rashomon.jpgPaul Bremer comes to his own defense in an op-ed in the Washington Post entitled "What We Got Right in Iraq " where he defends, among other things, the disbanding of the Iraqi army:

Before the 2003 war, the army had consisted of about 315,000 miserable draftees, almost all Shiite, serving under a largely Sunni officer corps of about 80,000. The Shiite conscripts were regularly brutalized and abused by their Sunni officers. When the draftees saw which way the war was going, they deserted and, like their officers, went back home. But before the soldiers left, they looted the army's bases right down to the foundations.

So by the time I arrived in Iraq, there was no Iraqi army to disband. Some in the U.S. military and the CIA's Baghdad station suggested that we try to recall Hussein's army. We refused, for overwhelming practical, political and military reasons.

[]

So, after full coordination within the U.S. government, including the military, I issued an order to build a new, all-volunteer army. Any member of the former army up to the rank of colonel was welcome to apply. By the time I left Iraq, more than 80 percent of the enlisted men and virtually all of the noncommissioned officers and officers in the new army were from the old army, as are most of the top officers today. We also started paying pensions to officers from the old army who could not join the new one — stipends that the Iraqi government is still paying.

Now I wasn't there but Rajiv Chandrasekaran was and he tells a somewhat different tale in Imperial Life in the Emerald City.  As I wrote during our Book Salon coverage of the book:

[Bremer's] de-Baathification of the government was a model of efficiency compared to the dissolution of the Iraqi army that put put between 250,000-300,000 military personnel on the street.  As Chandrasekaran tells the story, Bush had approved a plan to disband the Republican guard but retain the regular army.  The Central Command dispatched planes over Iraq to drop leaflets telling soldiers not to fight, to "stay home with their families" — which is exactly what they did as the American tanks rolled into Baghdad:

Despite the leaflets instructing them to go home, [civilian in charge of the Iraqi military Walter] Slocombe had expected Iraqi soldiers to stay in their garrisons.  Now he figured that calling them back would cause even more problems. The bases had been looted, so there was no place for them to live.  And he assumed that most  of the army's rank and file, who were Shiite conscripts, wouldn't want to come back anyway. If there had been proper barracks, only corrupt Sunni officers keen to retain their positions of authority would have returned.  As far as Slocombe and Feith were concerned, the Iraqi army had dissolved itself; formalizing the dissolution wouldn't contradict Bush's directive.

[]

Eleven days after he arrived in Iraq, Bremer issued CPA order Number 2, which dissolved not just the army but the air force, the navy, the Ministry of Defense, and the Iraqi Intelligence Service.  With the scrawl of his signature, he created legions of new enemies.

Bremer eventually announced that army officers who were not senior Baathists would receive monthly stipends and a new army of 40,000 infantrymen would be formed to guard Iraq's borders, but it was too little too late:

In a land of honor and tradition, the viceroy had disrespected the old soldiers. I never ran into Omri again, but months later, I did see another former soldier who had been at the protest.

"What happened to everyone there?" I asked.  "Did they join the new army?"

He laughed.

"They're all insurgents now," he said.  "Bremer lost his chance." 

I have no proof that one tale is more valid than the other, although one does sound a whole lot more plausible.  And the Washington Post opinion section is given of late to publishing weird, self-serving, fact-free NeoCon tripe by people seeking to absolve themselves for responsibility for this disastrous war.  But considering the fact that Chandrasekaran was in Iraq as Bureau Chief for the Washington Post and continues to work at the paper as an assistant managing editor, and his widely read and respected reporting paints a whole different picture from what Bremer is claiming, you have to wonder what posessed them to run this op-ed unchallenged.

Or not.   The opinion section of the Washington Post seems to have severed its ties with the Reality Based Community some time ago.

Related posts:

  1. The End of the Delusion in Iraq
  2. The Major General’s Temper Tantrum
  3. Report Confirms Poor Electrical Work by KBR Endangers US Troops in Iraq and Afghanistan
  4. In Iraq, As in So Many Contexts, Withdrawal is Victory
  5. Torture: Obama Heeded Maliki on Abuse Photos, Says McClatchy; What That Says for Our Occupation