Every now and again, I still argue with Green Boy, my co-blogger at Needlenose, about whether the invasion and occupation of Iraq was 100% doomed from the start or whether there was some small sliver of a chance (even 1% or so) that a reasonable facsimile of a non-brutal, non-authoritarian government might have been coaxed forth to rule a more-or-less unified country.
There's plenty of reason to think it was always impossible. As I wrote recently, the factions that are fighting now to reign over Iraq's carcass were plotting out their strategies well before the invasion, and none of them were thinking in terms of genuine power-sharing and democratic consensus. Rather, they suspected that Iraq would continue to be a land ruled by the gun and the police who come in the night -- and each of them was determined that, to the greatest extent possible, it would be their guns and their police rather than someone else's.
But those factional plotters didn't necessarily speak for millions of ordinary Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds who had lived in close proximity for decades and undoubtedly wouldn't have minded doing so under a less autocratic regime. If the U.S. had somehow provided enough security to isolate the groups determined to provoke conflict, why wouldn't those people be happy to see Saddam go and have a chance at genuine democracy?
If we could have brought it to them.. If we had any intention of bringing it to them.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran's Imperial Life in the Emerald City is the story of how that 1% chance, if it ever existed, was snuffed out. Instead of public servants who cared about results and helping the people of Iraq -- who could have seen the urgency of providing security and services to create a constituency for our continued presence -- the occupation (known as the Coalition Provisional Authority) was staffed with sheltered twentysomethings like Mark Schroeder:
Schroeder was incredulous when I told him that I lived in what he and others called the Red Zone, that I drove around without a security detail, that I ate at local restaurants, that I visited Iraqis in their homes.
"What's it like out there?" he asked.
And it was run by shallow self-promoters like Jerry Bremer, who pretentiously wore desert combat boots with his business garb even when waiting to be interviewed in Washington, DC (as shown above). Naturally, instead of limiting the influence of the exile-led factions that were scheming to maximize their own power, Bremer got rolled by them:
Bremer and his governance team . . . allowed religious Shiite political leaders, particularly Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, effective veto power over the selection of other Shiite members [of the pre-sovereignty Governing Council]. As a result, several more liberal and secular Shiites favored by the CPA were kept off the council, strengthening the position of SCIRI and Dawa [another exile-led party].
Please welcome Rajiv Chandrasekaran, who will be here to take your questions on the book and his experience in Iraq reporting for the Washington Post.
NOTE FROM MODERATOR: Please keep discussion on topic for this thread, in keeping with FDL guidelines. If you need to post something off-topic, please comment on the prior thread. Thanks all.
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Hello and welcome to the Lake
Mr. Chandrasekaran, thank you so much. You book is a great service to our nation.
Hello everyone. I’m looking forward to a stimulating, if depressing, discussion about Iraq.
RC
Welcome back, Rajiv!
John Casper @ 2
Thanks, John.
I hope my book will help provide Americans with a deeper understanding of just what happened — and how we squandered what little opportunity we had — in Iraq during that crucial first year after the fall of Saddam’s government.
Good find on the Bremer photo, Swopa. And an excellent post.
And you’re right — if there had ever been a chance to make anything out of that shambles the hope was in the billions we supposedly pumped into reconstruction that only went to line the pockets of a bunch of crooks. They took whatever hope was in the situation (virtually none) and guaranteed disaster.
Hi Raj, welcome to the Lake.
I gotta say, this is one of the noisiest books I’ve ever read. I’m always SLAMming it shut and muttering imprecations over it.
They boggle the mind, the tales you tell. It’s hard to believe, the mixture of incompetence, cluelessness and patriotic naivete in the Green Zone.
Here’s something that puzzles me. Can you explain why companies like Parsons so shockingly failed their engineering challenges with schools and hospitals? And why they were paid anyway?
As I was turning the pages of the book all I could think of was “how can they top the last one?” As in, how could they find someone more inexperienced, a bigger ideological idiot to bungle things even worse. One of the ways they make sure that elections can be stolen (in this country) is just to make sure the local system is so screwed up that there is plenty to take advantage of in the event it is needed. It struck me that it wasn’t mere stupidity that kept such a pack of brutal idiots in charge — it served everyone’s purposes, to make sure that there was no oversight and all the contractors got to operate in precisely the way they wanted to.
And I have to say that Jeff Skilling finally getting 24 years the other day gives me a lot of hope in the situation, because a lot of people need to go to jail for this.
Hi Rajiv,
I’ve just finished your book and I’m recommending it to friends. Well done.
One thing I’m curious about is to what extent the Iraqi government is sticking to the mandates that the CPA imposed on the nation? Bremer seemed to be desirous to create a free-market fantasyland out of a socialist state. Any signs of this working outside of the gun & ammo bazaars?
Mommybrain @
7
I didn’t think of it that way but you are right, Mommybrain. It was friggin’ noisy as hell. A lot of “harrumphing.”
I must congratulate Rajiv on a well written and very believable book. I fully agree with Swopa and his comments about the 1% chance being snuffed out. When I left Vietnam over 43 years ago I felt that I had lived through Catch 22, and there is no doubt in my mind that the events described in the book fall into the same category. Now that I have seen and hosted “Iraq for Sale”, and read “Imperial Life in the Emerald City” I have come to the conclusion that the Bush administration through ineptness and greed created the horrible mess we are in today, and have to agree with Congressman Murtha that it is time to get out and let those that live in Iraq sort out the mess our government created. I wonder how the author feels about getting out of Iraq.
Rajiv,
It seems that between waste, corruption, and incompetence, almost everything we (I hate saying that but I’m afraid it’s true) have done in Iraq is garbage — schools, clinics, roads. When we finally do leave, will anything we did or build last? I would very much like it if The Emerald City and our other ‘permanent bases’ fell apart soon after we leave. Any such luck?
Mommybrain @ 7
I think many of the contracting problems are the result of:
1. The failure of the contracting companies to send their best people to Iraq. It’s a dangerous assignment and some of the best and most talented project managers didn’t want to go.
2. There wasn’t enough oversight. The U.S. government officials who were supposed to be overseeing the contracts didn’t do enough to ensure that the contractors were following through on their promises, according to people with knowledge of the process. It wasn’t until the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction began digging did we come to learn of many of these abuses.
3. There are a lot of fly by night Iraqi sub-contracting firms and Western prime contractors sometimes got duped.
4. The process of sub-contracting was rife with bribes and kickbacks, so the best Iraqi firms sometimes didn’t get selected.
Sorry that I haven’t read the book yet- although I will after what’s bein said here.
One question– do you have an answer to the questions about oil and the invasion? What did the administration actually plan to do about the oil- and how did they plan to benefit from it?
Apparently they wanted to auction off all Iraqi govt assets including the oil. How could they be certain that the oil (or contracts for oil) thus auctioned didn’t fall into the hands of the chinese or OPEC countries?
As good as the book was I must agree with Rajiv and his use of the word depressing to describe the days after the Hussein government fell. So many experts that wanted to help, and knew what to do were left out in the cold.
Ray Duray @ 9
Some journalist (perhaps me!) should go through Bremer’s 100 edicts and see how many are being followed by the Iraqi government.
I’ll bet you all the money in my wallet that there’s not a single Iraqi police officer who is enforcing the new, CPA-written traffic code.
As for the economic reforms, I can’t imagine anyone is using the new, 15 percent flat tax. I doubt any Iraqis are even filing tax returns!
As for the privatization of state-owned industries, which was something the CPA wanted to do in the first few months of the occupation, nothing has been sold. I mean, who’s going to buy a factory in Iraq today? What the CPA should have done was to try to repair some of these factories so that people could have gotten back to work. Then, after a few years, the Iraqis could have moved forward with a sale. But as I write, that wasn’t in keeping with the neocon’s vision of the new Iraq.
Was there a good reason, as opposed to so many obvious bad ones, why more Iraqi’s were not hired to do reconstruction work?
Idle hands and all that stuff.
Rajiv: Congratulations on writing such a beautiful and insightful book.
As a journalist myself, I’m especially impressed by how seamlessly you have woven together information from the “before” and “after” portions of the narrative into a coherent story that seems to unfold so effortlessly in “real” time, i.e. the immediate aftermath of the occupation.
I’m curious from a technical point of view as to how much of your material about (a) the backstories of the characters and (b) the behind-the-scenes maneuvering inside the Green Zone you were able to gather while actually there, in the heat of events, and how much of it you had to find after returning to the U.S.?
Also…when is the last time you were in Iraq, and do you have any plans to go back?
Again, IMPERIAL LIFE is a masterful narrative that blows me away, and my hat is off to you for researching and writing it under what were obviously difficult conditions.
HotFlash @ 12
It’s hard to imagine this happening. Even if all U.S. forces redeployed outside of Iraq (at least outside of non-Kurdish-controlled Iraq), it seems very likely that the Iraqi military will take over these bases. That may not be such a bad thing, however. But it does seem unlikely that the U.S. government and the Iraqi government will open up the Green Zone. There will still be an American embassy there, and it’ll need fortress-like protection. And Iraq’s leaders, most of whom live and work inside the Green Zone, will still want to live behind the walls and barbed wire.
Rajiv @
13
I thought the situation you described with Custer Battles really clarified just how wrong and mismanaged the system was. A contract wasput out for bid that was so unrealistic, so rushed that the only people who bid on it were those who either had no idea what they were doing or had no intention of fulfilling the terms of the contract (or in terms of Custer Battles, both).
If the system is screwed from the beginning, doesn’t it deter well-run companies from getting into it?
I’m waiting to comment until I finish the book, Rajiv.
So, about its wake: Have you been contacted to testify to the 110th? What say you about the GOP ending the SP for IR? Will your reporting take you back to Iraq, or will you cover Hill hearings?
Thank you for this contribution (your book and this chat!) to our understanding of what’s been done in our name.
A question for Rajiv — in the book, as well as last week, you described how tightly controlled the CPA was in sticking to an all-is-well message. What were your most useful resources in trying to know what was really going on?
Since this is a blog, I’ll add the parochial follow-up as to whether you kept tabs on Iraqi blogs at all, and how helpful you felt that was.
Welcome Rajiv - and thank you for this amazing book!
I’m about half way through and continue to be stunned be each additional failure.
I still laugh whenever I see someone named a war profiteering company “Custer Battles.”
I mean jeez.
Dale in Alabama @ 18
Thanks, Dale. Very kind of you.
Good question. I was there for the full duration of the occupation. I probably spent more days on the ground in Iraq during the occupation than any other American print reporter. I went inside the Green Zone, and the Republican Palace, countless times, and I met, and interviewed, dozens of people who worked for the CPA and for contracting firms. But in most cases, I got my best material when I returned to the United States and looked them up. Many of them who went as true believers returned to America feeling disillusioned. They had thought that success was just around the corner, that the first democratic elections would be the panacea that Iraq needed. When that didn’t happen, many of them agreed to talk to me, often at length. (Some wanted to speak on a non-for-attribution basis because they still work for the government.) I sometimes spent 4 or 5 hours talking to them. I joke that I offered lots of former CPA staffers free therapy.
The company’s founders are Scott Custer, a former US Army officer and defense consultant, and former CIA officer Michael Battles, who ran for Congress in Rhode Island in 2002 and was defeated in the Republican primary. Battles is a Fox News Channel commentator. [1] Both Custer and Battles are often described in the media as “former US Army Rangers.” In fact, they are both mere graduates of the US Army Ranger course[2], a nine week US Army leadership school, and not former members of the US Army Ranger Regiment[3]. The distinction may seem obscure, but it is an important one for US Army veterans, particularly veterans of the Ranger Regiment, which is one of the US Army’s most elite formations.
Custer Battles was a newly formed company with no experience in the security industry when it landed one of the first contracts issued in Iraq in the spring of 2003 to secure the airport. The no-bid contract was worth $16 million when it was awarded in the chaos after the fall of Saddam Hussein. [4]
On July 1, 2003, the company announced that it would “bring its security training expertise to the State of Maine.” [5]
On April 9, 2004, BBC News reported that a Custer Battles employee and former British soldier, Michael Bloss, “was killed while guarding electrical workers near the town of Hit, west of Baghdad.” [6]
A litany of complaints against Custer Battles can be found in the Forum section of ALI Capital Partners.[7]
Custer Battles is currently banned from further Department of Defense contracting.[8] A qui tam lawsuit has been filed against it by several parties seeking recovery, on behalf of the US, of allegedly fraudulent claims by Custer Battles. A copy of the complaint can be downloaded from here.
Jane Hamsher @ 20
Jane, you’re very correct here. The CPA’s contracting processes were so screwed up — as the Custer Battles case that I write about demostrates — that it’s hard to imagine how this could have worked out. Some of the projects were unrealistic or unnecessary. There wasn’t proper vetting. There wasn’t oversight. It was broken from the very beginning.
Rajiv! Welcome back.
Rajiv … the most chilling part to me was the description of Bernie Kerik’s nightly posses - can you say more about what you think was going on there besides Kerik cowboying?
Swopa @ 22
Some of my best sources were Iraqis — and Iraqi Americans — who worked inside the Green Zone. Some of them saw through the CPA’s foolishness and were more than willing to tell me about it. State Department personnel who worked for the CPA were also good sources. (Yes, Mr. Cheney and Mr. Rumsfeld, you were right to worry about the guys from State. Some of them weren’t willing to keep their mouths shut when they saw things going wrong. They — gasp! — talked to reporters!) Career military officers also leaked tidbits about the CPA. They couldn’t believe the incompetence and many of them wanted the world to know.
I do keep read a number of Iraqi bloggers. For a list, visit my Website, www.rajivc.com.
Rajiv,
Reading your book was deja-vu all over again… Everytime I pulled the book outta the wall, and continued reading, I would realize that I had read this all before - in the “The Ugly American” - with the caveat that somehow things were even worse this time. No offense, but these guys (the present administration) would screw up a gang-bang in a turkish prison (with all due respect for turkish prisons!).
When do we start seeing such stand-up americans like “Custer” and “Battles” spend some rendition time?
And by the way, what was “Battles” actual military experience? You mentioned West Point and the CIA, but me… I ain’t so sure…
Great Book that needed to be written - on something a little sturdier that cardboard and paper…
Hi Rajiv and thank you for your important work– not quite through it yet, though. I want to thank you also for your fine reporting in the Post.
A bit in the same vein as Oilfieldguy’s question @ 17 (which is a great one, btw!) I wonder if you witnessed any resentment or disappointment by the Iraqi people that foreign mercenaries and contractors were making huge bucks while the Iraqis were and are, for the most part, living in abject poverty and in deplorable conditions.
Siun @ 29
If I knew, I would have put it in the book.
He did bust some criminals, but fellow Americans never really knew all that went on at night. That’s why the Military Police officers who were responsible for security in Baghdad wanted him to stop those operations.
Siun @ 29
Oh Jeebus, I think the Bernie Kerick portion of the book deserves its own musical. It is positively mind bogglingly absurd.
The Kerik/early Bremer days just so completely show the lack of any respect or even remotely humane feeling for the Iraqis …
TeddySanFran @ 21
I haven’t been called to testify before Congress. If I am, I’m going to have to decline. Not something I can do as a active duty journalist at The Post. But there’s plenty in the book for investiators to pursue.
I think the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has done some excellent work. It would be a shame to see that office close down.
No trips to Iraq scheduled at this point. I’m now back at The Post as an editor. My bosses want me to stick around the home office for a whlie. Sorry.
Jane Hamsher @ 34
Maybe Judith Regan will underwrite it!
angie @ 32
Oh, sure. Iraqis couldn’t understand why American firms were getting paid millions to do things Iraqi firms could do for thousands. And they knew that the American firms, after collecting their cut, would simply hire Iraqis do to the work but pay them a fraction of what they paid Americans.
I must say I’m rather glad you’re deskbound for now Rajiv! I suspect Iraq might not be a very safe location after the book.
Could you tell us a bit about your background and how you came to be such a good reporter?
Rajiv @ 36
zing!
I didn’t know reporters were authorized to have a sense of humor!
By the way, that is my own lame attempt at humor. Good one Rajiv.
Siun @ 39
My bio:
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, the author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City, is an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post. He heads The Post’s Continuous News department, which reports and edits breaking news stories for washingtonpost.com, and he helps to shape the newspaper’s overall multimedia strategy.
From April 2003 to October 2004, he was The Post’s bureau chief in Baghdad, where he was responsible for covering the American occupation of Iraq and supervising a team of Post correspondents. He lived in Baghdad for much of the six months before the war, reporting on the United Nations weapons-inspections process and the build-up to the conflict.
He took a sabbatical from The Post in 2005 to serve as the journalist in residence at the International Reporting Project at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies in Washington and as a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington.
Before the U.S.-led war in Iraq, he was The Post’s Cairo bureau chief. Prior to that assignment, he was The Post’s Southeast Asia correspondent, based in Jakarta, Indonesia. In the months following September 11, 2001, he was part of a team of Post reporters who covered the war in Afghanistan.
He joined The Post in 1994 as a reporter on the Metropolitan staff. He subsequently served as the paper’s Washington-based national technology correspondent. A native of the San Francisco Bay Area, he holds a degree in political science from Stanford University, where he was editor in chief of The Stanford Daily. He lives in Washington, D.C.
Rajiv,
You wrote that “(fixing Iraq’s industry)wasn’t in keeping with the neocon’s vision of the new Iraq.”
Let’s play devil’s advocate for a second. Here’s a version of “the neocon vision” that doesn’t show up in the NYT or WaPo.
Say that you were primarily interested in two goals, maximizing the plunder of Iraq’s oil and lebensraum for Israeli settlers.
For proof that the plunder of the oil is the primary goal, we have the FOIA documents acquired by Judicial Watch from Dick Cheney’s 2001 “energy blueprint” which assigned Iraq’s oilfield to various “friends of Dick”.
Proof of the second would be “A Clean Break”, a plan written for Binyamin Netanyahu by Richard Perle, among other neocons calling for an attack upon and the dismemberment of Iraq.
The first thing you’d do would be to weaken the enemy with a sanction regime. Done. The next would be to conquer the terrain. Done. Third, maximizing the chaos inside Iraq is brilliant for furthering the de-population of the targeted area. Those who can afford to do so are creating a huge exodus from Iraq today. Those unfortunates left behind are now engaged in bloody internecine conflicts that will sap the strength of the coming generation of Iraqis. Sending in P2OG (Proactive Preemptive Operations Group) or SAS covert operatives to stir up sectarian unrest would be helpful to further this goal.
In the meantime, the Turks continue to plan their Southeast Anatolian Project which will effectively de-water Iraq by 2050.
See: http://preview.tinyurl.com/y8nd4n
As I see it, the people of Iraq are doomed. Far too many eyes are on their resource prizes.
See: http://www.thinkingpeace.com/Lib/lib062.html
To paraphrase Randy Newman, we ought to just drop the big one now. It’ll save us endless decades of futile debate.
Oh, and about rebuilding Iraq’s industries? Sure, just as long as they can be rebuilt in Amman, Tehran or Damascus. The Pentagon is in need of some target practice.
Rajiv @ 37
Rajiv I think you could have a future in this blogging business.
ceabaird @ 31
Take a read (if you missed this development):
Verdict Against Iraq Contractor Overturned
Occupation Authority’s Murky Status Cited
By Renae Merle
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, August 19, 2006; D01
A federal judge threw out a $10 million jury verdict against an American company accused of overcharging on an Iraq reconstruction contract after concluding that the now-defunct Coalition Provisional Authority was not a U.S. government entity.
The civil fraud suit against Custer Battles LLC, which has offices in Northern Virginia, arose out of the chaotic 14-month period during which the authority governed Iraq after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.
Using federal whistle-blower laws, a former employee and a subcontractor claimed Custer Battles created phony Cayman Islands companies to overcharge the authority on a contract to furnish Iraq with a new currency. The firm denied the claim.
Although a jury found the company guilty, U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis III ruled on review that the firm could not be sued under the federal False Claims Act because of the ambiguous structure of the authority, which issued the contract. The judge also concluded that the way in which the company had been paid distanced it from the U.S. government.
He said there was ample evidence that the company had submitted “false and fraudulently inflated invoices” but found that the nature of the Coalition Provisional Authority precluded a fraud claim. Ellis signed his ruling Wednesday; it was made public yesterday.
Although “the CPA was principally controlled and funded by the U.S., this degree of control did not rise to the level of exclusive control required to qualify as an instrumentality of the U.S. government,” the 23-page ruling said. “In fact, the evidence clearly establishes that it was created through and governed by international consent.”
The case is one of several to emerge from the $21 billion U.S. reconstruction effort as complaints emerge about sole-source contracts and allegations of fraud and corruption. The office of the special inspector general for Iraq Reconstruction has referred more than 20 criminal cases to the Justice Department for prosecution and has said that the authority’s financial systems were so flimsy that billions of dollars could not be accounted for.
The Custer Battles litigation was brought under a separate anti-fraud law that allows citizens to sue on behalf of the government. It is not known whether any similar cases have been brought against contractors for the CPA. Such matters are sealed until the Justice Department decides whether to join the suit, which it did not in the Custer Battles case.
The Justice Department declined to comment on the ruling or its possible impact on other cases.
The plaintiffs in the Custer Battles suit, Robert Isakson and William Baldwin, will appeal, said their attorney, Alan M. Grayson. “If you want to make a list of all the things the Bush administration has screwed up, they created this Frankenstein entity called the Coalition Provisional Authority,” Grayson said.
“CPA was created by the U.S. government, run by largely U.S. employees. This ruling could stand logic on its head,” said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). “It’s a setback for accountability.”
Custer Battles was founded by Scott Custer, a former Army Ranger, and Michael Battles, a West Point graduate who served in the CIA. The company grew rapidly after the Iraq war as it was awarded CPA contracts.
The company’s owners are “ecstatic,” said their attorney, Robert Rhoad.
Thanks Rajiv!
Looks like you’re doing Stanford proud!
Your ease about living outside the green zone and actually - gasp - connecting with Iraqis is so refreshing in the book … and precisely what is missing in so much of the coverage and policy that we are exposed to.
Jane - I think you are right and hope we get first dibs on any Rajiv blogging in the future!
Zing! POW!
Rajiv, you need your own blog with snark like that.
It would be difficult to write such a book without using a flamethrower.
Rajiv, about that IG for Iraqi reconstruction…
The other day Senators Collins and Lieberman were asked who put the bit about getting rid of him in the bill and they both denied it and said they did not know who did it, but maybe it was on the House side and maybe a staffer did it.
I wonder if anyone (you?) on the Post staff will pursue this mystery.
I am glad that they have introduced legislation to restore Bowen’s position, but I think it more than a little “odd” that nobody seems to know how this bit was inserted.
Here’s a great excerpt from the book (p. 35). Remember Jay Garner, who was in charge of post-invasion Iraq for the first three months? Meet the guy so incompetent that Garner had enough time to fire him:
angie @ 49
I thought Jim Glanz’s story in the NYT (Yes, I read the competition!) was very good on this. It was on the front page last week (or was it week before last?). Check it out.
Garner certainly looks like a whiz kid compared to Bremer who is one scary weird dude!
angie @ 49
I would be interested to know the answer to that one too, Rajiv. Is it something you’re looking into?
On Friday on NPR’s All Things Considered, they featured author William Polk, who co-authored “Out of Iraq, a Practical Plan for Withdrawal Now” with retired Senator George McGovern. It was the first person I’ve heard who seemed to be talking sense about how to get out of there with minimal loss of life on both sides.
I was wondering if you’re familiar with the book and what your thoughts are on its thesis.
Rajiv,
Based on your experiences living in Iraq, do you think that a different approach from the git go - actually helping, using Iraqi labor and experience, involving them and spending money in the reconstruction process, might have worked? Or are the problems of Iraq unconquerable?
Rajiv @ 51
As I recall the article was good but had no satisfactory answer to that particular question, who put the axe into him.
Swopa @ 50
So long as we’re doing excerpts, here’s one of my favorite passages…..
Stratcomm, as it was called in the palace, was the CPA’s public relations office. It was run by Daniel Senor, a lanky thirty-two-year-old with a receding hairline and a you’re-either-with-us-or-against-us attitude toward journalists. He arrived in Iraq with Garner but stayed on after Bremer arrived. His press relations experience was limited to a stint as a spokesman for a senator, but Senor was an ardent Republican and soon became a trusted member of the viceroy’s inner circle. He helped Bremer, a fellow Harvard Business School graduate, decide when to hold press conferences, which journalists to grant interviews, and what photo opportunities were worth a dangerous trip outside the Green Zone.
As the occupation wore on, Senor became the most visible CPA official after Bremer. Clad in a suit, he held televised press briefings several times a week in the Convention Center. The briefing room was decorated by a White House image consultant, who was flown to Baghdad to specify the dimensions and location of the backdrop — a gold seal emblazoned with the words Coalition Provisional Authority. The consultant also had two big-screen plasma televisions affixed to the wall so Senor could play video clips. While other CPA officials waited months for equipment and staff to arrive from the United States, the press room’s needs were quickly met.
Behind the podium, Senor never conceded a mistake, and his efforts to spin failures into successes sometimes reached the point of absurdity. “The majority of Iraqis . . . do they want the coalition forces to leave? They say no,” he once said. The CPA’s own polls suggested just the opposite. Asked why Iraq had such interminable lines at gas stations, he insisted it was “good news” — more Iraqis were driving because the CPA had allowed the import of a quarter-million new cars. He made no mention of the CPA’s delays in getting Halliburton and other contractors to solve the problem by repairing refineries. When Senor was frank, it was never for publication. In April 2004, a few reporters asked him about a paroxysm of violence that had Americans hunkering in the Green Zone. “Off the record: Paris is burning,” he told them. “On the record: Security and stability are returning to Iraq.”
Senor couldn’t speak Arabic. When an Iraqi journalist asked a question, the cameras captured Senor lifting a pair of earphones so he could listen to a translation. His language handicap made some briefings almost comical. Basic queries posed by Iraqi reporters — When will you pay pensions? When will electricity production increase? — were often unsatisfactorily answered because the question or the response was mangled by a translator. Other requests for information about government services were punted to the Governing Council, to perpetuate the myth that it had real authority. The Governing Council’s press office was inept, so the Iraqi reporters rarely received an adequate answer.
Senor’s briefings were intended for an American audience. He talked about visits by congressional delegations and cabinet secretaries. There was another session for Arabic speakers, but it was conducted by a Brit who regurgitated day-old items from Senor’s talking points, a slight that rankled many Iraqi journalists. “The Iraqis want to know what is happening in Iraq,” a correspondent for one of Baghdad’s largest newspapers groused after a Senor briefing. “But all he talks about is American politics.”
Thanks Rajiv, I did read Glanz’s story, but…
like Jane said at 56.
I really think the American people need to know.
TRex @ 54
I have to confess that I haven’t read it yet, so I can’t comment. It’s on my nightstand.
angie @ 58
You’re right. I just looked it up and it doesn’t answer the question you pose. I have to admit that I don’t know the answer either. I hope someone is digging into this.
Rajiv 57 — I like this part:
No comment necessary, I think.
Mommybrain @ 55
I think that if we did things differently — and better — the situation wouldn’t be as bad as it is over there. But even if we had done everything right, I don’t think we could have prevented an insurgency or sectarian fighting.
Oilfieldguy asks: “Was there a good reason, as opposed to so many obvious bad ones, why more Iraqi’s were not hired to do reconstruction work?”
Without access to classified DoD plans, I would suggest that this is a psyops designed to demoralize the Iraqi population. Providing work for a population you’re attempting to turn into refugees is counterproductive.
Ray Duray @ 63
I have a sneaking suspicion that you are right; same thing is happening in Afghanistan…
I would not be so gentle. They behave like carney barkers, WWF rassling announcers and used car salsemen. Feh.
The difference of course is measured in lives lost. It’s all about the pitch to them, though.
Unfortunately, I’m going to have to log off now. I’m sorry I can’t stay longer. But keep firing away with questions and comments. I’ll read them later tonight and send a response to Jane, who can post it if she wants.
Thanks to everyone for reading the book and for all of your thoughtful comments and questions. It’s been an honor and pleasure to participate in this forum.
If you want to contact me, or if you want to know more about the book, please visit www.rajivc.com
Bests,
RC
Rajiv - thank you! for your time and for your very good book!
Ooh, thanks, Rajiv. That Senor excerpt raises another question I wanted to ask:
You have a great chapter on the eruption of violence in Sadr City at about this time, but I believe this passage is also referring to a massive ambush of a Halliburton convoy in Anbar province that led to a severe supply shortage for Americans. Can you tell us more about this time period?
(Update: Oops, too late… hopefully you can respond via Jane.)
Rajiv, thanks so much for joining us here today. And if you send me further responses I will gladly post them. It is, as I’ve mentioned before, a topic we’re going to be writing a lot more about.
And thanks to Swopa for a thoughtful post, much appreciated.
Swopa @ 68
Ditto, I would like to know more about this.
Angie,
I think this policy directive is still essentially operative in Iraq:
http://preview.tinyurl.com/1i6v
As Lily Tomlin suggests, “no matter how cynical I get, it’s hard to keep up.”
angie and Ray,
I keep falling into the default position of denying our government, meaning us, would be so sinister as to create a market for those who feed on misery.
Maybe those who feed have smooth voices and nice smiles and sound really really reasonable inside an echo chamber. After all, they bought their admission ticket.
And Jane, thank you for having such a wonderful blog to attract such talent. Understanding our past is necessary to plan for the future.
kudos to you and Christy
and TRex
and Pach
and all these great commenters.
Jane, thanks again for making Sunday’s Book Salon a must read.
Met a 4-month old poodle yesterday and fell in love. Alas, she belongs to another so I’m doomed to admire her from afar.
To put all of this in perspective, MFI has an article from the UN News service on the condition of children in Iraq -
http://gorillasguides.blogspot.....ctims.html
Thank you Rajiv and FDL.
Thank you Ray Duray for the link and OFG.
I do think that Iraq and Afghanistan are meant to be “empty spaces”.
I read that from MFI, Siun.
;(
Swopa @
50
Sounds like Major Major from Catch 22
even the lead in to this book gives incredible insight.
hard to believe there was only a once percent chance or less this cojuld have gone well
I would prefer to think that IF the president secured their treasure FOR THEM, and IF the reconstruction was doled to IRAQI’S, and IF we had a capable secretary of defense, and IF we actually had a coalition, then good might have come from this campaign
sadly, we will never find out, will we.
so what’s really left?
what will become of Iraq when we leave?
is it doomed to anarchy and destruction, self distruction and international destruction at the hands of those countries too afraid to allow the anarchy to continue?
water is wet, there is nothing we can do about that…is this now a war of generations with nothing to do about it?
There have been 2,865 deaths of US soldiers in Iraq. In the past 4 months, they have ranged from 70 to 100 per month, with 40 so far at the 2/3 mark in November.
After 135 more American soldiers die, we will hit another milestone: 3,000 deaths.
At a rate of 60/month, that will come one week after the President’s Jan. 20 State of the Union Address to Congress.
At a rate of 70/month, that will come a few days before the State of the Union Address.
At a rate of 80/month, George W. Bush will hit the 3,000 mark less than a week after the Jan. 4 opening of the new Congress.
At a rate of 90/month, we will reach 3,000 deaths, 135 more men and women will have died by the day that the new Congress opens.
This is macabre arithmetic, I will be first to admit.
And I wish that there would be not one more death of an American or an Iraqi or a mercenary contractor.
But there will be, and that horrible 3,000 figure will most likely arrive during the month of January.
Who will be the “last man (or woman) to die for a mistake” in Iraq?
Probably number 3,500 or number 4,000. But by then we will be on our way out and the helicopters will have lifted off the roofs of buildings in the Green Zone, in the Emerald City.
Meanwhile, we can steel ourselves for number 3,000 — in January.
and uncounted numbers of Iraqis … uncounted.
Rajiv’s book should be required reading for all … such a tale of shame.
Oilfieldguy writes: “I keep falling into the default position of denying our government, meaning us, would be so sinister as to create a market for those who feed on misery.”
To date myself, I was a subscriber to I.F. Stone’s Weekly in the 1960s. Myra MacPherson has a new bio out on Izzy titled “All Governments Lie!”