting has all been couched in terms of “Russia’s aggression” but it sure appears to me that it was at least equal, if not more aggression, and the triggering events, on the part of Georgia. what is your understanding on this?

That is a standard McCain-ism. It’s sophomoric bar-room banter and wholly unserious; Putin himself uses a lot of lockerroom language, so perhaps they understand each other.

I do not think we are in a Cold War, nor that Putin could goad McCain or Obama — whoever becomes president — into one. I don’t any chance of a global military rivalry like the Cold War. I fully expect Russia and the U.S. to remain on polar sides of many issues, and there to be resulting tension. I also think that there are grounds for cooperation — the first thing the next U.S. president should do is resurrect the ABM treaty; that would play extremely well in Russia. Its abrogation was a symbol of Bush’s go-it-alone, we-are-king approach to foreign policy, and its restoration would be a sign that modesty and diplomacy is back. We could also find common ground on the absolute reduction of nuclear weapons.

Still in the middle of reading … but what a fascinating book you’ve written Steve!

Russia remains this mysterious foe somehow in the american psyche …

Folks, we are entering the murky world of Kremlinology. As long as everyone accepts the limitations, I’ll give it a go on Georgia: Saakashvili should have been nowhere near South Ossetia. Most countries bordering Russia have serious beefs with it, but somehow restrain themselves from going to war. In short: the indication as far as I’ve seen thus far is that Saakashvili moved first. One rule of war is that when one so acts, one can’t then govern how the other side reacts. So you have Russia crossing the South Ossetian border into Georgia proper, bombing Poti, bombing near the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Pavel Felgenhauer, the superb Russian military analyst, says Putin was preparing to fight since at least April, and was provoking Saakashvili. What were his aims? I personally think that No. 1 was to give the much-reviled Saakashvili a bloody nose. Yet, the wonderful chess player that he is, Putin certainly was mindful that by attacking Georgia, he was underscoring the vulnerability of the entire East-West, Central Asian-Caucasus corridor that the U.S. had spent the previous 15 years carefully cultivating. He knew that Russia’s power in the region would rise manifold by simply engaging in one sector — Georgia.

well, we grew up with the Soviets as our arch enemy. I think there are a lot of people like Pat Buchanan & John McCain who are happy to resurrect the Soviet Bugbear.

Elliott: you raise an important issue, and that is the importance — which I think that Jerome would support — of raising the discourse above vilification, and dealing with pure national interest. The next president needs to look clear-eyed at Europe and Eurasia, define U.S. interests, and put an incredible chess player of Putin’s caliber in charge of devising and executing policy. I might add that I do not see democracy-building as a primary U.S. interest in this case — Russia is not going to be a western-style democracy any time soon.

Just a correction: BP has explicitly denied that there were any bombings anywhere near the pipeline. Sadly, their denials were given much fewer headline than the breathless and false (as mostl of their others) claims of the Georgians.

On the conflict, I think Steve’s summary is spot on. There has been an ogy of propaganda on this conflict coming from Tbilisi (understandable) and relayed (less understandable) by London and Washington. I can understand the Poles being worried by such a conflict, but not the English or Americans fanning the flames. Thankfully, the Germans have been a moderating influence throughout, and even Sarkozy, despite his usual need to grandstand, was on a mostly sensible line – and the ceae-fire and now the troops moving out are as decent a result as coud be expected given the circumstances.

And this needs to be done as a priority. In the first month of the next administration.

Actually, I fully understand the caveat, but it is very helpful. This is something that Ian and I discussed a lot at the time and that was pretty much our take on it as well. But when your view is flying in the face of the coordinated effort of US media and government, it is hard to be certain.

Note on BP: Guy Chazan of the Wall Street Journal — whom I do not regard as a breathless reporter — visited the site of the bombings and in his piece described the presence of 45 giant craters. His report included photographs of the site. After many years of watching the energy corridor, I do not regard BP as the last word on the region.

How refreshing to read actual fact based info – thanks Steve and Jerome!

Yes all the Georgians can rationally do at this point is stand back and go on with their lives. There simply is no chance, at least any time soon, that Abkhazia or South Ossetia, will form any union of any sort with Georgia. And, for its own reasons, there is equally no chance of Russian troops withdrawing from either region.

Interesting post Ateve and Jerome;
Please comment on mcCain, Isreali and US in Shakivilli’s roll in the prodding of Russia at the foot of the Caucuses, The pipeline fron the Caspian port of Baku and what is at stke strategically. My sense is McCain and Isealis wanted control of that pipeline…a power play.

How do you see the Russian move to support the banks of Iceland in this chess game?

Elliott: I neglected to say that I have never heard of C.A.S.P.I.A.N., though it is true that a number of former senior lieutenants of the Bush I presidency did show up and do business in the former Soviet Union.

BigBrother: Israel has sought influence in the region since the 1991 breakup. On my own first trip to the region in January 1992, I ran into the new Israeli ambassador to Uzbekistan, who had set up an informal office in the Hotel Uzbekistan. There are not many Muslim-dominated places in the world where Israel has influence, and it sought and achieved it to some degree in Central Asia and the Caucasus (notwithstanding that Georgia itself is Orthodox Christian). Israel provided drones and other equipment to the Georgians.

As for seeking to control the pipeline — the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is the materialization of a 15-year-long power play by the U.S. government. It is a western-backed corridor straight through Russia’s back yard. So whatever McCain and Israel imagined there could not be anything different from what already exists.

As for the stakes at play — it is the economic and political independence of the eight Central Asian and Caucasus states. It is also economic and political influence in Europe. Some strong voices play down the latter concern. I do not. I think that Putin absolutely equates petro-power with political power in Europe, and that it is the business of the West to understand that and erect its own policy reply.

Well, when we have one presidential candidate’s chief foreign policy adviser being paid by the Georgian government, fanned flames are the least we can expect. Saak got his money’s worth there, I’d say.

Peter: has Russia finally responded to Iceland’s request for $6 billion in credit? I’d be interested in Jerome’s thinking, but my own is that it would be a positive move to draw Russia in to the devising of a solution to the global crisis. The geopolitical deck is being reshuffled. Russia should be included.

Before the Iraq War, there was a website about the organization, it was all CheneyCo. But I can no longer find anything about the group online. At first I didn’t understand why there was such an effort by U.S. to get gas/oil from the Caspian region when it was not going to go to the U.S.; but now I understand the “fungibility” of that market better.

I’m also in the middle of reading this and just wanted to say thanks for being here. I’m enjoying the visit and the book very much!

I haven’t heard anything finalizing the deal, but even to have approached Russia was a big shift. As the Financial Times led in their initial story on this last Tuesday,

Iceland expressed disappointment on Tuesday that western allies had failed to provide support to help ease the country’s financial crisis, forcing it to turn to Russia for a €4bn loan.

“We have not received the kind of support that we were requesting from our friends,” said Geir Haarde, prime minister. “So in a situation like that one has to look for new friends.”

Sounds like a deck being reshuffled to me.

Elliott: I’m glad you raised the western oil effort on the Caspian. Some without your depth of knowledge of the region would suggest that Bush/Cheney invented U.S. interest in Caspian oil. The first western oilmen, however, arrived in the region in 1987, and the number surged in 1990-forward. The main big deals were all consummated during the Clinton administration, as was the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline (while we are on the topic, Putin did not invent Russian opposition to NATO expansion. Yeltsin stood in front of the U.N. general assembly in 1993, and delivered a blistering attack against the expansion plans. He declared the Caucasus and Central Asia a sphere of Russian influence. The Economist dubbed it the “Monroeski Doctrine.)

Some strong voices play down the latter concern. I do not. I think that Putin absolutely equates petro-power with political power in Europe, and that it is the business of the West to understand that and erect its own policy reply.

I agree. Putin is right, petro=power IS power. Too bad we’ve dithered away the last thirty years on petroleum based fuels instead of intensively researching and developing alternative energy sources. We wouldn’t be behind the proverbial eight ball now.

As we come to the end of this very informative Book Salon,

Steve, Thank you for stopping by the Lake and spending the afternoon with us discussing your new book.

Jerome, Thank you very much for Hosting today’s Book Salon.

Everyone, if you haven’t bought this book yet, there is a link above.

Thanks all.

I would like to add that it’s swell when the book author and the presenter-introducer don’t agree on everything. Thanks for conducting a civil discussion, but thanks also for its wide-ranging and robust aspect.

Peterr: I wonder why Russia has hesitated (busy tending to its own problems probably). But it is incredible indeed that Iceland has been permitted to go under.

Apparently the Russian loan fell through, and Norway stepped in with a liquidity line for Iceland. It would indeed be an “interesting” move for Russia.

Let me just add that I talk about these subjects quite frequently on my blog, so stop on by. Thanks again Beverly and Jerome.

Much appreciated transparency. Is the Europena press, say Der Speigel. more objective on these Euro-Russian matters. Ny sense is that Cenral Asian issues were powering the Iraq/Afghanistan occupations?

Der Speigel is first-rate, I think. Afghanistan I think is powering itself.

Just a final note: gas is a co-dependency (pipelines contrain both the supplier and the buyer). It’s a problem only if you believe in absolute dominance. The gas relationship with Russia (and previously the Soviet Union) has been managed well enough by Germany, France and Italy over the past 30 years. It’s only the Cheney/blair approach that makes it a problem.

And as I’ve noted elsewhere: if you think depending on Russian gas is a problem, stop having energy policies that basically encourage industry players to build gas-fired power plants across the continent!!

Either that, or trying to figure how best to play this. Does Russia squeeze for the best financial terms possible, going for the short term economic benefit, or do they act generously, trading potential profits with a possibly more permanent friendly relationship with Iceland?

Long ago I was an intern in the US State Dept. The in-house arguments in Russia over this are probably a big, big part of the delay.

Thanks everyone

Thanks for the link, and also for coming by today!

Thanks Steve for the nice conversation. Thanks Beverly for the invitation.

Thank you both very much. Fascinating.

Thank you Bev, and thank you so much for your time and brainpower, Steve and Jerome, what a great Book Salon this was.

Good Luck Steve on the your book tour, may it take you places you never dreamed.

Thanks Jerome and Steve for the great insight! Come back soon!

From Deutsch Welle TV, Iceland originally was hoping for the US to help them.
as Ian said, “HAHAHAHA”

Alternative energy…the financial meltdown would not have sucked the capital markets dry had we kept the oil money in the system instead of transferring it to the sovereign funds and OPEC. Well placed idea Elliot…thank you for adding that.

Thanks Steve for doing the work to keep us informed about labyrinthian Russia.

For too long the quality and quantity of information about this critical country (look at their natural gas reserves for one) have fallen to the wayside as the meaningless campaign rhetoric and idiotic bushcheney foreign policy smokes and spins out of control.

My interest in Russia mainly focuses on the USSR’s role in WWII (and the reactionary American foreign policy laid out from 1947-1949), the KGB/FSB, and, of course, Putin’s rising hegemony over mother Russia or, at least, Moscow.

i’ve just heard of you book but based on Jerome’s overview (thanks Jerome!), i have a question: What exactly is different about your analysis of modern-day Russia and that analysis put forth by the US government in regards to the USSR during the second half of the 1940s? (Even the title of your book harkens back to Churchill’s speech.)

The takeaway is that Putin is ultimately defending and pursuing Russian interests, and he should be, and that the West simply needs to recognize that often these interests confict with the West.

A phrase like “Russian interests” is a black box. You don’t know what it is from time to time.

We are in a difficult period because of Bush. The next administration will see things differently. That’s inevitable because of the personalities involved and because of the shifting views of Americans. We are being dealt one blow after another by nature and by our own hands and it will take a focused attention and time to fix things. Part of that process, in my view, is to simply tell the leaders of other countries that we need their best efforts, their help, to put the past in the past and look at the world anew and with hope.

The policies of an Obama administration, in particular, would be quite different than the present Bush administration. It must be obvious by now that it’s absolutely necessary for us to change our ways. We cannot continue to let Wall Street and the energy crisis and our health care crisis and all the rest destroy us. Internationally, we need good things to happen, not bad. That means we need to extricate ourselves from military adventures which waste money and instead we need to relate to other peoples for the commercial benefit of everyone. Once we do that we might see Russia differently. Tensions might subside. American exports might increase. A new world awaits.

Politically, it makes no sense to speak of promoting Democracy around the world while also creating and talking up tension and violence. It’s better to promote peaceful beneficial relations in every way. And, in that way, you help the Russians and Chinese to improve their political and economic systems to make them more responsive to their citizens need for freedom, harmony and prosperity and at the same time to maintain a strong national identity, power, safety and respect among nations.

Even as I write this post about a transition from a Bush administration to an Obama administration the reality of the world’s economic problems insists we work together. We must.