daveb @ 124

simp@17, wordsmith@64,Tap Duncan@106 and Redshift@81.

According to the SSCI report, Plame is responsible for suggesting that Wilson be sent. To say that she only conveyed the offer is wrong.

…however, interviews and documents provided to the Committee indicate that his wife, a CPD employee, suggested his name for the trip. The CPD reports officer told Committee staff that the former ambassador’s wife “offered up his name” and a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of the CPD on February 12, 2002, from the former ambassador’s wife says, “my husband has good relations with both the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of
activity.”

Great catch daveb! Where’d you find that! Cool.

Also, from the report to Grossman from Ford after Grossman asked Ford about the trip at the behest of Libby, Ford reports:

“In a February 19, 2002, meeting convened by Valerie Wilson, a CIA WMD manager and the wife of Joe Wilson, he previewed his plans and rationale for going to Niger but said he would only go if the Department thought his trip made sense (Tab 1). Both the memo of this meeting prepared by INR’s West AFtrica analyst (now in Pakistan) and other material indicate that the CIA believed the Ambassador and the Embassy were unlikely to ferret out the truth from their NIgerien contacts. INR strongly demurred from this view at the February 19 meeting. We have no record of any other INR written or personal contact with Wilson regarding Nigerien uranium.

The impetus for the Ambassador’s demarches in this period and the investigative trip by Joe Wilson (Tab 4 is the CIA account of this trip findings) was a “report of questionable credibility from a foriegn service.” This was INR’s conclusion in an assessment of March 1, 2002, entitled “Niger: Sale of Uranium to Iraq is Unlikely.” In a May 8, 2002 INR assessment of Iraq’s WMD and missle programs, we noted “There have been provocative allegations of Iraqi nuclear activities, such as an alleged contract for the provision of uranium from Niger, but we regard such information as questionable.”

But Ford also states in this report that it is based on paper and electronic files and the recollections of those “at the margins”. “The two INR staff members who were most involved” (i.e. present at the meeting) ” are not here (one reassigned to Pakistan and another on leave) to guide us through these emails.”

Even the notes are vague and certainly suggest that they were second-hand.

Exhibit DX71.5 appended to fords assessment “Notes- Niger/Iraq Uranium meeting CIA 2/19/02″ opens with the odd statement “Meeting apparently convened by Valerie Wilson, a Cia Managerial type and wife of Amb. Wilson…”

“APPARENTLY CONVENED”?????

That desn’t appear to be the notes of someone who was present at the meeting? It seems that these are based on some other documents, and then these ambivalencies are written up by Ford as stating that Plame CONVENED the meeting.

And these selfsame documents were used by the SSIC!

Who has bothered to interview the CIA and others who were there? DID Plame convene the meeting? Did she lead the meeting? What does “convene” mean” (simply introduce her husband and give his bona fides/background?).

The references to Plame suggesting her husband for a mission relate to the 1999 trip…not the 2002 trip. The SSIC makes reference to confusion in the memories of some on this issue, I recall.

I have always thought that the misleading early news reports of Wilson’s trip (suggesting that Cheney had sent him) pushed the VP right off the rails. He knew he had squashed, misdirected, stove-piped and lied about intel in order to promote his little war, but by god he NEVER sent any lefty ambassador anywhere! This was something Cheney could really get his teeth into – a true denial. Also, like arrogant people everywhere, he simply could not stand being accused of something he really, really, really didn’t do (burdened as he is by all the awful things he IS guilty of).

So, Cheney, nuts already and furious at the hammering he’s getting over Iraq, just decides to let ‘er rip. Personal attack was his strategy, and Libby was his weapon. As Andrew Sullivan recently said, speaking of Bush/Cheney, but it applies equally to the whole bunch, “these are indecent men” [and women!].

And I agree with the comments above re:Libby setting Ari up. The government has all those categories of secrecy, but “hush-hush”? Man, I bet Ari is pissed off.

From Global Security dot org

simp@17, wordsmith@64,Tap Duncan@106 and Redshift@81.

According to the SSCI report, Plame is responsible for suggesting that Wilson be sent. To say that she only conveyed the offer is wrong.

…however, interviews and documents provided to the Committee indicate that his wife, a CPD employee, suggested his name for the trip. The CPD reports officer told Committee staff that the former ambassador’s wife “offered up his name” and a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of the CPD on February 12, 2002, from the former ambassador’s wife says, “my husband has good relations with both the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity.”

My point is that SHE (Plame) is not the one responsible for AUTHORIZING the expenditure of sending Wilson to Niger, nor was she part of WHOMEVER, who ultimately made the decision he was the one to send to Niger.

For the non-lawyer, criminal-trial-impared out here (e.g. me), I guess I would just like to see the legal eagles lay this out.

If there were no defense to come, I would say yeah, the jury will follow Fitz’s lead – just as the Grand Jury did. The problem is that there _will_ be a defense, and I am guessing they have at least something since they chose not to plea bargain. Not saying Fitzgerald has to hit a grand slam, but to me Ari’s testimony today was more in the range of a double for the prosecution. Nice, but not decisive.

Perhaps I am wrong on this.

Cranky

6 miles: isn’t this saying the same thing I just said above? That Libbey KNEW…but did NOT pass that knowledge on the Ari? Hence the disclosure of covert agent?

If you open the door and encourage the dog to run outside…YOU LET THE DOG OUT. Don’t blame the DOG for going outside.

Didn’t Libbey let the dog out?

simp@17, wordsmith@64,Tap Duncan@106 and Redshift@81.

According to the SSCI report, Plame is responsible for suggesting that Wilson be sent. To say that she only conveyed the offer is wrong.

…however, interviews and documents provided to the Committee indicate that his wife, a CPD employee, suggested his name for the trip. The CPD reports officer told Committee staff that the former ambassador’s wife “offered up his name” and a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of the CPD on February 12, 2002, from the former ambassador’s wife says, “my husband has good relations with both the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of
activity.”

Great catch daveb! Where’d you find that! Cool.

Also, from the report to Grossman from Ford after Grossman asked Ford about the trip at the behest of Libby, Ford reports:

“In a February 19, 2002, meeting convened by Valerie Wilson, a CIA WMD manager and the wife of Joe Wilson, he previewed his plans and rationale for going to Niger but said he would only go if the Department thought his trip made sense (Tab 1). Both the memo of this meeting prepared by INR’s West AFtrica analyst (now in Pakistan) and other material indicate that the CIA believed the Ambassador and the Embassy were unlikely to ferret out the truth from their NIgerien contacts. INR strongly demurred from this view at the February 19 meeting. We have no record of any other INR written or personal contact with Wilson regarding Nigerien uranium.

The impetus for the Ambassador’s demarches in this period and the investigative trip by Joe Wilson (Tab 4 is the CIA account of this trip findings) was a “report of questionable credibility from a foriegn service.” This was INR’s conclusion in an assessment of March 1, 2002, entitled “Niger: Sale of Uranium to Iraq is Unlikely.” In a May 8, 2002 INR assessment of Iraq’s WMD and missle programs, we noted “There have been provocative allegations of Iraqi nuclear activities, such as an alleged contract for the provision of uranium from Niger, but we regard such information as questionable.”