With his laughable declaration of a "Fourth Branch" of government, Dick Cheney made his bid for power clear.
But that declaration was not how he actually accrued more power than any other Vice President in history. Instead, Cheney grabbed power by mobilizing his superior understanding of the federal bureaucracy. That's the great value of Barton Gellman's Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency--the way Gellman meticulously catalogs the methods by which Cheney manipulated the federal bureaucracy to work his will (see his website for updates).
These include:
- Collecting and using intelligence on others--as when Cheney used VP vetting information he had collected to undercut Frank Keating's candidacy to be Attorney General; or when OVP collected NSA transcripts of other government appointees; or when OVP copied itself in on all emails going to the National Security Council.
- Halting the Government Printing Office publication of executive orders--the ones Clinton signed in his last days in office--to prevent them from going into effect.
- Firing people, as when (Gellman implies) Cheney intervened to have Paul O'Neill fired so he could push through an unnecessary tax cut.
- Capitalizing on his history as a briefer--using (among other things) his skill at reading documents upside down.
- Lying blatantly, as when he told Dick Armey the Iraqis had suitcase nukes.
- Asking questions--to offer direction without leaving the tracks of having done so, and to ascertain the positions of all others without revealing his own.
- Mobilizing surrogates to sponsor his favored policies so as to hide his own sponsorship of those policies.
- Maximizing ambiguity in scientific thought (on both the economy and environmental issues) to undercut policy and regulation.
Boring stuff, some of it. Just as an example of how banal this all is, consider the way Cheney found and contacted Ellen Wooldridge to intervene in the Klamath River dispute, to make sure farmers' water rights got higher priority than the fishing rights of Native Americans and the needs of fish listed as endangered species.
Dick Cheney found his way through that labyrinth, to just the right woman in just the right place, because the thing on his mind at that moment was about to land on her desk. How he knew that, Cheney did not say. He liked to "reach down"--that was his term--through layers of management. He wanted his information direct, unfiltered. If a decision was coming, Cheney made sure to find out when and where it would be made.
"The vice president of the United States was and remains the consummate staffer," [Cheney domestic policy advisor Ron] Christie said. "He understands how the bureaucracy works and, when the bureaucracy is not working, how to cut through it.
Jack Goldsmith provides another description of Cheney's bureaucratic skills.
[Cheney and Addington] "were geniuses at this," Goldsmith said. "They could divide up all these problems in the bureaucracy, ask different people to decide things in their lanes, control the facts they gave them, and then put the answers together to get the result they want."
As this book makes clear, it was through Cheney's mastery of this kind of minutia that he succeeded in dominating our national policy for the last seven years--and in the process, getting us into a disastrous war of choice, diminishing our national reputation with his barely-concealed endorsement of torture, and gutting our national economy.
There's much more in this book. The additional detail about the March 10, 2001 hospital confrontation--beyond even those included in the WaPo excerpts--makes buying the book worthwhile by itself.
Then there's the stuff not getting press: a description of a November 2002 UN inspection disproving the aluminum tube story that the Administration used to get us into war; new details about how Cheney manipulated the White House email system to accrue power; and description of a Code Red panic within the White House in December 2003.
But the lasting value of the book, I think, is the way it exposes the many vulnerabilities in our federal bureaucracy that allow one man and his allies to seize control over much of the executive branch of government.
Barton Gellman has just one hour for this book salon, so I wanted to get him started with several questions:
David Addington is--as we speak--asking the DC Appeals Court to intervene so he can avoid giving a deposition to CREW about the Office of Vice President's compliance with the Presidential Records Act. Assuming CREW gets to depose Addington, what questions would you recommend they ask about the OVPs archiving--particularly with regards to email?
You don't mention Tom Delay's briefing on the warrantless wiretap program the day after the hospital confrontation. Do you have any idea why the Administration briefed Delay or what transpired in that briefing?
I was struck by something you quote Scooter Libby as saying after he hired Cesar Conda as Cheney's chief domestic advisor: "Focus on the economy, because that's what the client wants." [my emphasis] Did the word client strike you as at all strange? Do you understand the word "client" to refer to Cheney--or is it someone else?
As a reminder, please take off-topic discussions to a different thread.
Gellman can be reached at bartongellman.com
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Barton, Welcome to the Lake.
Marcy, Thank you for Hosting today’s Book Salon.
Welcome, Bart. Really glad you can join us today.
Glad to be here — I’ll get started now.
Question for Mr. Gellman,
You refer to the OVP being added to NSC email distribution lists. Are you aware of any other email lists that the OVP was surreptitiously added to?
Welcome to the Lake m’man. (Unfortunately, Gen. Caldwell picks now to hold a conference call on the new Army stability-ops field manual…)
I heard you on Diane Rehm today–and know that on that show–as in other forums, you’ve been getting a lot of questions about Palin’s comments about the Vice Presidency.
I’m curious whether you think Steve Schmidt has had any influence on her views?
You note in your book McCain’s stated views on the VP in a primary debate:
So how, then, did McCain’s VP adopt such an expansive view of the Vice Presidency? And does McCain now agree?
Barton Gellman’s website is - bartongellman.com /
I have a process Q. Many people, myself included, think Cheney is the personification of evil and wouldn’t have the emotional fortitude to do the work you did to write this book (many thanks).
What was your attitude about Cheney, before writing the book, then afterwards?
So to your initial three questions.
1. Questions for Addington. I wouldn’t advise a litigant, but what I’d like to know myself is the precise taxonomy of records in OVP. I’d want to use the most inclusive possible language to ask which records of any kind were kept but the full list of named employees, detailees, volunteers and consultants to the vice president in his White House, Senate and residential offices, and anywhere else if they related to official business of the government of the United States. Cheney’s initial position is that he is “part of” neither elected branch of government, though “attached to” the legislative branch, and so it’s not sufficient to limit requests to White House records.
2. I’m not sure I know the Delay meeting you’re talking about. You don’t mean the briefing for the Gang of Eight on the day OF the hospital visit, do you? That was Wednesday afternoon march 10, 2004 at 3 pm, and I discuss it at length in the book.
3. The “client” was quite interesting, and I didn’t belabor it in the book, but Libby clearly referred to Cheney rather than Bush. He has the right to direct his own staff, but it’s suggestive.
Thanks so much for being here today, Barton. Your work has always been really popular here.
How did you feel about Sarah Palin’s comments regarding expanding the power of the “fourth branch?”
Short answer is no. But Cheney participated actively in the Domestic Policy Council, National Economic Council, Homeland Security Council and Council on Environmental Quality. One way or another he and his staff kept up with business in those places. At the NSC, it was not only email. I describe in the book how the system worked for paper documents as well. Nobody snooped on personal emails, from one individual to another, but memos and notes with official recommendations to for instance the National Security Adviser were hand-carried to Cheney as well. John Bellinger, Rice’s lawyer, found that out to his regret THREE YEARS after starting the job.
No. According to Negroponte’s list of briefings, DeLay had his own briefing on March 11, alone, the day after the hospital confrontation.
I was wondering if you had heard about it–or if you would speculate about why they might have briefed him then?
I have a piece coming in SLATE later today … if no one minds my mentioning that other site ;-) … that addresses the Palin-as-Cheney theory. She’s awfully hard to parse, frankly, but does seem to buy Cheney’s signature beliefs that his office has “flexibility,” “authority,” and a duty to use them. She’s no Dick Cheney, though, as an operator.
Welcome to the Lake Mr Gellman !
1. What was so bad in Cheney’s proposed Spying program that even John Ashcroft opposed it ?
I know from previous interviews you have never been able to get the details, can your fans out here count on you to continue pressing for answers ?
a huge thanks for your work. You have done your country a huge favor and the Founders would be proud.
this Gellman fan loves the idea of somewhere within the bowels of DC Mr Cheney is dealing with some major agita at the mere idea some free and vigorous soul broke the veil - and quite possibly is chewing on Addington’s ass for it :D
Barton, thanks so much for your fine work on this. My question is simple: of all the stories you discovered, which one or two were the most stunning to you?
I recognize that it’s hard to single out just one story, but I was blown away by this: “Every time [John Bellinger, National Security counsel to Condi Rice] wrote a memo to his boss, a blind copy was routed to the vice president’s office. Libby, according to one official, made the arrangement with Steve Hadley, Rice’s deputy.”
Unbelieveable — except, of course, that this is so in keeping with everything we’ve seen from Cheney, Libby, Addington, & Co over the last 8 years that it is entirely believable.
Thanks.
I also have a bit broader question. Much of the information on the internal Administration argument over torture is sourced to Jack Goldsmith (in your book, Jane Mayer’s, and Goldsmith’s own). Do you think that Goldsmith has been able to control the narrative about the torture debate to cast his actions in a more favorable light? Did you have sources to confirm his side of the story?
Sarah’s kidding herself if she thinks that McCain would abdicate power the way Bush has and just go on bike rides while she runs evertyhing.
Ah, good point. I’m not big on speculation, but that is the period in which Cheney & Co. expanded the circle from the Gang of Four (intelligence committee chairs and vice chairs only) — first to the Gang of Eight (including #1 and #2 leaders in each house, and then a little bit more broadly. Tom Delay would be a natural audience. The controversy was beginning to emerge, and the White House was building a backstop of support to keep it from getting out of hand. One possible motivation might have been to quash any movement toward greater intervention by Congress. I did learn, in any case, quite a bit about what was said in the meeting the day before, and that’s all spelled out in Chapter 12.
Was there an Abramoff angle to this? Wooldridge was one of the Abramoff people at Interior. Susan Ralston was a forme Abramoff staffer and, after she started working for Rove, his connection in the White House to Rove. Rove too was in on the Klamath deal, as was Interior Secretary Gail Norton. So there were at least a couple of ways for Wooldridge’s name to pop up for Cheney.
Thanks for writing this disheartening book. I hope it enables our Republic to prevent another accumulation of power by one man such as Cheney. I hope it will be a cautionary tale to our next President, and future Presidents as well.
Cheney has always struck me, in his certainty and driving fortitude, as someone very like my grandfather’s bridge club, which had as its motto: Often in Error, Never in Doubt. He epitomizes the Washington attraction to strength even in the face of grievous error.
What steps do you think our democracy should take to strengthen the hand of people who are right, while also delegitimizing those who commit error after error? Our political discourse seems so often to reward the wrong people. Cheney’s lack of a popular constituency should have been a clue for people who owe their success to political exercises — no one ever seems to ask, “Sure, the Vice-President wants this, but who else does?”
Barton:
Transparency in government… it has now become expose of government practices after the fact. Rape, pillage, murder and steal the public treasury. Opacity is a sure sign of underlying crimes covered by executive priveledge?
Welcome, Mr. Gellman. Congratulations on an important and engaging book.
In the book you take pains to stress that Bush isn’t just a figurehead to a de facto Cheney presidency. Can you say more about what you mean by that? When I read your description of Cheney’s activities in office, including his extraordinary power to interpret the scope of his own authority, I’m tempted to describe that as a de facto presidency.
Mr. Gellman, you seem to have missed my Q at 8. So here it is again. Apologize if you were in the process of answering it.
On that note–did you notice how frequently during the debate on FISA, people claimed that the Administration had briefed the Gang of Eight from the start–when in fact they only briefed the full Eight (which is required by law) when they needed cover in March 2004.
Barton, welcome to FDL. Thanks so much for all of your superb reporting — but especially for digging in so throughly on the Cheney/Addington/Libby machinations against the rule of law. It is very much appreciated.
Thank you for pulling back the curtain and explaining how he did it.
Two questions. What have you tried but not yet been able to uncover?
On page 244 a minor thing piqued my curiosity. Josh Bolten says that Cheney was often out on the West Coast. What was he doing out there so often?
I certainly did talk to Goldsmith, but in the 70 pages of Endnotes you’ll find other named sources and references (as transparent as I can make them) to sources that can’t be named. I’m confident I have the story right, and I don’t think Goldsmith actually is trying to control the narrative to make himself look good to anyone likely to frequent this conversation. He’s quite embarrassed to be lionized on the left (although he’s often criticized as well for not doing enough, and not doing it soon enough, on torture). He believed Yoo’s work was so shoddy and wrong that he had to face down the White House and withdraw it. That requires a courage that is easy to claim but very very hard to carry out in practice. (Try it with your boss’s boss’s boss sometime.) On the other hand, Goldsmith distinguished sharply between “torture” and the “cruel inhuman or degrading” conduct that is also banned by Geneva’s Common Article 3. Leaving policy decisions aside, he believed the president legally had the power to depart from Geneva and that the War Crimes Act, carefully parsed, did not forbid cruelty as a matter of U.S. law.
I hate to use up space better left open for questions, but we in our household thank you for your dedication and service, Mr Gellman. One of our sons gave me your book for my birthday. Perhaps that speaks volumes enough from our household. I will hush and just read.
This is a great question. Not only is there no love lost between McCain and Cheney, but McCain made clear he does not approve of the Cheney Model. He would certainly not give Palin as much leash as Cheney had. I don’t know whether she didn’t get the memo, didn’t mean what it sounded like she meant, or is staking out an independent position here.
Holy darkside, there are a lot of questions here. Will try to type faster….
Barton, you note that Cheney was quite familiar with the concept of the ex ante pardon from his days in the Nixon White House. This is a pardon granted for past actions that might be found to be illegal at some point in the future — such as Ford’s pardon of Nixon.
People have speculated that Bush would issue a bunch of pardons before leaving office. After reading Angler, I am more and more persuaded that this will happen. The only questions are (1) how many pardons will Bush confer, (2) how far down the bureaucracy will these pardons go, and (3) what will the reaction be from the folks that *didn’t* get a pardon?
That’s why I was wondering about Schmidt–given that he has basically taken over McCain’s campaign, and has had a key role in Palin’s prep for the debate. It seems like Schmidt HAS supported Cheney’s tactics in the past.
In 41’s administration Cheney appeared to be reasonable[a relative term - I know]. Was this an illusion? If not, what happened to cause him to become such a radical?
Bart — One of the “minutiae” that Cheney maneuvered into his favor was the fact that all tax policies originate in the House, and thus he secured office space via Bill Thompson in the House in order to better shepherd that. You also reported — and this was one of my favorite nuggets that you managed to wrangle out of someone — that Cheney stopped the presses on the Federal Register to prevent last-minute Clinton appointments and presidential orders from becoming permanent.
Has any other Administration before this ever thought at that level of control? And in terms of Cheney/Addington/and Libby, talk for a bit about the shadow national security apparatus they set up in the Veep’s offices, their meetings at Langley and how much approval they were working under from George Bush himself on this, if you would. The end-run via OLC is so well-documented in your book, but the NSC and NSA information is something that has always intrigued me as well.
In any discussion of Addington I have to bring up the quote attributed to him by Goldsmith:
This is why he is fighting against being deposed and will simply ignore any provisions about perservation of records that he finds inconvenient.
You obviously didn’t read the Cheney-Addington Iran-Contra minority report.
This isn’t a political book or a case for the prosecution or defense. It’s a narrative of what really happened and how and why, often moving day by day and even hour by hour. I do have more voice in the book than I do in the daily newspaper, though, and I felt free to give some assessment. It’s more balanced than some here would like. I believe that if you do not give Cheney his principles, acknowledge that he thought he was doing the right thing, you can’t understand what happened these last eight years. Consider: zealots have had a lot more impact on history, for good or ill, than hypocrites.
Here are a few paragraphs from my last chapter — but get the book! It’s got a lot more:
The history of the Bush administration cannot be written without
close attention to the moments when Cheney took the helm—
sometimes at Bush’s direction, sometimes with his tacit consent, and
sometimes without the president’s apparent awareness. In those moments,
especially in the early years, Cheney had lasting impact on the
nation’s course. Cheney was the UNODIR vice president, following
his own stars “unless otherwise directed.” But it is just as important
to note the times when Bush stepped in, grabbed the wheel, and
veered from Cheney’s heading.
The substantive differences between
the two men were seldom apparent during their White House years.
But this was decidedly not a Cheney administration. Had there been
such a thing, it would have looked very different. Almost certainly it
would have self-destructed, as Bush’s very nearly did at the cliff’s
edge with Justice in March 2004.
Many of those who worked for
Cheney called him the “ultimate staffer,” and that said more than
most of them intended. Cheney had prodigious talents and appetite
for work and, above all, force of will. He knew what he wanted. In
previous roles—chief of staff, minority whip, defense secretary—he
had learned finesse and compromise. After September 11, most of
the battles he fought involved core principles on which he was disinclined
to look for middle ground. A staffer can afford to be unbending;
the principal cannot. Cheney Unbound was unsuited for the top
job. He had no regulator on his engine. Bush discovered that belatedly
but never forgot…
Cheney served his country with devotion, at some cost to himself.
The stresses of the job did not improve his health. After more than a
decade without incident, Cheney suffered eight cardiac events in
eight years. He relinquished millions of dollars in stock options and
income forgone. The author found no evidence of self- dealing behavior
in office, involving Halliburton or anything else. There were
times when Cheney stretched the truth, times he may have snapped
it clean in half, but he was fundamentally honest about his objectives.
Cheney believed that the country was in mortal danger and that he
knew better than others how to avert it….
Cheney’s most troubling quality was a sense of mission so acute
that it drove him to seek power without limit. His indifference to
public opinion, an important constraint on most office holders, verged
on contempt. He spoke most openly in disdain of the news media and
self- appointed elites, but he had a way of saying “polls”—the kind
that measure public opinion—that made the word sound dirty.
Cheney would not put it this plainly, but the fact was he did not much
admire the way his fellow Americans made decisions. Our fickle loyalties,
our emotional swings, our uneven grasp of facts, our failure to
see the main point, our logical errors—all the things that made our
collective conversation so unlike Dick Cheney’s conversation with
himself—brought the vice president close to saying he need not
bother listening.
In relation to the fire that occurred in the old OVP area, what is your understanding of what was there at the time, what was lost and if there was anything particularly suspect about the deal. I am nor insinuating that such is the case, but it has kind of dropped off the radar screen, just like to confirm that is not a bad thing.
Schmidt served Cheney and now serves McCain. In between he served the Governator in California. Three very different breeds of GOP. He’s an operator, not an ideologue, and not a Cheney plant.
I’d love to know more about that fire. I’ve heard a lot of jokes about it, but not a lot of data. Anyone who knows something, feel free to pass it along…..
That, and the time the shredding machine showed up to the Navy Observatory. Both have fallen off the radar.
Yes, he was a radical from the Nixon Administration but he was never in a position to wield power as he wanted to until he found an empty vessel like Bush who would allow him to.
It’s true that I never could figure out what Ashcroft/Comey/Goldsmith/Philbin believed to be unlawful in the NSA program. I pursued many sort-of promising lines of reporting and informed speculation, but none I thought solid enough to put my reputation behind. People who know the answer told me that previous efforts in print and online to crack the case have been embarrassingly wrong. What I found was that there was a huge story here — of Cheney’s management and Bush’s ignorance — that could be told even if I treated the program as a black box of unknown content.
Hey folks. Can we all agree to go out and buy Barton’s book, and recommend it far and wide, as at least some reward to him for the tremendous list of homework questions we’re throwing at him? Meanwhile, keep ‘em coming, and don’t lose resolve, Barton. We really should have sent a buffet snack tray or 10. Perhaps you gathered, this is quite a pack of dawgs here sir. They read, they think deeply, they have no fear of discussions, and they are dedicated to helping however they can. *g*
Have you read the IG report on Alberto Gonzales’ notes of the March 10 meeting with Congress? He suggests he wrote those notes after the fact–probably during the weekend, which would also put it after the time when Gonzales signed the re-authorization and when Bush learned that Comey might quit. And he also says Bush ordered him to record the notes.
Given your reporting on the report that DOJ put together on the lead-up to the clash, I was wondering what you thought of that? It seems like your reporting, along with teh IG report, suggests Bush made that order after WH received teh report from DOJ.
I’ll take a crack at this too. Yes, as the Iran Contra minority report demonstrates, Cheney always held an edge-of-the-envelope (or beyond the edge) view of executive supremacy. At the Pentagon under Bush 41, I turned up evidence (now, but not then, when I covered him!) that he was an outlier on many other questions of policy — Baker, Scowcroft and the president himself squashed him time after time. Examples: he wanted to recognize Lithuania’s independence immediately and sink Iraqi tankers immediately after the invasion of Kuwait, before Baker finessed a UNSC resolution. We never heard of these things because Cheney almost never lets his dissents leak.
It was about power not service. As for Halliburton, from my scanals list (item 333), re defense contracts in a Waxman report:
Thanks for that. I will get the book, just haven’t had a chance yet.
I was also surprised to hear you on another program say that Cheney put all his HAL stock in trust for charity. That’s what started me thinking about him in a different way. What you cited from the book moves forward my ability to think about him rationally.
However, I can’t resist the following:
You mean like Mao or Pol Pol? In the linked book (one of my all time faves), Ludwig calls those types of leaders “visionaries” because they change their societies completely. Cheney has taken a good run at it here.
http://www.amazon.com/King-Mou.....038;sr=1-2
Probably used one to destroy the evidence of the other…
Your WaPo collaborator, Jo Becker, is not a co-author of this book. How did that come about?
left you a couple of possibilities downstairs
Makes me wonder what Baker, Scowcroft, and especially George HW Bush thought of Cheney’s work as chair of the VP search committee for GW Bush. Anything from those three on this that didn’t get into your book?
I’m not totally clear about your question but I did read the IG report with interest. Clearly, once Bush had his brush with political suicide, he got himself more involved. We can only surmise from here, but in the turmoil from Friday the 12th to Friday the 19th — after Bush told Justice to fix the program but before the internal fight with OVP, on the details, was resolved — it must have been important to someone to record a helpful version of that meeting with Congressional leaders. One big thing I know was on everyone’s mind, and there’s reporting in the book on this, was laying down as thick a blanket of legal immunity as possible for everyone involved. (I stress that Addington and Cheney believed they were within the law as they understood it, but they did worry that some future prosecutor would disagree.) Part of the legal work doubtless included whatever support the White House could claim from the senior leaders in Congress. In the book, I describe a scene in which Gonzales calls that a “legislative remediation,” a term that Comey and others found baffling.
Rumor around Houston was that Baker was less than pleased and, in fact, talked with “Junior” about his views on Cheney before it became official. With 41’s blessing, if the rumor I heard was accurate.
I respectfully disagree that Cheney was about power not service. It was power in the service of the national interest AS HE SAW IT. And it’s clear that Halliburton did very well these past two terms, but I’m unable to find any link to Cheney or his proxies. I found that kind of link on lots of things that ought to have been harder to get, involving classified and legally privileged information, so I’m reasonably confident that I’m not missing anything big. Only reasonably, though. I have a very poor record of prediction, which is why I stick to an empirical profession. I’d be broke long since if I had put any real money on my bets.
Before Bush made the choice, or before Bush announced the choice?
(And wasn’t *that* a lovely story to use to open the book?)
Thank Mr. Gellman,
My question is, what strategy would you suggest using to bring to justice Vice President Cheney and the rest of those in the administration who redefined torture and made it the law, policy and practice of the United States.
For Dan,
Heather
When Obama comes into office in January there will need to be a DeCheneyfication of the Government (DeBushifcation? DeRoveification?)
We know that they have been placing loyalists.
When people talk about Bush and Cheney leaving bomb they talk about laws, but I’m more concerned with PEOPLE who are locked in and will fight to keep their power.
Who should we look for as Cheney loyalists who won’t leave? What can we do to expose them? And FOIA times and people we should look at?
We all know that Baker disagreed with Cheney on Iraq, Iran, North Korea and some other policy areas. I don’t know that he opposed Cheney’s selection for the 2000 ticket. I’m skeptical of that. He did, however, make a gentle reminder to Bush 43 that Rumsfeld had tried to spike Bush 41’s career.
Definitely before it was announced, but I think also before it was officially offered to Cheney as well. Or at least Baker thought it was before then, if what I heard was correct.
Here’s another sort of weedy question on the hospital confrontation.
Your book says that the AG authorized the warrantless wiretapping a week later.
The SSCI report–which confirmed last year that the authorization for that period bore Gonzales’ signature–suggested his signature might have authorized the program for a longer period of time.
Are you saying that after Comey was satisfied he had won the battle, he signed the authorization for the March 11 forward period?
I’m curious, especially, because that’s what telecoms presumably used, and Gonzales signature should have been the tip off to them they were breaking the law. In other words, that’s the one period we know when telecoms weren’t meeting statute wrt domestic wiretapping.
Much obliged on the whole snack tray thing. I’m not a picky eater.
Though it could be another example of when someone got to Bush too late–the way Condi and Powell and Whitman repeatedly did.
I’m getting here later and so I’ll put these up as questions while I go back and read. Apologies if they are duplicative.
1. Did anyone fill you in on the memo that DAG Thompson received when he stopped signing FISA applications because and/or the specific liabilities that caused him such concern that he threw up that roadblock to processing national security wiretap applications?
2. Any discussions from any of your sources on why there was never any objection to rewriting the national security act to allow for briefing of the “Big Four” as opposed to the Gang of Eight -why hasn’t Congress been chomping at the bit over that? Was it bc the Dems in the then constituted Big Four signed off on keeping things closely held and/or that they don’t want to discuss their roles in approval of items such as torture?
3. Did Bush ever get the word (that was given to Addington by the CIA) that a large chunk of those held at GITMO not tied to terrorism in any way? Did your sources fill you in on any discussions of any kind with respec to the liablity for the actions taken against people if even the Yoo/Philbin/Flannigan fig leaf offered up - that there were no rules if you were torturing “unlawful enemy combatants” - got yanked away with the determination that the tortured were NOT unlawful enemy combatants? Any ripples about that aspect of the recent DC Circuit decision?
4.
Charming, as well as smart and diligent! Come back at the cocktail hour. We frequently share edrinks.
Presidential pardons will enable Cheney, etc. to escape from justice.
That is a fairly meaningless assertion since as the Yoo memos (which Addington practically co-wrote) make clear Cheney and Addington thought the President’s Article II powers (the cover for their actions) were unlimited.
That’s the thing, the timeline on it is tough to pin down, because the source I got that from was one of those “heard it from someone who would absolutely know, but wasn’t there for the actual discussion” kinds of things. Which I why I’ve never written it up.
Haven’t read the comments yet but wouldn’t Anger the Cheney Presidency be a bit more on the mark:)
The people like Pataki and Danforth thought they were being interviewed before the job was offered to Cheney, too . . .
Btw, I bought Angler as soon as it came out (well, as soon as my local bookstore opened up after Ike). It is an excellent book and essential reading for anybody who wants to understand the last eight years.
Jo Becker was a full and indispensable partner for the WashPost series. Just before it ran, she moved to the New York Times. She made the switch with complete integrity, helping shepherd the project (for her new competitor) into print even after the move. It would have been awfully hard, though, to keep up the partnership after that. Part of the deal was first serial rights to the WashPost, and in any case trying to ferret out newsy secrets with Brand X would have been … well, I couldn’t find any precedent for it and couldn’t imagine how. Jo also had a brand new job and I don’t think she could have taken book leave. I took a year off to do the book.
Barton - Thanks for all you do!
It seems clear that Everyone involved in the discussions on Re-Certifying the Program in the week leading up to Mar. 10 knew that Comey was the Acting AG for the Hospitalized Ashcroft.
If Comey was the Official AG at the time, on what authority (basis in Law) were Gonzales and Card asking Ashcroft to Over-Ride Comey’s OLC-supported position with a Signature during the Hospital Visit?
Mr. Gellmen,
Heard you mention on NPR this morning about how Cheney used the process of vetting for VP to his own advantage. Do you think that is what he planned all along? And the information he had gathered did he later use it to get stuff from folks like Bill Frist?
Nice try.
I’ll check out the book you linked.
And while the book is fantastic, we’ve really missed your reporting while you were writing it!
Barton,
The Cheney usurpation of powers is so disturbing to me that I wonder what might be done to constrain such power grabs in the future. What is needed? New laws? More vigilance by Congress? A more watchful president?
And where does the balance of powers fit in? What role does Congress and the Courts have? Is impeachment the only option? What can be done to reign in a runaway VP short of impeachment?
Thanks again for your book!
Bob in HI
Gonzales testified that there’s no rule saying an official who relinquishes his authority can’t reclaim it, and no specified procedure. Theoretically Ashcroft could say any time that he was back in charge. Asking him to do so from intensive care, on the other hand, is about as far as you can stretch that notion.
awwwwww.
Hey, don’t we have any critics in this bunch. I do, honestly, enjoy being challenged. Only fair if I’m going to delve into the things other people do.
You mean Cheney can’t raise the dead?
What WO said.
It is a great book, and I think Barton’s description of what he tried to do with it @37 is right on the mark. Well worth getting, reading, and spending lots of time trying to get your head around it.
I spent a whole chapter on this, and the answer is pretty subtle. I don’t think he intended to be VP as early as March and April 2000, when he accepted the assignment. But I’m not inside his head. What I trace is a series of things he did and did not do that are suggestive of when he saw a VP in the mirror.
I’m terribly sorry to cut this short, because there are tons more great questions and comments. But I’m keeping a big shot waiting (anything for you, Lake Folk), and can’t be more than 15 or 20 minutes late. ;-)
So I gotta go. Look for more on my web site.
we actually do the challenge thing when necessary - just ask your um, colleague Mr Woodward about his recent visit *g*
While working on this book, how did you deal with the question that inevitably arose around certain episodes: “Should this go in today’s paper or wait for the book to come out?”
Barton, Thank you for stopping by the Lake today and spending time with us discussing your new book.
Marcy, Thank you for Hosting this great Book Salon.
Everyone - this is a must buy, must read book, if you haven’t bought one yet, there is a link above.
Thanks all.
I think many of us might disagree with your read that Cheney’s actions were all good faith attempts to implement what he thought was best for teh country. I think one can make a very compelling argument on both Iraq and on his energy plans that he knowingly followed policies that helped an almost neo-feudalist vision of the country which served to benefit the kind of people he shoots quail with–and that Cheney knew that policy would destabilize the US.
But I’m not going to complain about superb, studiously objective journalism. It’s rare enough to see done well, it’d be churlish to complain!
Any untold stories about the craziness in the Situation Room on 9/11?
Thank you for coming by!
Thanks for stopping by Bart.
One thing I wanted to mention. When we were doing the Libby trial coverage, I had occasion to ride up in the elevator with Libby and his attorneys a couple of times. It constantly struck me how genteel, calm, and mild-mannered he appeared from the outside, how courtly he tried to be in terms of manners outwardly anyway. But when you’d observe him inside the courtroom during testimony, there were times when a vein would bulge out on his forehead, he’d clench his hand or twitch his thumb, and this look of utter anger and loathing would, occasionally, flash into his eyes when a sharp question would come out of Fitzgerald to dig out a particular point from a witness or when witnesses would question his motives — especially during Cathie Martin’s testimony, I noticed.
From watching Addington’s appearance in the House not too long ago, I saw a lot of the same personality characteristics — that attempt to outwardly be one thing, but when challenged on anything, the anger would flare. Addington, though, took it a step further to utter disgust for anyone who didn’t agree with him — he was a piece of work to watch.
Were there particular stories about either man that you found most compelling?
That was fun!
He chases down what the 9/11 Commission backed off of–the fact that Cheney almost certainly gave the shoot down order without sanction from Bush.