(Please welcome Jonathan Schell, author of The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger, in the comments -- jh)
The philosophy of deterrence and proliferation is at least as old as catapult technology. Likely much older. Nations seek prestige or its restoration. They fear humiliation or its repetition. They seek invulnerability from harm and guarantees of enduring power.
The timeless motivations remain. It should therefore be unremarkable that as the Cold War justifications for ostentatious nuclear arsenals have fallen apart, new justifications have been created and the world's current nuclear powers are preparing to improve their nuclear capabilities instead of talking about mutual disarmament. The United Kingdom, China, France and Russia are all modernizing their nuclear capacity. The UK and France have joined the United States in declaring that their nuclear arsenals could be deployed anywhere in the world against shadowy, ill-defined, as-yet unrealized threats. Schell tells us that the current global count of 443 nuclear reactors could reach 5,000 by the end of the century, while countries like Japan, Brazil and South Korea are thought to be nuclear capable in short order.
Now, entering a seventh decade of a world under permanent threat of nuclear annihilation, it seems a good time to take more seriously the "bomb in the mind," that Schell illustrates so well in this book with telling anecdotes from the global rush to proliferation.
... In 1946, after a bruising meeting with the American secretary of state James Byrnes, the British foreign minister Ernest Bevin remonstrated with Prime Minister Clement Atlee when he intimated that perhaps Britain didn't need the bomb. "No Prime Minister, that won't do at all," Bevin said. "We've got to have this. I don't mind for myself, but I don't want any other Foreign Secretary of this country to be talked at, or to, by the Secretary of State in the United States as I just have in my discussions with Mr. Byrnes. We've got to have this thing over here, whatever it costs. We've got to have the bloody Union Jack on top of it." ...
... If Britain refused to yield exclusive great-power status (or, now, superpower status) to the United States, France refused to yield it to Britain and the United States. Believing that if it did otherwise, then, in the words of a note from the Quai d'Orsay (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), France's "security will be entirely in the hands of the Anglo-Saxons." Or as de Gaulle would put it, with the bomb in France's possession, "We'll take back our status as a great power at the negotiating table." ...
... Amre Moussa, the former foreign minister of Egypt, has said that if Israel declared or tested its arsenal, "Egypt would have to take drastic action." There would be "immeasurable pressure" on "certain Arab countries to go nuclear. ... Membership in the NPT for Arabs would become humiliating." Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher said, "An Israeli declaration would be seen as throwing down the gauntlet. It would have a profound psychological impact in Egypt. We would have to react." ...
... "We see what you are getting ready to do with Iraq. And you are not going to do it to us." [A North Korean general, explaining why his government made the decision to remove spent fuel rods from the reactor at Yongbyon in October, 2002.]
The existence of the idea of the bomb gave inexorable rise to the physical weapon, on the principle that someone would build it eventually and they had to be defended against. And as an idea, a product of human knowledge, the spread of the bomb itself has proved just as insistent. The world marches away from what non-nuclear nations often see as nuclear apartheid and towards a single standard of global mutual assured destruction.
Is this the sort of equality the world has been waiting for?
Yet the picture we're shown is not altogether grim. Though A.Q. Khan's "international enterprise ... a network of companies in many countries" was able to cobble together material for a succesful nuclear weapons program in Pakistan, and be deployed to aid the ambitions of Iran and North Korea, it's still a project of a scale that requires a state. No states have shown themselves willing to start a nuclear exchange in all these many years.
As McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's national security adviser and nuclear historian, is quoted as saying, "in the real world of real political leaders ... to bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable."
Not that there is no danger, but that it has been often misstated, and 'solutions' applied that have only worsened the problem. Thoroughly lost, for example, in the developed world's renewed nuclear ambitions is Schell's obvious point that "nuclear danger is posed above all by nations that possess nuclear weapons, not by those that don't."
Taking the example of the Bush administration, Schell points out how extreme a break with American military and nuclear philosophy they have made. Ending a tradition that sought counter-proliferation through diplomacy, the Bush administration has cast off all international restraint, listing treaties right alongside terrorism as threats to American superiority. They have ended a policy of targeting only specific, credible nuclear threats with targeting the whole world from the new Global Strike command. They have declared as enemy targets any military force that would seek to prevent the entry of US forces into their territory, issuing themselves a blanket, no-knock search warrant for the world.
The image conjured by Schell's eye-opening presentation of the Bush administration's international power grab is a mix of Dr. Evil and Judge Dredd: the "I am the law" presidency. If not for the cost in lives, it would be wholly comic in its overreach, as events in Iraq and Afghanistan have made a joke of global dominance through superior firepower. We are reminded why, "during the Cold War, the idea of "world domination" was still regarded as an intrinsically evil goal, if not an absurd one."
Regardless of how futile it has been for US politicians to get Bush to back away from his war, it has shown once and for all that ultimate safety through pursuit of nuclear arms is an unattainable fantasy. An object lesson that should not be discarded with the rest of the trash as the president leaves office in little less than a year.
Schell says of Bush's failed ambitions that, "A plan for global dominance was a solution on the proper scale, for the problem was and is in its very nature global: the universal pretensions of global empire matched the universal availability of the bomb in the mind." The logic of every country's national defense leads to the result that nuclear capability in one country begets it in another. A double standard can't endure forever under those circumstances, just as the idea of bomb can't be uncreated.
So harking back to the Reagan administration's own exhortations to global disarmament and America's intellectual homage to a tradition of consent in opposition to unilateral action, Schell calls readers to consider the alternate solution of proper scale. If backed up by full inspections and good faith, international monitoring of the nuclear fuel supply, he says there's no reason why proliferation can't be contained and non-state actors forever prevented from acquiring nuclear capacity - a guarantee that can never be offered by the vicious cycle of the permanent arms race.
The Seventh Decade is a look at the arc and motivation of the global nuclear arms race that pays close attention to both political and psychological context, making it a valuable addition to our understanding of global strategic concerns. And with that I welcome Jonathan Schell, here today to share his wicked nuclear knowledge skills with us, along with your questions and comments.
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Welcome Jonathan, welcome Natasha. It’s great to have you both here today.
Jonathan, Natasha, Welcome to the Lake.
Welcome, Jonathan!
You talked in the book about what a mistake it was to conflate the nuclear and terror threats. Could you develop that a bit here?
Hello Jonathan, What is your take on Wolfie’s new role in armaments at State? Does this signal a Cheney win over this group? How much damage can he do?
It’s great to be with you this evening.
Thanks for the invite, glad to be at FDL today :)
“With Enough Shovels” was one of the seminal books of my political coming-of-age. Hard to believe it was 25 years ago. I remember sending it to my Republian mother. She confirmed she got it, that was about it.
I guess I read it for both of us.
The terrorist threat and the nuclear threat do overlap at a very significant point: the one at which leaking nuclear materials fall into the hands of a terrorist group. This is a great and real danger. But it would be mistake to address nuclear danger by trying to round up all the terrorists– something that can’t be done. The promising course is to roll back nuclear weapon technology on a global basis. No nuclear materials, no terrorist bomb.
hello Jonathan and thank you for hosting, Natasha,
Jonathan, I recommend your book to all.
I was surprised to learn there was almost a moment where we did away with all the nukes under Gorbachev and Reagan. …but no cigar.
Welcome Jonathon! Great intro, Natasha — much appreciated.
Having done some graduate study on national security issues and game theory on deterrence, watching the Bush Administration bumble around the foreign policy and national security arena like a drunken elephant has been painful. No finesse. No long term strategy. Just ego-driven blunder after blunder.
I frequently ask myself how we recover from this. One thing that keeps coming to mind is getting back to the deterrent potential of securing the highly non-secure material in the former Soviet Union and getting a handle on the AQ damage beyond the surface level information we know at this point. This book is such a fantastic discussion on what should be — and I wonder how you would prioritize things for the next Administration if you had the opportunity to do so?
The wolfowitz appointment is an astonishing one. He single idea is to attack countries that are trying to get nuclear weapons — that’s why we’re in Iraq. It’s a formula for what I call endless “disarmamen wars” — ones that cannot conceivably prevent the global spread of nuclear weapon technology. That can only be done by diplomatic means, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Let me second your compliment on Natasha’s introduction, whose generosity made it easy for me to like it perhaps. The most important thing a new administration could do would be to make it clear that the goal of American policy is to proceed to a world without nuclear weapons. It’s too late in this seventh decade of the nuclear age to nibble at the edges. Only a commitment by the nuclear powers to get out of the nuclear business will have the heft and clout to persuade others, such as Iran, not to get into it. Otherwise they are looking down others’ nuclear cannons with no defense of their own.
I had a professor as an undergrad who called that “an eye for an eye that may or may not exist at some point” strategy. It was laughable back in the 90s as a sort of stretched out, ludicrous hypothetical that no one would be stupid enough to find valid…not so funny now.
The near-agreement between Gorbachev and Reagan to abolish nuclear weapons at Reykjavik in 1986 is one of the most astonishing — and hopeful — episodes of diplomacy I know of. It was so far outside the official consensus at the time that it was kept sem-hidden. Only now are we in a position to give the two gentleman their due
I keep wondering why Bush gets away with saying that Iran is violating the nuclear no proliferating treaty? They can do civilian nukes, right?
I thought we were the biggest violators of that treaty by not disarming as required.
Discuss. Is that correct? And doesn’t “upgrading” our nukes constitute a violation?
Also, can you address the missile defense ’shield” which seems only good at doing one thing. Sucking up huge amounts of our cash.
Except that even those countries with that nuclear cannon are staring into the abyss of destruction and nuclear winter. Israel for sure would not come out ahead of the deal were it to nuke Iran and the same is true for both India and Pakistan (naming just two of the hot spots with nuclear powers)
Welcome Jonathan and Natasha! what an important discussion this is … and what an honor to have Jonathan here - his work has informed and activated so many of us over the years!
The India/Pakistan stand-off has always seemed to me the hottest of hot spots. With Kashmir as the constantly sparking match.
Iran has a right to all civilian nuclear technology. The U.S. charge against Iran is indirect: for some years it concealed nuclear activity it should have revealed. This is correct, but not reason enough, most nations believe, to suspend the right to civil technology. So Iran refuses, and the United States threatens sanctions or even military action. You point to the root of the problem when you say that our nuclear upgrading definitely defies the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Our proposal is: we can have the bomb forever, and you can’t have, and if you try to get it, we’ll use our nuclear weapons against you. This is a formula that is bound to fail in its own terms.
I’m very curious about the recent Nato lobbying effort which suggests a more nuclear prone stance - and says we should not take first strike off the table. Jonathan, do you have any thoughts on this:
Pre-emptive nuclear strike a key option, Nato told
In South Asia, all the major forms of nuclear danger converge and increase. 1) proliferation: Mr. A.Q Kahn’s proliferation network was a global nuclear technology sale, with a mushroom cloud on one of his brochures
2) Nuclear terrorism: Lots of extreme folks, including the Taliban in the neighborhood, eager to get their hands on Pakistani nuclear technology.
3) Nuclear war: Pakistan has about 70 nuclear bombs, India more than 100, and they can lay waste all South Asia in a few minutes. They have fought four conventional wars so far.
Jonathon — On paper, at least, a lot of the national security and foreign policy advisors to the various Democratic presidential campaigns seem at least cognizant of the volatile spot in which we find ourselves at the moment, partially through our own intransigence, partially through the irrational acts of other states emboldened by our fundamental weaknesses in diplomacy. I know this is always a tough question, given the high power of so many of the advisors that I know are attached, but does any candidate seem to have an advantage on this issue — through their own public work on disarmament/security issues? Or through a particularly good set of advisors?
(Full disclosure, Tony Lake who works as an Obama advisor was a professor and advisor of mine in college. But all of the Dem. candidates have a good compliment of brainpower it seems to me on this issue. The GOP candidates have a fairly frightening contingent of neocons sprinkled about, which is enough of a reason to just say no to them right there…)
Four former NATO generals, including our John Shalikashvili, have called for NATO to have a preempive, first-strike nuclear policy to stop proliferation. Russia no also has a first-strike policy. This carries us back to about 1953 in strategic policy, before even the idea of mutual assured destruction had been born. It is gratuitous insanity, but shows the direction the world will take if we don’t start rolling back nuclear arms on a global basis.
I haven’t read the book but the intro sounds like you deal more with the philosophy and psychology behind nuclear power so my question may be off-topic.
How does the use of depleted uranium fit into the picture?
Probably a lot of Democrats read Mahdi Obeidi’s NYT op-ed about how the Gulf War ended Iraq’s nuclear program for the Republicans in our lives, as well. It probably didn’t go down well to read how completely disarmed Hussein’s Iraq had been.
One of the interesting juxtapositions in Seventh Decade was how, on October 4, 2002, just six days before Congress voted on the AUMF over the potential threat of Iraqi weapons, “North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju had admitted to possessing a uranium enrichment program, in violation of treaty obligations, and furthermore had asserted his country’s perfect right to possess nuclear weapons if it chose to.” That was three days before the president made a major speech outlining his case against Iraq. It wasn’t until October 19, 2002, that the North Korean government linked the news to the press, while the Bush administration didn’t even tell anyone outside the executive branch in our own government.
So as Schell describes it, “Congress unwittingly authorized a war against Iraq, which allegedly possessed WMD programs, yet did nothing to deal with a country that perhaps possessed nuclear weapons and was known to be gearing up to produce more.”
The closeness of the Taliban and the intel services in Pakistan doesn’t exactly give me easy dreams, I have to say. And their involvement in looking the other way with A.Q. Khan ought to give all of us more than pause. Absolutely agree on that one — all that money we’ve been sending to Pakistan without tracking where it has really been going makes me beyond nervous. I have this horrible feeling it’s going to rebound back on us…
Thanks so much. Particularly troubling is all this is the move underway by those here to arm various countries with nuclear power (for profit for companies hereat home). Just the opposite of what we need I think.
Obama and Edwards have embraced the elimination of nuclear weapons, though not with the fanfare that would be required if they were very serious about it. Hillary has not. There is a new initiative by, of all people, former secretary of state George Shultz, Henry Kissinger and others, to reach a nuclear-weapon-free world. They cite Reagan’s efforts at Reykjavik. So far there have been no Republican takers, much as they like to call themselve Reagan’s heirs.
Blowback is the name of the game in nuclear matters. The knowledge and technology for making the Bomb cannot be confined. It was folly in 1945 to think it could be restricted to one power. Now it is folly to think it can be restricted to the existing nine. Also, as you suggest, this old, well-known technology is on the verge spreading beyond terrorists to private hands. The only sane direction is to move toward a single standard: even as all possess the knowledge, none may build the bombs.
The paths to nuclear power and to nuclear weapons are the same except for the final few steps, so nuclear power is a prime vector for proliferation, and its revival increases the nuclear-weapon danger.
There seems to be very little left in the way of international trust right now of the sort needed to advance disarmament. How should that be tackled?
That’s interesting, because it really hasn’t been discussed — it’s often hard to find much distinction between their positions on various issues. How would you describe Clinton’s position vs. Obama’s, particularly with regard to key advisors that either has embraced?
Will anything ever come of the Nunn/Lugar recommendations, do you think? They have done so much work on quantifying problems, but so little attention seems to ever be paid to it. Any thoughts on what they have tried to do — or how it could be done better? Those two are such Beltway insiders, it has always surprised me a bit how little traction they seem to get on this issue.
International trust is certainly at a low ebb. One major reason–though far from the only one — is that the U.S. has tried in recent years to run the show on its own. My optimistic thought, though, is that if we had a change of direction here in the United States, a lot of common ground would instantly become visible, especially on global warming, but also on on economic and disarmament issues.
Curiously, though, the longer we wait, the more the game slips out of American hands. Right now, what the world seems to look to us for more than anyhing else is shopping — so the Chinese and the Indian economies can thrive. I don’t know whether that’s international cooperation or not.
As the US has found out in Oraq. It’s easy to go into another country. Its a hard to stay there, and the US has not yet learnt how to leave (unlike the British from 1958 to 1965, who left on a time table. Ok gents, here are the keys to your country. Good Luck!)
As you know, Nunn-Lugar is the U.S. program to secure loose nuclear material in Russia. It’s a most enlightened and useful program, but it has sharp limitations. How much intrusion with the Russians accept in the long run when it is chafing at U.S. and NATO nuclear and other policies? I rather suspect that sooner rather than later a humiliated-feeling Russia, seeking to restore its prestige, will throw out the American technicians.
OK, that’s how I’ll look at it, as Possibility, because we will have a change in direction
There are a lot of camps proposing nuclear energy as a solution to global warming right now. I think it’s bad policy for reasons of water use and time imperatives, among others, but had thought very little previously about the vector it would be for proliferation. I guess I’ve gotten used to not thinking about this particular danger in that context.
Do you have a read on the motivations for pushing this particular technology as a climate crisis fix?
A “change” to use the current buzz-phrase, does seem likely. What’s worrisome is that all of the candidates choose their advisors from th existing stock, which carry with them so much baggage, from the Cold War and even before, that putting together the kind of radical, concrete proposals we need is tough to do. The danger is that we’ll get the word change but not the thing itself.
I heard an interview this week on Rachel Maddow, the Russian Spy / Mole that worked in the US after 1989, he wrote a book. He stated that spies, informants were paid in nuclear warheads. One scientist was asked where his nuclear warhead was - it was safe, he was still looking for a buyer.
- Scary if true - comment?
There are three objections to nuclear power: a Chernobyl like explosion, burying the wastes, which last hundreds of thousands of years, and proliferation. The third is what I know about it, and rules out for me support for an expansion of nuclear power. Of course that industry wants to expand, but in addition alarmed environmentalists, looking at the real horrors of global warming, want to use nuclear power to get away from fossile-fuel use. I share their concern but wish they would seek another solution.
I’d be surprise if anyone paid a spy in nuclear warheads! What is true is that American, German, British, Turkish, etc., etc. companies have been very happy to turn a buck by providing nuclear technology to such countries as Pakistand the India, which used them to build the bomb.
The toxicity of the nuclear waste is the big one for me. Unless and until that can be addressed, nuclear needs to be left fully alone.
What staggers me is that no one solved the waster problem before we all started using nuclear power. It would be as if you were to cook in the kitchen for fifty years without any garbage can — just sticking the trash in the refrigerator, on the shelves, etc. Let them first solve the waste problem and then come back with proposals for nuclear power.
Jonathon, I must tell you that “The Real War” is, in my opinion, one of the best and most informative books about Vietnam ever written. It ranks up the there with Herr and Halberstam, thank you.
Have you been following the Sibel Edmonds case with her recent claims about administration officials engaging in nuclear secrets trading with the Turkish government, among others, knowing that the information was being resold to countries such as Pakistan?
Jane said:
Just looking at the advisors on the surface for all of them, they are fairly similar on this issue — with some subtle arguments among them. The Lake/Brzezenski pairing with Obama continues to amuse me, though, because I can almost hear them bickering over details on things. Same with any number of the Clinton advisors, all of whom are fairly high profile.
Would love to know if Jonathon or Natasha have any thoughts on that…
I’ve read a few articles about Sibel Edmonds in The Guardian and the London Times. Her reports that U.S. officials were in cahoots with Turkish nationals to deliver nuclear technology to Pakistan and maybe elsewhere look credible but I’ve seen no follow-up so far in the U.S. press. An old story.
There was a good article by Ari Berman in The Nation on Obama’s and Hillary’s advisers. The main distinction seems to be that most of Hillary’s such as Richard Holbrooke, were Iraq war supporters, while Obama advisors, such as Brzezinski opposed it.
Thanks.
Thank you for bringing that up!!
They are both sort of hedging on nuclear power, though Obama’s put more caveats on its use such that if he did work to implement them, it might be a long time coming. And both of them seem to have been quite belligerent on the question of Iran, which is in large part a nuclear issue.
Mr. Schell, a great honor to have you here at FDL.
Jonathan, you mentioned in the book the implacable trend towards people everywhere reasserting self-governance. Do you see that as being part of what’s going on in Pakistan, and what do you think of their recent claims that their nuclear program and materials are secure?
I do see events in Pakistan in the way you suggest. The events there show the primacy of local politics over superpower machinations. Yet it’s hard to be very optimistic as it’s difficult to see how the groups there can put together a coherent peacable state anytime soon. So while the nuclear weapons may be secure in the sense of having good barbed wire fences, the question of what political force will inherit them down the road is up in the air.
I’ll be checking out now, but I’ll look in again every now and then in case the conversation goes on.
Jonathan
Mr. Schell, Thanks for your fine work. Having been a Nation subscriber, I seem to recall reading some of your writing in that magazine. Are you currently a regular contributor to the Nation?
Thanks, Jonathan, it was great having you!
Jonathon, thanks so much for the discussion today and the great book. And a huge thanks to Natasha for such a wonderful intro to the discussion today. Much appreciated, both of you!
Thanks so much for being here, Jonathan. It was a pleasure to have you. And thank you too, Natasha. Great job.
Thanks again for having me. Though lastly, for one more data point in support of Schell’s thesis, this headline today …
Jonathan, Natasha, Jane, Christy, thank you all soo much, what a discussion!